State v. Woods, 57
| Decision Date | 10 March 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 57,57 |
| Citation | 179 S.E.2d 358,278 N.C. 210 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Earline WOODS. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Robert M. Davis, Salisbury, for defendant appellant.
Defendant brings forward only assignments of error relating to the charge. Assignments Nos. 3 and 6 require discussion.
The portion of the charge which is the subject of Assignments No. 3 follows:
'When the intentional killing of a human being with a deadly weapon is established by the evidence, there is cast upon the defendant in this case, Earline Woods, the burden of proving to the satisfaction of the jury--not by the greater weight of the evidence, nor beyond a reasonable doubt, but simply to the satisfaction of the jury--the legal provocation that will rob the crime of malice and thus reduce it to manslaughter or that will excuse it altogether upon the grounds of self-defense, accident or misadventure.'
Following the excerpt quoted above the judge gave a further exposition of murder in the second degree, instructions upon voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, and a statement of the law of self-defense. Then, after a brief summary of the evidence, he delivered his final mandate. The substance of this instruction, which is the basis of Assignment No. 6, is summarized below:
If the State has satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant, by means of a deadly weapon, intentionally inflicted the wound which produced Terry's death it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree unless defendant has satisfied you that she shot Terry in self-defense. If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intentionally shot Terry and that his death 'was the natural and probable result,' but you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that she shot him with malice, your verdict will be voluntary manslaughter unless defendant has satisfied you she got Terry in self-defense. If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant shot Terry intentionally but are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that she shot him in the commission of some unlawful act and his death 'was a natural and probable result,' your verdict will be guilty of involuntary manslaughter 'even though the wounding of the deceased was unintentional,' unless defendant has satisfied you she shot in self-defense. Although the State may have satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant shot and killed Terry, if she has satisfied you that she was not the aggressor and that she shot Terry under circumstances which created in her mind the reasonable belief that it was necessary to shoot him in order to save herself from death or great bodily harm, it would be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty. However, even if defendant has satisfied you she was not the aggressor and she shot Terry under circumstances which reasonably caused her to believe 'that the shooting of the deceased was necessary in order to save herself from death or great bodily harm,' yet if she 'fails to satisfy you that the forces used were not excessive under the circumstances, it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty of involuntary manslaughter, or if you find the defendant was the aggressor then the plea of self-defense would not be available to her.'
Defendant asserts that the foregoing excerpts from the charge are fatally defective in the following respects: (1) The judge failed to instruct that until the State satisfied the jury beyond a reasonable doubt defendant intentionally shot Terry And thereby proximately caused his death, no presumption arose that the killing was either unlawful or done with malice. (2) Although the judge instructed the jurors under what circumstances they should return a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree or manslaughter, and how murder in the second degree could be reduced to manslaughter, it was only in the event they found defendant to have acted in lawful self-defense that he specifically told them they could or should return a verdict of not guilty. These contentions must be sustained.
The State's evidence tended to show that defendant intentionally shot Terry after having announced her intention to kill him and that he died as a result of the bullet wound she inflicted. Defendant's evidence (her testimony) tended to show that after scuffling with Terry over the rifle on the front porch of their residence she got possession of the weapon and went into the house; that Terry said he was going to take the rifle from her and, despite her warning to him not to come in, he started into the house; that, because he had previously shot her, was afraid of him, and she 'shot to miss him and hot him'; that her only purpose in shooting was to scare him. All the evidence, therefore, tends to show that defendant intentionally fired the shot which struck Terry. It must be kept in mind, however, that she made no judicial admission that he did as a result of the wound she inflicted.
The presumption that a homicide was unlawful and done with malice arises not only upon proof or admission of an intentional killing with a deadly weapon but also 'when the defendant Intentionally assaults another with a deadly weapon and thereby proximately causes the death of the person assaulted.' State v. Gordon, 241 N.C. 356, 358, 85 S.E.2d 322, 323, and cases cited; State v. Mercer, 275 N.C. 108, 165 S.E.2d 328; State v. Propst, 274 N.C. 62, 161 S.E.2d 560; State v. Price, 271 N.C. 521, 157 S.E.2d 127; State v. Phillips, 264 N.C. 508, 142 S.E.2d 337. However, no presumption arises against a defendant and no burden is cast upon him until the State has satisfied the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, or the defendant has judicially admitted, that he assaulted the deceased with a deadly weapon and thereby inflicted a wound which proximately caused his death. Here a specific instruction to this effect was not given.
Although defendant testified that she...
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