State v. Wright

Citation76 Conn.App. 91,818 A.2d 824
Decision Date08 April 2003
Docket NumberNo. 21830.,21830.
CourtAppellate Court of Connecticut
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Travis L. WRIGHT.

Joseph A. Moniz, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Eileen F. McCarthy, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were David I. Cohen, state's attorney, and James Bernardi, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

MCDONALD, J.

The defendant, Travis L. Wright, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) denied his motion to suppress his confession, (2) excluded portions of his psychological records and (3) gave two "Chip Smith" charges to the jury, depriving him of his constitutional rights to due process and an uncoerced jury verdict. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On April 11, 1999, the lifeless body of Wieston Tarnowski, a victim of multiple stab wounds, was found in an abandoned vehicle in Stamford. While being interviewed at the Stamford police station following his arrest on June 25, 1999, on a charge of attempt to commit robbery, the defendant was asked about the Tarnowski homicide, and he indicated that he knew about the stabbing of a man in the south end of Stamford. The defendant subsequently confessed to twice stabbing a man in the chest after that man attacked him. The defendant told the police that he left that man in a vehicle in the area of Rockland Place and Atlantic Street in Stamford.

After a jury trial, the defendant was found not guilty of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53-54a and guilty of manslaughter in the first degree, as a lesser offense included within murder, in violation of § 53a5-5 (a) and sentenced to seventeen years incarceration. This appeal followed.

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly denied his pretrial motion to suppress the confession that he gave to the police. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly failed to base its decision on the totality of the circumstances surrounding that confession.1 We disagree.

After a hearing on the motion to suppress, the court found the following facts in its memorandum of decision. "On June 25, 1999, Officer Michael Merenda of the Stamford police department went to the area of Spruce Street in Stamford, at approximately 6-6:15 a.m., on the report of a robbery. He had a description of several suspects who may have been involved in the robbery. Merenda saw three black males near the area of Fairfield Court matching this description who, upon seeing him, fled. One of the three was the defendant, who then came to a stop. Merenda detained the defendant pending further investigation.

"In the meantime, Officer David Dogali was involved in assisting the victim of this robbery, one [Alejandro] Pagan. Upon learning that Merenda had detained a suspect, Dogali drove Pagan to the detention scene. Pagan identified the defendant as one of his assailants.

"Merenda then arrested and handcuffed the defendant, placed him in his patrol car and advised him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), from a card carried for those purposes. The defendant said he understood those rights. Merenda asked the defendant about his involvement in the robbery; the defendant said that he had been there, but the two others had actually committed the robbery of Pagan. The defendant also denied striking Pagan. The defendant then said, `I don't want to talk to you anymore,' so Merenda terminated the questioning and transported the defendant to the Stamford police department for booking. The defendant was then, again, administered his Miranda rights by way of a written notice of rights form. The defendant read the form, said he understood it and signed it at approximately 6:40 a.m.

"The defendant was put in a cell and remained there until later that morning. In the meantime, Officer Gregory Holt and Sergeant Anthony Luppinacci had come on duty. They, and later Officer John Lynch, would come to be involved in the questioning of the defendant. Holt and Luppinacci received a `thumbnail sketch' of the Pagan robbery. They removed the defendant from his cell at approximately 11:49 a.m. They brought him into an interview room in the detective bureau. The officers did not give the defendant his Miranda rights again, then, because they saw that the earlier notice of rights form had been completed.

"The officers told the defendant that they wanted to talk to him about the Pagan robbery. The defendant appeared agreeable to this and spoke freely. The defendant admitted his involvement in the robbery, including punching Pagan and `running' his pockets. The defendant also admitted having done similar robberies previously. The defendant agreed to give a written statement concerning the Pagan robbery. The officers reviewed yet another notice of rights form with the defendant and had him read and sign it. This was done at about 1:05 p.m. The officers took and typed the defendant's statement, concluding at about 2:21 p.m.

"At about this time, Officer Holt left the interview room and Luppinacci remained with the defendant. Luppinacci asked the defendant if he had any knowledge of any other criminal activity, or about the south end homicide involving Tarnowski [which Luppinacci put to many people who were arrested]. The defendant asked what Luppinacci would do for him. Luppinacci said that he would speak to the prosecutor handling the case. The defendant then gave his first oral statement about the Tarnowski homicide, in which he admitted being present with others when Jerry Cook stabbed the victim. The officers assembled a photographic array, including a photograph of Cook, and the defendant identified Cook's photograph as being [that of] the perpetrator.

