State v. Williams
| Decision Date | 20 February 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 56395,56395 |
| Citation | 787 S.W.2d 308 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Donna F. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
J. Justin Meehan, St. Louis, for defendant-appellant.
William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Robert V. Franson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff-respondent.
Defendant appeals from conviction by a jury of second degree murder and resultant sentence of twenty years imprisonment. We reverse and remand.
Defendant was charged and convicted of killing Joel Robinson with her automobile. The substituted information alleged first degree murder in that with deliberation defendant "knowingly attempted to cause the death of Louis Teague and in the course thereof actually caused the death of Joel Robinson by striking Joel Robinson with an automobile." The state does not dispute the applicability of, and the case was tried on, the theory of transferred intent. Under that concept although defendant did not kill the person she intended, her mental state for killing her intended victim is transferred to the ultimate victim and defenses she had to killing the intended victim transfer to the killing of the actual victim. State v. Stallings, 326 Mo. 1037, 33 S.W.2d 914 (1930) [2-4].
Commencing in 1983 defendant and Teague had had an ongoing intimate relationship for five years before the crime. Shortly after the commencement of that relationship defendant became pregnant with their child. Throughout the relationship defendant was employed and Teague usually was not. Teague was married, defendant was not. On at least ten and possibly as many as seventeen occasions defendant was beaten by Teague. At least one of these occasions involved a kick to the stomach while defendant was pregnant. Many of the beatings required medical treatment. On one occasion Teague required medical treatment after defendant hit him with a flower pot in attempting to defend herself. On one occasion while defendant and Teague were separated he entered her residence while she was gone and vandalized it. This included destroying a substantial amount of her furniture by throwing it out of the residence. Police told defendant that if she had been there Teague would have killed her. Teague pleaded guilty to burglary and vandalism and was placed on a year's probation. On another occasion Teague broke the windshield out of defendant's automobile. On one occasion (which may also have been the flower pot incident) while Teague was beating her, defendant picked up a knife but then decided against using it and put it down. Teague told her she should have killed him. Police were called on several occasions following beatings and following the windshield incident but other than the apartment episode Teague was always released without charges.
Defendant was hospitalized in 1985 for depression manifested by excessive drinking. Teague had both an alcohol and a drug problem. The couple lived together during the relationship on an on and off basis. Following some of the beatings defendant would evict Teague from her residence. She would subsequently allow him to return because of his indications of contrition, because she felt sorry for him, because he had nowhere to live, because he was out of work, because he had sustained a death in the family, because she believed he had or would change, and because she felt their daughter needed a complete family. She blamed his violent outbursts on alcohol and drugs.
On April 22, 1988, defendant worked from 2:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. Teague was to pick up their daughter from the babysitter and meet defendant at home. Teague had the only set of keys to the residence. Teague spent the day with friends, including Joel Robinson, drinking, using drugs and playing cards. Robinson and defendant were good friends and Robinson was a confidante of defendant in her problems with Teague. Defendant picked up the daughter when she found Teague had not done so. The child was with a man only slightly known to defendant having been turned over to him by the babysitter. Defendant was upset about the potential harm that might have occurred to the child under the circumstances, although in fact the child was unharmed, and she blamed Teague for having failed to pick up the daughter.
Defendant located Teague at Robinson's residence and went there to get the keys. An argument ensued. Teague struck defendant in the face knocking her down the steps. He then struck her while she was on the ground. Defendant's glasses were knocked off. Robinson intervened to protect defendant and defendant escaped to her car. She was holding her glasses in her hand but did not put them on until after the subsequent events when she was some distance from the site. Without glasses defendant's vision is in the 20/400 range which would be reduced further at night and if she were crying. When she entered her car defendant was hysterical and crying.
As she was starting her vehicle Teague approached the automobile. Defendant pulled out and struck the vehicle ahead of her. The evidence is not clear whether this occurred as a result of defendant attempting to strike Teague. For purposes of this appeal we will assume it did. Unknown to defendant, Robinson had also entered the street as she pulled out and was caught between her vehicle and the one she sideswiped. This caused Robinson to fall into the street. Defendant observed a body lying in the street through her rear-view mirror. Believing that Robinson had never left the curb she assumed the body was that of Teague and that he was hurt as a result of her actions. Defendant recalled at that time that Teague had told her one time that if she ever hurt him she had better kill him, because if she didn't he would kill her. She said she observed the body get to its knees. Defendant then drove a short distance to an intersecting street, made a U-turn and drove over the body in the street. Until too late to avoid running over the body she believed the person in the street was Teague. She ran over the person in the street to prevent Teague from killing her. Robinson died as a result of being run over. Defendant left the scene but returned shortly thereafter, turned herself over to police, and gave a full confession essentially the same as the facts stated herein. We have set forth the facts in the light most favorable to the defendant because the issues raised require us to examine the facts in that light. Most of the salient facts are, however, undisputed.
Defendant, pursuant to Sec. 563.033 RSMo 1989 Supp., filed her timely notice of intent to offer evidence that she suffered from "battered spouse syndrome" as that pertained to a defense of self-defense. At a pre-trial hearing the court refused to allow such evidence on the basis that defendant was not married to Teague, was not a spouse, and such evidence was not therefore admissible. The trial court, following a disqualification of the motion judge, reaffirmed that ruling on the same basis. Both judges accepted as true the offer of proof made by the defendant of the facts and the expert opinions that defendant suffered from "battered woman syndrome." The matter was preserved throughout trial and post-trial. The court refused to give an instruction on self-defense or an instruction on manslaughter.
Sec. 563.033.1 provides: "Evidence that the actor was suffering from the battered spouse syndrome shall be admissible upon the issue of whether the actor lawfully acted in self-defense or defense of another." It is the province of the General Assembly of this state to establish the conduct which will subject its citizens or residents to criminal punishment. It is further within its province to establish the punishment which will flow from such transgressions. It is also within its province to establish the circumstances under which actions resulting in injury or death will be regarded as excusable or justifiable. We in the judiciary are bound by the actions of the legislative branch in making those determinations. By Sec. 563.031 RSMo 1986, the General Assembly has provided that self-defense is a justification for an otherwise felonious homicide. We will discuss the elements of that defense subsequently. It is our obligation to apply the statutes as written and to determine from the language utilized their application in a given case.
The General Assembly has made the determination that evidence of the battered spouse syndrome and that the defendant is suffering therefrom is admissible on the issue of self-defense. It is the purpose of such evidence to explain to the lay jury the nature of the syndrome, its consequences, and its effect on the actor's mental state. This evidence is an aid to the jury in assessing the mental elements of self-defense. It is not necessary, therefore, for us to engage in the examination engaged in by other courts as to the scientific validity of the syndrome or its admissibility where self-defense is raised. Ibn-Tamas v. U.S., 407 A.2d 626 (D.C.App.1979); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo.1981).
We turn to whether application of the statute is dependent upon the marital status of the defendant. We note initially that the statute makes no requirement that only a spouse may utilize the evidence. The only reference to the person who may utilize it is "actor" a term which is both gender and marital-status neutral. We might presume that had the General Assembly intended the limit imposed by the trial court it would have utilized the phrase "a spouse" in place of "the actor" where the latter phrase appears in the statute.
The language refers to an actor "suffering from the battered spouse syndrome." The emphasized language constitutes a specific medical or emotional condition bearing certain identifiable...
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