State v. Womble

Decision Date14 April 1977
Docket NumberNo. 28,28
Citation233 S.E.2d 534,292 N.C. 455
PartiesSTATE of North Carolina v. Willie Henderson WOMBLE.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Atty. Gen., Rufus L. Edmisten and Associate Atty., Elizabeth C. Bunting, Raleigh, for the State.

Felix B. Clayton and William Land Parks, Durham, for defendant-appellant.

MOORE, Justice.

Defendant first contends that he was deprived of his liberty without due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under Article I, Section 19, of the North Carolina Constitution. This contention is based upon the premise that the felony-murder rule relieves the prosecution of the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime of first degree murder. More particularly, defendant objects to the operation of the felony-murder rule upon the ground that it relieves the State of the necessity of proving actual malice on the part of defendant at the time he committed the crime. For this proposition, he cites In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975).

Defendant's argument is not well taken and has been rejected by this Court in State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383, 226 S.E.2d 652 (1976). In Swift, we held that Mullaney did not signal the demise of our felony-murder rule, as stated in G.S. 14-17. The Court in Mullaney condemned a law of the State of Maine which affirmatively shifted the burden of proving a critical element of the State's case to the defendant. The holding of the case was that "the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case." 421 U.S. at 704, 95 S.Ct. at 1892, 44 L.Ed.2d at 522.

The felony-murder rule in this jurisdiction is contained in G.S. 14-17, and provides in pertinent part:

"A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree and shall be punished with death. . . ." (By virtue of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976), and the provisions of the 1973 Session Laws, c. 1201, s. 7 (1974 Session), the punishment for first degree murder under this statute is now life imprisonment rather than death. See State v. Covington, 290 N.C. 313, 226 S.E.2d 629 (1976).)

This rule does not place any burden of proof upon a criminal defendant. In present case, the State was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a murder was committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a robbery, and that defendant participated in that crime. Upon a finding by the jury that these elements are proved beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant is, by statute, guilty of first degree murder. There is no requirement in the statutory definition of the crime that the State prove malice, premeditation or deliberation. Thus, the State is not relieved of the burden of proving malice, since malice is not an element of the crime. Further, no burden is placed upon a defendant to prove or disprove any of the elements of the crime contained in G.S. 14-17.

In his charge to the jury, the trial judge clearly placed the burden of proving every element of the crime upon the State. The judge also properly charged that the burden of proving an alibi did not rest upon defendant but rather the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant participated in the crime. Accordingly, since no burden of proof was placed upon defendant under G.S. 14-17, we are of the opinion that the felony-murder rule is constitutionally sound and this assignment is without merit. See Evans v. State, 28 Md.App. 640, 349 A.2d 300 (Md.App.1975).

Defendant next contends that the trial judge improperly recapitulated the evidence. The improprieties about which defendant now complains were not objected to at trial. Therefore, we apply the rule that objections to that portion of the charge which reviews the evidence and states the contentions of the parties must be made before the jury retires so as to give the trial judge an opportunity to correct any misstatements. Otherwise, any objection to the misstatements will be deemed to have been waived and will not be considered on appeal. State v. Cawthorne, 290 N.C. 639, 227 S.E.2d 528 (1976); State v. Watson, 287 N.C. 147, 214 S.E.2d 85 (1975); State v. Gaines, 283 N.C. 33, 194 S.E.2d 839 (1973); State v. Virgil, 276 N.C. 217, 172 S.E.2d 28 (1970). Despite this waiver, we have examined the charge and have been unable to locate any material misstatements in the evidence sufficient to warrant a new trial.

In several assignments of error, defendant contends that there was no evidence which would connect defendant with the robbery and the murder of Mr. Bullock. Defendant did not make a motion for...

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8 cases
  • People v. Dillon
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • September 1, 1983
    ...882, 317 N.W.2d 99, 101-102.North Carolina: State v. Swift (1976) 290 N.C. 383, 226 S.E.2d 652, 668-669; accord, State v. Womble (1977), 292 N.C. 455, 233 S.E.2d 534, 536-537; State v. Wall (1982) 304 N.C. 609, 286 S.E.2d 68, 71-72.Oklahoma: James v. State (1981) 637 P.2d 862, 865.South Car......
  • State v. Sims
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • November 14, 1978
    ...Me. 92, 96-99, 99 A.2d 78 (1953); State v. Priest, 117 Me. 223, 231-32, 103 A. 359 (1918)." (406 F.Supp. at 416) In State v. Womble, 292 N.C. 455, 233 S.E.2d 534 (1977), the court dealt with a statute similar to ours, and, after reviewing the common law history of the felony-murder rule, "T......
  • People v. Benson
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • June 18, 1984
    ...480 N.Y.S.2d 811 ... 125 Misc.2d 843 ... PEOPLE of the State of New York ... Javonne BENSON ... Supreme Court, Kings County ... June 18, 1984 ...         Bert Nisonoff, Brooklyn, for defendant ... Nowlin, 244 N.W.2d 596, 604-605 People v. Dillon, 34 Cal.3d 441, 472-473, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 408, 668 P.2d 697, 715, supra; State v. Womble, 292 N.C. 455, 457-459, 233 S.E.2d 534, 536-537). The rationale of these decisions is that since intent is not an element of the crime in reality ... ...
  • State v. Womble
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • April 20, 2021
    ...on 7 July 1976. The Supreme Court of North Carolina unanimously found no error in his conviction. See State v. Womble , 292 N.C. 455, 233 S.E.2d 534 (1977) (Moore, J.).¶ 8 Joseph Perry was tried for first-degree murder of Roy Brent Bullock on 3 and 4 November 1976. The State presented eyewi......
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