State v. Yamashita
| Citation | 151 Hawai‘i 390,515 P.3d 207 |
| Decision Date | 05 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | SCWC-20-0000075 |
| Parties | STATE of Hawai‘i, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joshua YAMASHITA, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Hawai'i |
Benjamin E. Lowenthal, Wailuku, for Petitioner.
Richard B. Rost, for Respondent.
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Joshua Yamashita ("Yamashita") was convicted of various drug, theft, fraud, and property crimes in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit ("circuit court").1 At sentencing, in addition to a five-year term of incarceration, Yamashita was ordered to pay a crime victim compensation ("CVC") fee under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes ("HRS") §§ 706-605(6) (Supp. 2018) and 351-62.6 (2015) and a drug demand reduction ("DDR") assessment under HRS § 706-650 (Supp. 2018). He objected to imposition of the CVC fee because he was presently unable to pay and would not be able to pay the CVC fee in the future. He also contended both the CVC fee and DDR assessment amounted to unconstitutional taxes. The Intermediate Court of Appeals ("ICA") affirmed the circuit court's imposition of the CVC fee and DDR assessment, finding there was substantial evidence that Yamashita would be able to pay the CVC fee in the future and that the CVC fee and DDR assessment were constitutional fines, not unconstitutional taxes.
The ICA's judgment on appeal is affirmed except as to the issue of Yamashita's ability to pay the CVC fee. His present inability to pay the CVC fee mandated waiver of the fee pursuant to HRS §§ 706-605(6) and 351-62.6.
In August 2017, Yamashita pleaded no contest in Case No. 2CPC-17-0000133 (the "First Case") to one count of unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle in violation of HRS § 708-836 ; Yamashita was sentenced to four years of probation and ordered to pay restitution and fees.
Between November 20, 2017 and October 30, 2018, Yamashita was charged in seven other cases (the "Other Cases") and subsequently pleaded no contest to drug, theft, fraud, and property crimes in the circuit court.2 Under the plea agreement for the Other Cases, Yamashita also admitted to violating the terms and conditions of probation in the First Case. On May 31, 2019, the circuit court held a sentencing hearing for the Other Cases, and a resentencing hearing for the First Case. The circuit court entered a judgment on the Other Cases convicting and sentencing Yamashita to a term of incarceration of five years for each felony, one year for each misdemeanor, and thirty days for each petty misdemeanor, to be served concurrently. The circuit court also ordered Yamashita to pay $1,810.00 in court fines, $8,767.20 in restitution, a $2,075.00 CVC fee under HRS §§ 706-605(6) and 351-62.6,3 a $2,500.00 internet crimes against children ("ICAC") fee,4 and a $100.00 DDR assessment under HRS § 706-650.5 The circuit court then entered an Order of Resentencing in the First Case whereby Yamashita's probation was revoked; he was resentenced to serve five years of incarceration with credit for time served (to be served concurrently with the sentences in the Other Cases) and ordered to pay $1,000 in restitution, a $105 CVC fee, and a $100 ICAC fee.
Taking the First Case and the Other Cases together, Yamashita was sentenced to financial penalties totaling $1,810 in fines, $9,767.20 in restitution, a $2,180 CVC fee, a $2,600 ICAC fee, and a $100 DDR assessment.6
The circuit court ordered that Yamashita pay, in order: restitution, the CVC fee, the ICAC fee, the DDR assessment, and the fines at the rate of twenty-five percent of gross earnings while incarcerated, then at a rate of at least $30.00 per month upon his release. At sentencing, Yamashita requested a waiver of the CVC fee7 and the circuit court set an evidentiary hearing to determine his ability to pay and whether his request for a waiver of the CVC fee should be granted.
