State v. Williams

Decision Date07 December 2010
Docket NumberNo. COA10-58.,COA10-58.
PartiesSTATE of North Carolina v. Jarvis Leon WILLIAMS.
CourtNorth Carolina Court of Appeals

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 1 September 2009 by Judge Calvin E. Murphy in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 September 2010.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Daniel D. Addison, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.

Don Willey, Jefferson, for defendant-appellant.

MARTIN, Chief Judge.

Defendant was indicted upon charges of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine and of having attained the status of an habitual felon. Defendant pled not guilty.

At trial, the evidence tended to show that on 2 April 2008, a confidential informant told Sergeant Brian Scharf that a black male named Jarvis was selling cocaine from the front porch of 429 Heflin Street. The informant told the officer that the cocaine was located in a hanging flower pot. Sergeant Scharf and Officer Gilliland responded to the tip by driving to 429 Heflin Street, where they saw defendant sitting on the front porch. They also observed a hanging flower pot. Sergeant Scharf saw a small plastic bag sticking out of the flower pot. He handcuffed defendant and searched him. During the search of defendant, he found and collected $195 in small denominations. He retrievedthe bag out of the flower pot. The bag contained a substance which Sergeant Scharf believed to be crack cocaine.

At the police station, defendant made the following statement to the police:

[t]he cocaine that Officer Scharf found at 429 Heflin Street was put there by a black male named Chris. He put it there to sell it. When I got there, Chris told me the cocaine was there so I could sell it for him until he got back. I sold about thirty or forty dollars worth today. The cocaine was not mine. The cocaine was in a clear plastic bag in a flower pot hanging from the porch ceiling.

Sergeant Scharf testified that, during the course of his eleven-year employment at Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD), he had received training in the identification of drugs and controlled substances. He had been trained to identify crack cocaine "[b]y the way it looks, by the way it's shaped, by the way it's packaged, the color." He testified that crack cocaine has "a certain smell to it because it's made with powder cocaine chemicals, bringing it together to make it a hard substance to be able to ingest it by smoking it." He stated that he has identified substances and then had lab results confirming his identifications that were "accurate a hundred percent of the time." Scharf testified that, over the course of his career, he had participated in "[o]ver a thousand" drug and narcotic arrests—between three quarters and two thirds of which involved crack cocaine—and that each time, he observed the substance. He testified that he believed that the substance seized from the flower pot in the present case was crack cocaine.

Officer Gilliland testified that, during the course of his eight year employment at CMPD, he had also received training in identifying substances and drug paraphernalia. He testified that he had been directly involved in approximately 75 arrests that involved cocaine or crack cocaine. He then testified that "Scharf retrieved the baggie from the flower pot, which had crack cocaine in it." Gilliland confirmed that he had been able to observe the bag's contents.

At trial, over defendant's objection, CMPD crime lab forensic chemist Ann Charlesworth detailed the process that chemists in the lab follow when testing substances. She explained that forensic chemists first conduct a preliminary color test on a substance, and then extract a small amount of the substance to put with a solvent in a GC Mass Spec instrument. Charlesworth testified that in this case a color test was done twice and a GC Mass Spec test was done once. She testified that these are the same tests that she and other experts in her field reasonably rely upon when forming an opinion as to the weight and nature of substances.

Charlesworth explained that the GC Mass Spec generates a graphical result which a forensic chemist must interpret. Chemists look at retention time, which is specific for each chemical substance, and the graphical result from the GC Mass Spec, in order to see how well the graph matches the known standard for the substance.

Once a chemist has completed his or her analysis of a substance, all cases are then peer reviewed. In explaining what is done during a peer review, Charlesworth testified:

I look at a worksheet and see what the description of the item was, how much the item weighed, and what tests were conducted. And then I also look at the instrument printouts from the GC Mass Spec, and I interpret those and see if I agree with the results that the chemist came up with, and then I look at the report and make sure it looks to be correct.

