State v. Williams

• Citation: 991 P.2d 107,98 Wash.App. 765
• Decision Date: 10 January 2000
• Docket Number: No. 41494-1-I.,41494-1-I.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Chris WILLIAMS, Appellant.

991 P.2d 107

98 Wash.App. 765

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Chris WILLIAMS, Appellant.

No. 41494-1-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

January 10, 2000.

Gregory Charles Link, Seattle, for Appellant.

Ann Marie Summers, Seattle, for Respondent.

Pamela Beth Loginsky, Wa Asst. Pros. Atty., Olympia, Amicus Crime Defense.

Gene M. Grantham, Seattle, Amicus Pros. Atty.

Aaron H. Caplan, for amicus curiae American Civil Liberities Union of Washington.

AGID, A.C.J.

Chris Williams was charged in King County District Court with harassment in violation of two provisions of the state harassment statute, RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i) and (iv). After a jury found him guilty, Williams appealed to the King County Superior Court, which affirmed the conviction. This court granted discretionary review. On appeal, Williams contends that (1) the statute under which he was convicted is overbroad and void for vagueness, (2) there was insufficient evidence to convict him, and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

FACTS

On January 2, 1995, Michael Cannizzaro, the general manager at the Sleep Country USA store in Kent, informed Williams, a store employee, that he had been terminated. Later that day when Williams returned to the store and asked Cannizzaro for his paycheck, Cannizzaro told him it would be available on the next scheduled payday, January 12.

On January 11, Williams returned to the store with a friend and told Sandra Marsh, the bookkeeper, that he had come to get his check. Marsh told Williams he would have to speak with Cannizzaro. When Williams approached Cannizzaro's desk and asked him for his paycheck, Cannizzaro said the checks could not be distributed until the next day. Williams replied that some employees were paid before the scheduled payday, but Cannizzaro explained that was a special exception for the night crew. Williams responded by saying, "Motherfucker, you better give me my check." At that point either Williams or his friend said, "Don't make me do what I want to do," and Williams shifted his body sideways and put his hand on his hip. Cannizzaro saw something in Williams's pants and was certain it was a gun. He testified that Marsh then mouthed the words, "He has a gun." Cannizzaro was scared and gave Williams his paycheck. As Williams and his friend walked out of the store laughing, Williams said, "Don't make me strap your ass." Cannizzaro called the police.

DISCUSSION

RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(iv) Is Not Substantially Overbroad

Williams contends that one of the two prongs of the criminal harassment statute under which he was convicted, RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(iv), is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face and as applied in this case. That portion of the statute reads: "A person is guilty of harassment if ... the person knowingly threatens[] ... [m]aliciously to do any other act which is intended to substantially harm the person threatened or another with respect to his or her physical or mental health or safety ... [.]" Because we conclude that this prong of the harassment statute does not sweep within its confines a "real and substantial" amount of protected conduct, we hold that RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(iv) is not unconstitutionally overbroad.

A party bringing a constitutional challenge to a statute bears the burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.¹ Overbreadth analysis is intended to ensure that legislative enactments do not prohibit constitutionally protected conduct like free speech.² Criminal statutes require more exacting scrutiny and may be facially invalid even if their application is legitimate.³ Unless the appellant presents a state constitutional analysis as described in State v. Gunwall,⁴ this court decides the overbreadth issue under federal constitutional law.⁵

The first task in an overbreadth analysis is to determine if a statute reaches constitutionally protected activity.⁶ Because the criminal harassment statute prohibits threats, it proscribes pure speech and not merely conduct.⁷ The United States Supreme Court has held that true threats must be distinguished from constitutionally protected speech.⁸ A "true threat" is a statement made in a context in which a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of another individual.⁹ But RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(iv) criminalizes, among other things, threats to do an act intended to substantially harm another's "mental health." These are not threats to inflict bodily harm or to take the life of another. The statute therefore prohibits at least some threats that are not "true threats" and therefore, on its face, the statute proscribes at least some protected speech. Because RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(iv) prohibits protected speech, we must next examine whether the statute prohibits a "real and substantial" amount of protected activity in contrast to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.¹⁰ Even a substantially overbroad will not be overturned if the court is able to place a sufficiently limiting construction on it.¹¹ If possible, a statute must be interpreted in a manner that upholds its constitutionality.¹²