In support of his request for a waiver of the CVC fee, Yamashita filed a motion to reconsider all of his sentences across the First Case and the Other Cases ("Motion to Reconsider Sentence") asking the court to waive the CVC fee because he was unable to pay it. Yamashita relied on Haw. Insurers Council v. Lingle, 120 Hawai‘i 51, 59, 201 P.3d 564, 572 (2008) in arguing that the CVC fee and DDR assessment were unconstitutional taxes given the constitutional principle that only the legislative branch of government has the authority to tax. He argued that the CVC fee and DDR assessment were not constitutionally permissible user fees, paid "in exchange for a particular governmental service which benefits the party paying the fee ... to compensate the governmental entity providing the services for its expenses[,]" but rather, were taxes "imposed by the government on persons, entities, transactions, or property to yield public revenue[,]" which may not be delegated by the legislature. Lingle, 120 Hawai‘i at 60, 62, 201 P.3d at 573, 575 (internal quotation marks omitted). Yamashita contended that to determine whether a charge is a user fee, as opposed to a tax, the court should apply the three-part test in Lingle, 120 Hawai‘i at 62, 201 P.3d at 575, which considers whether the charge "(1) applies to the direct beneficiary of a particular service, (2) is allocated directly to defraying the costs of providing the service, and (3) is reasonably proportionate to the benefit received." Under the Lingle test, Yamashita argued that the CVC fee and DDR assessment were unconstitutional taxes because they were set and collected at the court's discretion, primarily, "to generate revenue."
The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing to assess Yamashita's ability to pay the CVC fee and to determine whether he should be granted a waiver of said fee. At the hearing, Yamashita testified that he was twenty-nine years old and had a GED. He testified that, prior to incarceration, he was "on the streets," and his last non-prison job was as a roofer. Yamashita testified that he was currently incarcerated at Halawa Correctional Facility ("HCF") and was employed at HCF as a plumber. He confirmed that he had not been trained as a plumber, but "learned on the job." Yamashita testified that as a plumber he made twenty-five cents an hour and worked about thirty-five hours a week, which averaged to about $15.00 to $20.00 per month in prison income. He also stated that his mother sometimes put $100.00 per month in his HCF account, when she was able to. He testified that $30.00 per month was automatically removed from his account by the "[c]ourt" and that his HCF account was currently empty. He claimed that he had no other sources of income and had no investments or assets. He stated that he had two daughters and paid $100.00 in child support every month. Yamashita testified that he had no medical issues, and that he could get a full-time job and intended to work to support himself and his daughters and to pay off his financial obligations upon release from prison. Yamashita testified that he was presently unable to pay the CVC fee, but agreed that if he became employed post-incarceration, it would be "feasible" for him to pay $30.00 per month after his release.
After the evidentiary hearing to assess Yamashita's ability to pay the CVC fee, the circuit court filed an order on January 15, 2020 granting in part and denying in part Yamashita's Motion to Reconsider Sentence, and denying Yamashita's request for a waiver of the CVC fee. Based on Yamashita's testimony, in its Findings of Fact ("FOFs") and Conclusions of Law ("COLs"), the circuit court concluded that Yamashita was "healthy, young, ha[d] his GED, [wa]s able-bodied, and [wa]s willing and able to find employment after release from custody." The circuit court found that "Defendant's plumbing job at Halawa will provide him with training and a skillset that will allow him to become gainfully employed outside of prison." Thus, the circuit court determined that because Yamashita had "skills as a plumber, was employed at his evidentiary hearing, and ha[d] the ability to become employed in the future," paying $30.00 per month post-incarceration "would be feasible" and he would "eventually be able to pay" his financial obligations, "including his CVC fees."
As to Yamashita's constitutional claims, the circuit court concluded that because the CVC fee and DDR assessment were expended for "legitimate criminal justice purposes," both charges were constitutional.8
Yamashita argued in his appeal to the ICA that the circuit court erred in denying his Motion to Reconsider Sentence.9 He first posited that the circuit court erroneously "concluded that it must consider [his] future earning capacity" when imposing the CVC fee, and contended that future earning capacity was only relevant to the amount of the CVC fee under HRS § 351-62.6(b).10 The State denied that the circuit court abused its discretion by imposing a CVC fee and argued that the "most reasonable and consistent reading" of HRS §§ 706-605(6) and 351-62.6(a) together permitted consideration of a defendant's future ability to pay CVC fees. Yamashita responded that this interpretation of the statutes did not align with legislative intent: "protecting the indigent" from having to pay a CVC fee.
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