Charlesworth stated that she conducted the same type of review that she would have had she been the peer-reviewer. She agreed with the original forensic chemist, DeeAnne Johnson, "that from the printouts from the GC Mass Spec that the cocaine did come out, and it chemically matche[d] with the cocaine standard ... in [the] library."

On cross-examination, it was clarified that Charlesworth herself did not analyze the substance itself. Nor was Charlesworth present on 16 September 2008 when the tests were run. Charlesworth also did not generate her own report. Rather, she explained that it was her role to assure that Johnsonfollowed the protocol and procedures to correctly analyze the substance.

On 1 September 2009, the jury found defendant guilty of possession with intent to sell and/or deliver cocaine. Defendant then pled guilty to being an habitual felon. He was sentenced to 107 to 138 months' imprisonment.

_________________________

Defendant appeals, arguing that the testimony of Charlesworth violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. We agree.

This Court reviews alleged violations of constitutional rights de novo. State v. Tate, 187 N.C.App. 593, 599, 653 S.E.2d 892, 897 (2007). Under the de novo standard of review, this Court "considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the [trial court]." In re Appeal of the Greens of Pine Glen Ltd. P'ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003) (citing Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cty. Planning Bd., 356 N.C. 1, 13, 565 S.E.2d 9, 17 (2002)).

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. Our Court in State v. Brewington, --- N.C.App. ----, 693 S.E.2d 182 (2010), recently traced the lineage of the Confrontation Clause as it applies to situations where a chemist testifies to a "peer review" of tests done by other chemists. See id. at ----, 693 S.E.2d at 187-88 (discussing State v. Galindo, --- N.C.App. ----, 683 S.E.2d 785 (2009), State v. Mobley, ---N.C.App. ----, 684 S.E.2d 508 (2009), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 809, 692 S.E.2d 393 (2010), State v. Davis, --- N.C.App. ----, 688 S.E.2d 829 (2010), State v. Hough, --- N.C.App. ----, 690 S.E.2d 285 (2010), and State v. Brennan, --- N.C.App. ----, 692 S.E.2d 427 (2010)). After discussing the development of this line of cases, the Brewington Court noted that:

[c]onfrontation is designed to weed out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent one as well. Serious deficiencies have been found in the forensic evidence used in criminal trials. Like expert witnesses generally, an analyst's lack of proper training or deficiency in judgment may be disclosed in cross-examination.
... [T]he purpose of requiring the analysts themselves testify is so that their honesty, competence, and the care with which they conducted the tests in question could be exposed to testing in the crucible of cross-examination. Thus, to allow a testifying expert to reiterate the conclusions of a non-testifying expert would eviscerate the protection of the Confrontation Clause.

Id. at ----, 693 S.E.2d at 189 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court then went on to describe a four-pronged test which applies in these cases:

(1) determine whether the document at issue is testimonial; (2) if the document is testimonial, ascertain whether the declarant was unavailable at trial and defendant was given a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant; (3) if the defendant was not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the unavailable declarant, decide whether the testifying expert was offering an independent opinion or merely summarizing another non-testifying expert's report or analysis; and (4) if the testifying expert summarized another non-testifying expert's report or analysis, determine whether the admission of the document through another testifying expert is reversible error.

Id.

Turning now to the present case, it is clear that the report detailing the tests done by Johnson and then "peer reviewed" and testified about by Charlesworth is testimonial. See Melendez-Diaz v. Mass., ---U.S. ----, ----, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2531, 174 L.Ed.2d 314, 321 (2009) (noting that testimonial evidence includes " 'statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial' ") (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1364, 158 L.Ed.2d 177, 193 (2004)). Moreover, there is nothing in the record supporting any conclusionthat defendant was given the opportunity to cross-examine Johnson.

This brings us to the third prong of the test: determining whether Charlesworth was offering an independent opinion or merely summarizing Johnson's report. Defendant argues that Charlesworth merely summarized Johnson's results, thus making this a case similar to Brennan, --- N.C.App. at ----, 692 S.E.2d at 431 (hol...

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