State v. Wint
| Decision Date | 12 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | 079660,A-28/29 September Term 2017 |
| Citation | 198 A.3d 963,236 N.J. 174 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent/Cross-Appellant, v. Laurie WINT, a/k/a Laurie A. Wint, Jr., Laurie Ainsworth Wint, Lance, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Respondent. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Marcia Blum, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant/cross-respondent (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Marcia Blum, of counsel and on the briefs).
Sarah Lichter, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent/cross-appellant (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Sarah Lichter, of counsel and on the briefs).
Nicholas C. Harbist, Princeton, argued the cause for amicus curiae the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Blank Rome, attorneys; Nicholas C. Harbist, on the brief).
Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Alexander Shalom, Alexi Machek Velez, Edward Barocas and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief).
In Edwards v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held that when an accused invokes his right to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation, questioning must cease unless the accused initiates further communication or conversation. 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). The Edwards doctrine, which bars continuing an interrogation after a request for counsel, applies even if a different law enforcement agency seeks to question the accused about an unrelated crime, Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 686-88, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988), and even if the accused has consulted with an attorney, Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990). The Edwards doctrine, however, does not apply "when a suspect who initially requested counsel is reinterrogated after a break in custody that is of sufficient duration to dissipate its coercive effects." Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 109, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010) (emphasis added).
In this case, law enforcement officers arrested defendant Laurie Wint on a New Jersey murder charge and brought him to the Camden County Prosecutor's Office for questioning. Wint invoked his right to counsel after receiving Miranda 1 warnings, and the interrogation ceased. Immediately afterwards, two detectives from Pennsylvania investigating an unrelated murder in Bucks County entered the interrogation room to question Wint. After receiving his rights for the second time, Wint again requested the presence of counsel, ending the interrogation. Wint remained in continuous pre-indictment custody in Camden County when, six months later, he was transported to Bucks County. There, Pennsylvania detectives again administered Miranda warnings but did not provide counsel as Wint had earlier requested. This time, Wint waived his rights and allegedly incriminated himself in the New Jersey murder.
The trial court denied Wint's motion to suppress his incriminating remarks believing that, for Edwards purposes, Wint reinitiated communication with the Pennsylvania detectives. The court also determined that the six-month lapse in time between interrogations satisfied the Shatzer"break-in-custody" requirement. With the admission of Wint's incriminating statements at trial, a jury convicted Wint of passion/provocation manslaughter and other related offenses.
The Appellate Division remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of the suppression issue. The panel held that the Pennsylvania detectives violated Edwards by attempting to interrogate Wint just minutes after he had requested counsel from New Jersey law enforcement officers. The panel also found that Wint did not initiate the third interrogation in Bucks County. The panel, however, stopped short of suppressing Wint's incriminating statements. The panel determined that the trial court must engage in an attenuation analysis and also decide whether the six-month period between Wint's requests for counsel and the third round of questioning in Bucks County constituted a "break in custody" within the purview of Shatzer.
We now reverse. We agree with the Appellate Division that the Pennsylvania detectives violated Edwards by attempting to question Wint in Camden after his earlier request for counsel. We also agree that Wint did not initiate the interrogation that occurred in Bucks County. That third and last interrogation proceeded without the presence of counsel despite Wint's two previous requests for counsel. Here, the giving of repeated Miranda warnings did not cure the Edwards violation.
Wint remained in continuous pre-indictment custody for a period of six months before the questioning in Bucks County. Therefore, no "break in custody" occurred within the intendment of Shatzer. The Supreme Court set a bright line in Edwards and Shatzer: after a defendant requests counsel during a custodial interrogation, any statement secured during a subsequent custodial interrogation must be suppressed unless (1) counsel was providedduring the questioning, (2) defendant initiated the communication, or (3) a break in custody occurred. None of those exceptions apply here. We therefore part with the panel's decision to remand for an attenuation analysis and a break-in-custody analysis.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand for a new trial on the charge of passion/provocation manslaughter at which the incriminating statements made by Wint in Pennsylvania will be inadmissible.
On September 26, 2012, Wint was charged in a Camden County indictment with murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2) ; second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) ; second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) ; fourth-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a) ; and second-degree certain persons not to possess weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b). Wint moved to suppress a statement he allegedly made to Pennsylvania detectives in Bucks County. He claimed that the Pennsylvania detectives violated Edwards by initiating an interrogation despite his earlier request for counsel in New Jersey.
A suppression hearing was conducted in the Camden County Superior Court, Law Division. At the hearing, the State elicited testimony from three witnesses: Investigator Lance Saunders of the Camden County Prosecutor's Office and two Pennsylvania detectives -- Detective John Bonargo of the Warminster Township Police Department and Detective Martin McDonough of the Bucks County District Attorney's Office. The testimony focused on three interrogations of Wint while he remained in pre-indictment custody.
Wint was charged on June 16, 2011 with the murder of Kevin Miller in the city of Camden and on July 29, 2011 with the murder of Tyrone Newman in Warminster Township, Pennsylvania. On July 31, 2011, Camden police officers arrested Wint and transported him to the Camden County Prosecutor's Office for questioning.
Investigator Saunders began interrogating Wint while Detectives Bonargo and McDonough from Pennsylvania watched from an adjacent room. Investigator Saunders advised Wint of his Miranda rights, including his right to the presence and appointment of counsel. Following a brief exchange, Wint responded, "I think I should call my lawyer" and "I really don't want to talk to anybody." All questioning then ceased.
After leaving the interrogation room, Investigator Saunders informed Detectives Bonargo and McDonough that Wint had invoked his right to counsel. Nevertheless, approximately three minutes later, the two Pennsylvania detectives entered the interrogation room to question Wint about their case. The detectives introduced themselves and, while acknowledging that Wint had chosen not to speak about the Camden case, asked whether he would be willing to speak about the Bucks County investigation. Wint responded he would if given a cigarette. However, after the detectives read him his Miranda rights, Wint requested the presence of counsel:
In light of that dialogue, the Pennsylvania detectives stopped the questioning and exited the room. When Wint left the room, the detectives initiated an unrecorded verbal exchange with him. The detectives wished him good luck and stated, "[W]hen we get you back to Bucks County we can talk about this again." Wint responded, "[Y]eah, I'll talk to you when we get back to Bucks County."
Several months later, the Pennsylvania detectives returned to Camden to secure DNA samples from Wint, who was being held in the Camden County jail. In their encounter with Wint, the detectives informed him that they were taking steps to transfer him to Bucks County where they would like to talk to him. Wint reportedly responded, "I'll talk to you when I get back to Bucks [County]." During neither of those informal...
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