State v. Wooden
| Decision Date | 07 April 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 39919,39919 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Otis WOODEN, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Michael J. Minerva, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
Louis O. Frost, Jr., Public Defender and Gerald Sohn, Asst. Public Defender, for respondent.
Respondent was convicted of rape and sentenced to 30 years in prison. He was advised of his right to appeal, but his court-appointed counsel refused his request for reasons of professional judgment, among which was counsel's conclusion that no meritorious ground for appeal existed. No appeal was taken.
By petition for writ of habeas corpus directed to the First District Court of Appeal (Wooden v. State, 236 So.2d 137 (Fla.App.1st, 1970) respondent alleged that his right to a direct appeal had been frustrated by state action and sought, under Baggett v. Wainwright, 229 So.2d 239 (Fla.1969), delayed appellate review. The District Court, citing Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963) agreed that Wooden had been deprived of a direct appeal by the action of his court-appointed attorney and granted a delayed appeal. We do not quarrel with this result.
However, in the course of its opinion, the District Court made the following statement:
Both sides agree that this language is in direct conflict with Powe v. State, 216 So.2d 446 (Fla.1968) and Baggett v. Wainwright, Supra, wherein we concluded that the proper method for raising the issue of deprivation of direct appeal was by petition for habeas corpus, Not by petition pursuant to Criminal Rule 1.850, 33 F.S.A. Upon review of these decisions we reaffirm our position in Powe and Baggett and expressly overrule the language in the opinion of the District Court leading to a contrary conclusion.
In so doing, we note with consternation that the Florida decisions construing Rule 1.850 do not adequately explain the theoretical basis for the remedy and the reason why a Rule 1.850 petition is not appropriate to raise deprivation of appeal. In interests of clarity and certainty, therefore, we undertake an explanation at this time.
Following the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and numerous others, the habeas corpus remedy in Florida underwent a virtual rebirth among practitioners who discovered it to be the most useful tool available to remedy constitutional errors at the trial level. At the same time, however, habeas corpus proved to be a cumbersome tool for the appellate courts to work with, primarily because the majority of habeas corpus petitions required factual determinations which the appellate courts were not equipped to make without appointment of a commissioner and temporary relinquishment of jurisdiction.
It was primarily as a remedy for this problem that Rule 1.850 was promulgated. See Roy v. Wainwright, 151 So.2d 825 (Fla.1963); Reddick v. State, 190 So.2d 340 (Fla.App.2nd, 1966); Tolar v. State, 196 So.2d 1 (Fla.App.4th, 1967); and Smith v. State, 176 So.2d 383 (Fla.App.3rd, 1965). Essentially, the Rule provides a method by which allegations formerly raised by petition for habeas corpus directed to the appropriate District Court may now be raised in the trial court which entered judgment and sentence; if an evidentiary hearing is necessary, it is a simple matter for a trial judge to provide one. Johnson v. State, 184 So.2d 161 (Fla.1966), rehearing 185 So.2d 466 (1966).
In view of the acknowledged purpose of Rule 1.850 to facilitate factual determinations, it will be supposed that therein lies the distinction between proceedings under the Rule and petitions for habeas corpus. But such is not the case. On petition for habeas corpus an appellate court may still appoint a commissioner to make factual findings if that measure is found to be necessary. A case in point frequently arises where a petitioner alleges deprivation of his right of direct appeal. See Hollingshead v. Wainwright, 194 So.2d 577 (Fla.1967); Baggett v. Wainwright, Supra; and State ex rel. Gaines v. Wainwright, 233 So.2d 174 (Fla.App.2nd, 1970).
In reality, the limitation on the scope of Rule 1.850 with which we are concerned here, is jurisdictional. A trial court may consider under the Rule those fundamental errors which it has power to correct, errors arising in the trial process itself. Stated another way, a trial judge may correct any error going to the validity of the judgment and sentence. If an error invalidating a judgment and/or sentence is discovered, the trial judge has power under the rule to vacate and set aside the judgment and sentence and to order a new trial or discharge the prisoner.
But what is a trial judge to do if he discovers that a defendant's right to a direct appeal has been frustrated? Clearly, he cannot enter an order granting a delayed appeal in the appropriate District Court or the Supreme Court, because he has no power over these courts and such an order would not be binding upon them. Nor can he set the judgment and sentence aside because a finding of frustration of direct appeal does not bring into question the validity of the judgment and sentence.
However, the appellate court which would have been empowered to hear the direct appeal could clearly grant a defendant a delayed appeal in appropriate circumstances through the remedy of habeas corpus. Baggett v. Wainwright, Supra.
We also observe that the habeas corpus remedy at the appellate level does not carry with it the jurisdictional problems associated with Rule 1.850. It is true that habeas corpus is no longer available in...
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