State v. Winfrey, 18716.

• Decision Date: 23 August 2011
• Docket Number: No. 18716.,18716.
• Citation: 24 A.3d 1218,302 Conn. 195
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticutv.McArthur WINFREY.

302 Conn. 195

24 A.3d 1218

STATE of Connecticut

v.McArthur WINFREY.

No. 18716.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 20, 2011.Decided Aug. 23, 2011.

James B. Streeto, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Seth R. Garbarsky, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and HARPER, Js.ROGERS, C.J.

The defendant, McArthur Winfrey, appeals ¹ from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a–279 (a), one count of possession of a controlled substance in violation of § 21a–279 (c), one count of interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a–167a, and one count of tampering with physical evidence in violation of General Statutes § 53a–155. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly: (1) violated his constitutional rights by denying his motion to suppress certain evidence taken from the motor vehicle that he was operating at the time of his arrest; (2) concluded that there was sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction on the possessory charges; (3) admitted his unredacted medical records into evidence; and (4) instructed the jury as to the state's burden of proof. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts that the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history. On September 18, 2007, narcotics officers Mark Sheppard and Dennis Ryan, of the Hamden police department, were on patrol in full uniform in an unmarked police vehicle. After Sheppard observed that a car traveling in the opposite direction had no front license plate and that the driver of the vehicle, the defendant, was not wearing a seat belt, Ryan turned the police car around and followed the defendant to the parking lot of an apartment building, where the defendant had just finished backing into a parking spot. Ryan parked the police car hood to hood with the defendant's car. The defendant and his passenger, Stephen Goodwin, then exited the vehicle, at which time Sheppard approached the defendant and explained why the officers were there.

The defendant produced a Connecticut identification card but avoided answering Sheppard's questions and began nervously placing his hands inside his sweatshirt pockets and under his clothing, in a manner that made Sheppard apprehensive for his own safety. When the defendant refused to comply with Sheppard's order that he keep his hands in view, Sheppard decided to conduct a Terry search.² The defendant verbally refused to allow Sheppard to pat him down and physically resisted the officer. With Ryan's assistance, Sheppard succeeded in placing the defendant's hands on the hood of a car, but when the patdown began the defendant twisted around and reached into his clothing. When Sheppard pulled the defendant's hand out of his pocket, a white package dropped on the ground. The package was a plastic bag containing five wax folds, each containing a powdery white substance that Sheppard believed to be heroin.

At that point the officers arrested the defendant for interfering with a police officer, and placed the package on the hood of a nearby car. Upon searching the defendant's person, the officers discovered rolling papers and $552 in cash. As the officers were leading the defendant to the patrol car, he again twisted out of their grasp. This time the defendant lunged onto the hood of the car where the officers had placed the suspected contraband, swallowed the entire package, laughed at the officers and said, “gotcha.”

After the defendant and Goodwin had been placed in police cruisers, the officers searched the car the defendant had been driving.³ In the center console of the car, they discovered two bags of crack cocaine and three bags of marijuana. The officers called for the car to be impounded, and transported the defendant to Yale–New Haven Hospital (hospital), because they believed he had swallowed the packaged heroin. At the hospital, the defendant was given a charcoal drink to neutralize any narcotics he had swallowed and to induce vomiting, but there is no indication that he regurgitated any evidence or exhibited any signs of overdose.

The defendant was charged with the crimes of possession of narcotics with intent to sell, possession of a controlled substance, interfering with an officer, and tampering with physical evidence. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the lesser included offense of possession of narcotics, and on the charged crimes of possession of a controlled substance, interfering with an officer and tampering with physical evidence. The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict and imposed a total effective sentence of seven years incarceration, followed by five years of special parole. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first contends that the officers violated his rights under both the state and federal constitutions ⁴ when they conducted a warrantless search of the automobile he was driving,⁵ and, accordingly, that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from that search. We disagree.

We begin our analysis by setting forth the appropriate standard of review. “Our standard of review of a trial court's findings and conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress is well defined. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record.... [W]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision.... Because [the present case] raise[s] questions of law, our review is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gonzalez, 278 Conn. 341, 347–48, 898 A.2d 149 (2006).

We next consider the scope of the warrant requirement as applied to motor vehicle searches. “The police ordinarily may not conduct a search and make a seizure unless a neutral and detached magistrate first issues a warrant based on probable cause.” State v. Trine, 236 Conn. 216, 235, 673 A.2d 1098 (1996). “[A] warrantless search and seizure is per se unreasonable, subject to a few well defined exceptions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Johnson, 286 Conn. 427, 444, 944 A.2d 297, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 883, 129 S.Ct. 236, 172 L.Ed.2d 144 (2008). “These exceptions have been jealously and carefully drawn ... and the burden is on the state to establish the exception.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 434, 944 A.2d 297. Specifically, a warrantless search of an automobile may be deemed reasonable if it was: (1) made incident to a lawful arrest; (2) conducted when there was probable cause to believe that the car contained contraband or evidence pertaining to a crime; (3) based upon consent; or (4) conducted pursuant to an inventory of the car's contents incident to impounding the car. State v. Reddick, 189 Conn. 461, 467, 456 A.2d 1191 (1983).

In the present case, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence of drugs found during the officers' warrantless search of his car. The trial court, in denying the motion to suppress, found that the search of the defendant's car was a valid search incident to a lawful arrest. The defendant concedes that in 2007, when the search occurred, Connecticut courts construed this exception to the warrant requirement broadly. He argues, however, that a recent United States Supreme Court case, Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), has limited the scope of the exception so that it would not have permitted the search of his car. He further contends that Gant should apply retroactively to his case, which was pending on direct appeal when Gant was decided.

The state responds that the search of the defendant's car was permissible as a search incident to a lawful arrest under the new Gant standards, and that, even if it was barred by Gant, the rationales underlying the exclusionary rule would not justify excluding the fruits of the search in the present case. In the alternative, the state contends that the search was justified by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Because we agree with the state that the search was permissible under the automobile exception, we need not determine whether the trial court's decision complied with Gant.

The United States Supreme Court first recognized the automobile exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), where the court explained that “if [a] search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid.” Likewise, under our state constitution, “our automobile exception permits a warrantless search of an automobile whenever the police have probable cause to do so”; State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 120, 547 A.2d 10 (1988); as where “the searching officer[s] have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.” Id., at 126, 547 A.2d 10; but see subsequent discussion in this opinion of State v. Miller, 227 Conn. 363, 630 A.2d 1315 (1993). “The probable cause determination must be based on objective facts that could have justified the issuance of a warrant by a neutral magistrate at the time the search was made.” State v. Badgett, 200 Conn. 412, 429, 512 A.2d 160, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940, 107...