"In the meantime, the officers had determined that Cook had been incarcerated at the time of the homicide and, therefore, could not have committed it. They confronted the defendant with this information. The defendant said that he had lied to get some consideration in the Pagan robbery. But on the basis of the information the defendant had already provided, the officers were persuaded that the defendant had been at the homicide scene. They refused, however, to provide the defendant with the details that so persuaded them.

"The defendant then began taking the tack that he had not divulged anything to his questioners; he became incommunicative. He was fidgety and upset. Holt moved closer to the defendant, asking him what was wrong. The defendant became more emotional, crying. The officers tried to calm him down, and Holt put his arm on the defendant's shoulder, reassuring him. They took a break so the defendant could compose himself. The defendant did and then told the officers a second version of the Tarnowski homicide.

"The defendant substantially stated that in the evening or early morning hours of April 11, 1999, he was on the streets in the south end of Stamford where he eventually encountered the victim. The defendant stated that he attempted to disengage himself from a grappling encounter with the victim, but that the victim had persisted. It was at about this point, the defendant stated, that he pulled out a knife and twice stabbed the victim. The defendant then fled the area and threw the knife off of a bridge. This essentially concluded the defendant's final version of the events that night. After this, the officers developed several details of the homicide with the defendant, including the use of diagrams.

"The defendant then agreed to go with the officers, in their car, to the area of the crime scene to show them where it had happened and what route he had taken in his flight therefrom, and also where he had disposed of the knife. Following this, they returned to the police department and the interview room. They asked the defendant more questions, which he answered. The defendant also described the knife he had used to stab Tarnowski. The officers then began to prepare for the taking of a written statement from the defendant at about 7:40 p.m. They advised the defendant of his rights in written form, had the defendant read one or more of these rights aloud and the rest to himself. He initialed the rights and a waiver of them. The officers then began taking the defendant's written statement, asking him questions as it was typed. When the statement was done, the defendant was given it to review and the opportunity to `edit' it. The defendant remarked that the statement made him look like a liar because of his earlier, false version of events. The defendant finally initialed and signed the statement. It was completed at approximately 11:27 p.m. The defendant, who had asked to call his mother about one-half hour before, called her. The defendant was then arrested for the murder of Tarnowski and returned to his cell. The following morning, Saturday, June 26, the defendant and several officers went to the vicinity of the Pulaski bridge in Stamford, which had been identified as the bridge from which the defendant threw the knife. The police performed several ground searches for the knife, with no success in recovering it. A later dive search also did not recover the knife."

The court further found the following facts: "The defendant [at the time of the confession] was seventeen years old and in high school. He did not appear to be under the influence of any substance or of fatigue. The rights were given in English, the language which the defendant spoke and read. He also knew how to invoke those rights, especially his right to remain silent. At the scene of...

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16 cases
  • State v. Houghtaling, AC 35720
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • March 17, 2015
    ...He does not argue that he did not understand or that he had any trouble communicating with the officers. See State v. Wright, 76 Conn. App. 91, 108, 818 A.2d 824 (2003) (considering totality of circumstances, including that "[a]t no time did the defendant reveal that he did not understand h......
  • State v. Houghtaling
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • March 17, 2015
    ...drawn. He does not argue that he did not understand or that he had any trouble communicating with the officers. See State v. Wright, 76 Conn.App. 91, 108, 818 A.2d 824 (2003) (considering totality of circumstances, including that “[a]t no time did the defendant reveal that he did not unders......
  • State v. Linarte
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • April 15, 2008
    ...the totality of the circumstances of the claimed waiver." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wright, 76 Conn.App. 91, 99-100, 818 A.2d 824 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 911, 840 A.2d 1175 In June, 2003, the defendant filed a motion to suppress his signed confes......
  • State v. Moreno
    • United States
    • Connecticut Superior Court
    • February 8, 2017
    ... ... about a confession to a serious crime that is not freely ... self-determined. State v. Doyle , 104 Conn.App. 4, ... 17, 931 A.2d 393, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 935, 935 A.2d 152 ... (2007). In State v. Wright , 76 Conn.App. 91, 818 ... A.2d 824, cert. denied, 267 Conn. 911, 840 A.2d 1175 (2004), ... the court held that " encouraging a suspect to tell the ... truth ... does not, as a matter of law, overcome a ... confessor's will ... neither is a statement that the ... ...
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