State v. Wilson
| Decision Date | 22 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. C-190281,C-190281 |
| Parties | STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Katherine WILSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
{¶1} After a night of partying, defendant-appellant Katherine Wilson and her friends were kicked out of the house early in the morning by parents who were less than pleased with the festivities. They stumbled across the street and decided to "sleep it off" in a car parked across from the house. Ms. Wilson made herself at home in the driver's seat, and when a police officer interrupted their slumber to see what was going on, he discovered that she had a suspended license and cited her for "operating" a vehicle with a suspended license. The state concedes that Ms. Wilson did not actually drive the car anywhere, and thus this case boils down to whether the term "operating" requires actual physical movement of the car. Consistent with the structure of the relevant statute and recent interpretative guidance from the General Assembly, we conclude that it does. We therefore find that the state failed to produce sufficient evidence that Ms. Wilson improperly operated a vehicle, and we reverse her conviction.
{¶2} On a brisk February morning, Officer Charles Hains responded to a call placed at 5:30 a.m. by a concerned neighbor who spotted a vehicle crowded with young people parked on a residential street. Arriving three hours later, at roughly 8:30, Officer Hains identified the reported vehicle and approached, finding four individuals fast asleep inside the running car, with Ms. Wilson at the helm of the driver's seat. Promptly waking everyone up, Officer Hains soon uncovered the reason for their sleeping in the car. One of the individuals lived in the house right across the street and, upon the parent tossing the group out, the foursome sought refuge in the car to sleep (sleep it off, really). Continuing his investigation, Officer Hains also discovered Ms. Wilson was currently under a driving suspension, and thus he cited her for driving under an OVI suspension.
{¶3} At trial, neither the state nor Ms. Wilson disputed the events of that February morning. Instead, the trial hinged on the meaning of the term "operate" for purposes of R.C. 4510.14(A), driving under an OVI suspension. The state championed the judicial interpretation of "operate," requiring evidence of either actual or potential movement of the vehicle. To satisfy this judicial definition, the state offered testimony from Officer Hains, who recounted the events above, emphasizing that Ms. Wilson was sleeping in the driver's seat, the key in the ignition, and the engine running. On the other hand, Ms. Wilson requested the court adopt the statutory definition set forth in R.C. 4511.01, necessitating evidence that she cause or had caused movement of the vehicle. Moving for a Crim.R. 29 acquittal, Ms. Wilson asserted that, because the state offered no evidence that the car actually moved (a point the state eventually concedes), it failed to establish that she operated the vehicle, a necessary element under R.C. 4510.14(A).
{¶4} Ultimately, the court sided with the state, maintaining that "as the Supreme Court has indicated, operation is more than actually driving," it is "having the ability to move the vehicle," and accordingly denied her Crim.R. 29 motion and convicted her of driving under an OVI suspension.1 Ms. Wilson now appeals, challenging in her sole assignment of error the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction.
{¶5} Generally, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we inquire whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found all the necessary elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Anderson , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160920, 2017-Ohio-8641, 2017 WL 5629570, ¶ 10, citing State v. Jenks , 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. But in this case, since neither side disputes the facts, we confront a pure issue of statutory interpretation, warranting de novo review. See State v. Pountney , 152 Ohio St.3d 474, 2018-Ohio-22, 97 N.E.3d 478, ¶ 20 ().
{¶6} Pursuant to R.C. 4510.14(A), "[n]o person whose driver's * * * license * * * has been suspended under section 4511.19 * * * shall operate any motor vehicle upon the public roads or highways within this state during the period of the suspension." The outcome of this case turns on what the term "operate" means as used in R.C. 4510.14(A), given that no statutory definition appears in the operative section.
{¶7} The parties essentially frame the debate as a choice between a statutory definition of "operate" from another section of the Revised Code— R.C. 4511.01(HHH) —or a prior judicial interpretation of the term from our Supreme Court. Ultimately, we view the judicial interpretation as superseded by subsequent legislative action and, regardless, not directed at the statute that we must interpret in this case. But to give context to these dueling positions, we must step back and set the stage a bit.
