State v. Wright
| Decision Date | 25 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 49106-1-II,49106-1-II |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. JAMES OTIS WRIGHT, JR., Appellant. |
LEE, J. — James Wright Jr. appeals his conviction for indecent liberties by forcible compulsion, arguing that (1) his speedy trial right was violated, (2) insufficient evidence was presented to show sexual contact and forcible compulsion, and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Wright also raises additional challenges in a statement of additional grounds (SAG).
We hold that (1) the trial court did not violate the time for trial rule, (2) sufficient evidence was presented to show sexual contact and forcible compulsion, and (3) defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. We also hold that Wright's SAG claims fail. Accordingly, we affirm.
On February 7, 2016, T.S.1 was working at a church in Olympia. That morning, Wright appeared at the door, stating he was cold and needed some coffee. T.S. was familiar with Wright because he had attended service before and had come to the church on other days. T.S. said she would make him some coffee.
They went to the room with the coffee maker. No one else was in the room besides T.S. and Wright. Wright told T.S., "I'm here to eat your pussy." Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 81. This "freaked [T.S.] out" and made her feel very nervous and anxious. VRP at 81. T.S. told Wright that it was not okay to talk to her that way. Then, while T.S. was bent over the counter making coffee, Wright came up behind her, pushed into her, placed his knee between her legs, reached around, pulled her in, and grabbed her crotch area with both hands. T.S. "freaked out" and began flailing and screaming. She told Wright to "[g]et off, get away, stop, let go." VRP at 87. Wright responded saying he did not do anything. Wright did not continue to hold onto T.S., but he did not step away. T.S. screamed at Wright to get out and pushed him out of the church.
T.S. testified it was "[q]uick" after Wright made the comment that he grabbed her. VRP at 83. She also said that she did not consent to Wright touching her at any point.
T.S. then texted her colleague who had worked with Wright. Her colleague told her to call the police. T.S. called the police and her husband. The police and her husband came to the church. T.S. spoke with the police about the incident, but had to tend to her church responsibilities. T.S. spoke to the police again after the second service and provided a written statement.
The police located Wright approximately eight blocks from the church. After being read his Miranda2 rights and told why he was being detained, Wright said he was at the church, but he did not touch T.S..
On February 10, the Thurston County Prosecuting Attorney's Office charged Wright with indecent liberties by forcible compulsion. Wright's arraignment date is not in our record. However, on March 16, the trial court issued an omnibus order that stated the trial date was set for April 11.3 The omnibus order also stated that trial was estimated to last three days and the defense to be asserted at trial was a general denial. On April 6, the trial court entered a trial confirmation order stating that trial was confirmed to begin on April 11 and that the last date for trial was April 23.
On April 11, the parties presented a motion to continue the trial due to the matter being set as a standby trial. The trial court granted the motion, set a status hearing for April 13, and continued the trial until April 25. On April 12, the State filed a motion for a continuance because "Officer [Duane] Hinrich [was] unavailable due to a previously scheduled, out of state vacation the week of April 25, through April 30, 2016." Suppl. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 56. On April 13, the trial court granted the trial continuance over Wright's objection and entered an order setting trial for May 2. The continuance order also stated that the last allowable date for trial was June 2. On April 27, the trial court entered another order confirming the trial date for May 2 and stating that the last date for trial was May 23.
At the start of trial, defense counsel reserved his opening statement. Later, defense counsel declined to provide an opening statement.
The State called T.S. as a witness, and she testified to the incident as discussed above. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked T.S. whether she had any sexual contact with Wright and she said "No." VRP at 95. But she also testified that if Wright "grabbing me from behind equates to sexual contact, I'd have to say yes." VRP at 95. T.S. confirmed on redirect that Wright touched her in an area of her body that she felt had a sexual context.
Officer Henrichs and Officer Shelby Nutter also testified at trial. Both officers testified that they were dispatched to an assault at the church. Both officers testified that T.S. appeared shaken when they first made contact with her. And Officer Nutter testified that T.S. had to do everything she could to hold back from crying and was repeatedly blotting tears.
In discussing jury instructions, the trial court stated that it was striking the "phrase of putting a person in fear of being kidnapped or another person would be kidnapped" from the jury instruction on forcible compulsion because it did not "meet[ ]" with the facts of the case. VRP at 45. The trial court also stated that it would not give an "intentional" nor "married" instruction based on the elements of the crime. Defense counsel did not object to the jury instructions, which included an instruction that the lawyers' statements are not evidence and only intended to help the jury understand the evidence and apply the law.
VRP at 117-18. On rebuttal, the State argued:
You're being asked to make a decision on the law and you are being asked to split an incredibly fine hair. What does the instructions say? "The defendant knowingly caused [T.S.] to have sexual contact with the defendant." Not hearing anything about anything else except caused her to have contact with the defendant, that's the hair you're being asked to split. So ask yourself a question. If someone pushes you, do you have physical contact with them? They're touching you. Isn't that what physical contact is? Who caused it? The other person caused you to have physical contact with them. Not—this is not saying—the instruction, I would submit, does not require the defendant did something to cause [T.S.] to reach out and grab him or in any way make her make an affirmative action, doesn't require her to do anything except have contact. It requires her to have contact with him, doesn't say who has to initiate it, that he has to cause it by reaching around her by pinning her in.
The jury found Wright guilty as charged. Wright appeals.
Wright argues that his speedy trial right under CrR 3.3 was violated because the trial date was continued beyond the original time for trial.4 We disagree.
We review a trial court's application of CrR 3.3 de novo. State v. Hawkins, 181 Wn.2d 170, 183, 332 P.3d 408 (2014). But we review a trial court's decision to grant a continuance for an abuse of discretion. State v. Ollivier, 178 Wn.2d 813, 822-23, 312 P.3d 1 (2013), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 72 (2014). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. State v. Nguyen, 131 Wn. App. 815, 819, 129 P.3d 821 (2006).
Under CrR 3.3(b)(1)(i), a defendant held in custody pending trial must be tried within 60 days of arraignment. Violation of the time for trial rule will result in a dismissal with prejudice, whether or not the defendant can show prejudice. CrR 3.3(h); State v. Tolles, 174 Wn. App. 819, 823, 301 P.3d 60 (2013).
Specific periods are excluded in the time for trial calculation, including continuances. CrR 3.3(b)(5), (e)(3). "If any period of time is excluded pursuant to section (e), the allowable time for trial shall not expire earlier than 30 days after the end of that excluded period." CrR 3.3(b)(5). The trial court may grant a continuance on the written agreement of the parties, which must be signed by the defendant. CrR 3.3(f)(1). The trial court may also grant a continuance on the motion of the court or a party when required in the administration of justice and the defendant will not be prejudiced in the presentation of his defense. CrR 3.3(f)(2). In doing so, the trial court must "state on the record or in writing the reasons for the continuance." CrR 3.3(f)(2).
Here, although there is no record showing the date Wright was arraigned, the record shows that as of the date of the omnibus order, the last date for trial was April 23. The record also shows that the parties brought a joint motion for a continuance on April 11, which the trial court granted, and the trial date was continued to April 25. This continuance, would have extended the time for trial until 30 days after April 25. CrR 3.3(b)(5), (e)(3).
Wright argues that he did not...
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