Williams argues that RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(iv) prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech for two reasons. First, he claims the statute criminalizes "any and all intentional conduct causing another person mental harm." Second, he contends the term "mental health" is a "definitional mystery" because it is not clearly defined in Washington law and is given very broad dictionary definitions. We disagree and hold that RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(iv) is not substantially overbroad because the statute, when read as a whole, contains limiting factors that sufficiently restrict its scope.

RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(iv) proscribes only threats to do an act that is intended to substantially harm another's physical or mental health or safety. In addition, the threat must be "malicious," which means "an evil intent, wish, or design to vex, annoy, or injure another person."¹³ Finally, criminal liability only attaches if the person threatened has a reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out. These factors sufficiently limit the scope of the statute's application despite any ambiguity surrounding the term "mental health." Contrary to argument, a person cannot be convicted simply because he or she makes a threat. The State must also prove intent, and a fear that is reasonable.

Williams's claim that a specific intent element cannot cure an overbreadth defect is based on a misunderstanding of this court's analysis in City of Seattle v. Ivan, where we held that Seattle's coercion ordinance was overbroad.¹⁴ The City argued that a requirement of criminal intent to threaten should be implied in the ordinance to limit its scope and thereby avoid a finding that it was overbroad. We refused to imply an intent requirement in that statute because threats require no additional element of intent. A threat is inherently intentional; one cannot innocently threaten another.¹⁵ In contrast, the statute at issue here requires that the threat itself be knowing.¹⁶ The State here argued that it is the intent to do substantial harm, not the intent to threaten, that limits the breadth of the statute. The Ivan analysis is inapposite to this case.

The overbreadth doctrine is strong medicine we should use sparingly and only as a last resort.¹⁷ RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(iv) contains substantial limiting factors that prevent it from proscribing a real and substantial amount of protected speech and conduct. We reject Williams's overbreadth claim.

RCW 9A.46.020(1) (a) (iv) Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague

Williams also contends that RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(iv) is unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied in this case.¹⁸ We conclude that this prong of the harassment statute provides the ordinary person with adequate notice of what threats are prohibited and contains standards that satisfactorily guard against arbitrary enforcement and hold that RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(iv) is not unconstitutionally vague. As with Williams's overbreadth challenge, we analyze the vagueness issue under federal constitutional law because Williams offers no Gunwall analysis.¹⁹ The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that citizens receive fair warning of proscribed conduct.²⁰ Fair warning of prohibited activity is required so that citizens "may plan their activity accordingly and freely enjoy those activities which are not expressly illegal."²¹ A statute is facially void for vagueness if it fails to either (1) define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited or (2) provide ascertainable standards of guilt to guard against arbitrary enforcement.²² The vagueness doctrine serves two purposes: first, it ensures that citizens receive fair warning of what conduct they must avoid, and second, it protects citizens from "arbitrary, ad hoc, or discriminatory law enforcement."²³ "[I]mpossible standards of specificity" or "mathematical certainty" are not required because some degree of vagueness is inherent in any use of language.²⁴ The measure for vagueness is common intelligence, and a statute is unconstitutionally vague if "it forbids conduct in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.'"²⁵ A statute is presumed constitutional, and the challenging party has the burden of proving otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt.²⁶

Williams argues that the statute is vague because there is no established meaning of "mental health" in dictionaries or in Washington law. He also contends the statute fails to provide proper notice of what behavior the statute prohibits because whether a threat harms another's "mental health" depends on the victim's threshold tolerance for a threat and is therefore inherently...