{¶8} Prior to the enactment of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 123, 149 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2467, 2951, R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) —operating a motor vehicle while under the influence—required the defendant operate the vehicle, but, similar to R.C. 4510.14, it failed to define "operate." See State v. Schultz , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90412, 2008-Ohio-4448, 2008 WL 4078447, ¶ 18 (). In absence of a statutory definition, the Ohio Supreme Court, in State v. Cleary , 22 Ohio St.3d 198, 490 N.E.2d 574 (1986), established that "[o]peration of a motor vehicle within the contemplation of the statute is a broader term than mere driving," and in fact "a person in the driver's position in the front seat with the ignition key in his possession indicating either his actual or potential movement of the vehicle while under the influence" sufficed for purposes of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1). Id. at 199, 490 N.E.2d 574.
{¶9} A few years later, in State v. Gill , 70 Ohio St.3d 150, 637 N.E.2d 897 (1994), the Ohio Supreme Court built upon its holding in Cleary . Distinguishing themselves from Cleary , the defendants in Gill emphasized that, while positioned in the driver's seat with the key in the ignition, the engine was not running, and thus this critical difference prohibited the court from finding a R.C. 4511.19 violation. Id. at 153-154, 637 N.E.2d 897. Yet the court refused to bite at this distinction, clarifying that Cleary was "intended to establish that if a person is found intoxicated in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle with the ignition key in the ignition" the person operates a vehicle for purposes of R.C. 4511.19, "whether or not the engine of the vehicle is running." Id. at 154, 637 N.E.2d 897. In rejecting the defendants' proposal, the court maintained that the purpose of R.C. 4511.19 is "to discourage persons from putting themselves in the position in which they can potentially cause the movement of a motor vehicle while intoxicated or under the influence[.]" Id. In other words, R.C. 4511.19 also carries a prospective purpose in eliminating the "potentially harmful conduct" that could result when a person sits in the driver's seat with even the ability to control the vehicle in an intoxicated state. Id. ; see State v. Wright , 137 Ohio App.3d 88, 91, 738 N.E.2d 61 (11th Dist.2000) (). Justice Pfeifer dissented, criticizing this expansive construction of "operate": "The legislature's intent was to deter and to punish drunk drivers, not to punish drunk radio listeners, or people who use their cars as a four-wheeled, heated hotel room." Gill at 157-158, 637 N.E.2d 897 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
{¶10} Taking a cue from Justice Pfeifer, the General Assembly had misgivings about the breadth of the judicial definition of operate, and thus it interceded. Effective January 1, 2004, it defined the term "operate" as used in R.C. Chapter 4511, as "to cause or have caused movement of a vehicle[.]" R.C. 4511.01(HHH). Ohio courts agree that the legislative purpose at hand was to overrule the judicial definition espoused by Gill and Cleary , and to narrow the definition of "operate." See State v. Anthony , 2016-Ohio-2905, 64 N.E.3d 591, ¶ 20 (5th Dist.), quoting State v. Barnard , 5th Dist. Stark No. 2010-CA-00082, 2010-Ohio-5345, 2010 WL 4347572, ¶ 25 (); State v. Wallace , 166 Ohio App.3d 845, 2006-Ohio-2477, 853 N.E.2d 704, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.) (). Indeed, the Second District in State v. Cochran , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22240, 2008-Ohio-3612, 2008 WL 2809220 —a case the state urges us to follow—recognized that R.C. 4511.01(HHH) "supersedes the prior judicial definition of ‘operate’ in State v. Gill [.]" Id. at ¶ 25. At the same time, the General Assembly created a new offense (seeming to encompass Justice Pfeifer's scenarios), "having physical control of a vehicle while under the influence" under R.C. 4511.194(B) ; defining "physical control" as "being in the driver's position of the front seat of a vehicle * * * and having possession of the vehicle's * * * ignition key or other ignition device." R.C. 4511.194(A)(2).
{¶11} The state says that this history is all well...
To continue reading
Request your trial