State v. Yancey

• Decision Date: 19 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. COA11–1409.,COA11–1409.
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Wesley Aaron YANCEY, Defendant.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

727 S.E.2d 382

STATE of North Carolina
v.
Wesley Aaron YANCEY, Defendant.

No. COA11–1409.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

June 19, 2012.

[727 S.E.2d 384]

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 1 June 2011 by Judge Yvonne Mims Evans in Burke County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 April 2012.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Stanley G. Abrams, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Andrew L. Farris, Durham, for defendant-appellant.

MARTIN, Chief Judge.

Defendant appeals from a consolidated judgment entered upon his plea of no contest to three counts of breaking or entering. He contends the trial court erred by entering an order denying his motion to suppress statements and evidence he contended were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. We affirm.

The unchallenged findings of fact in the trial court's order on defendant's motion show the following. A little after 8:00 a.m. on 15 October 2009, Officer Jack Moss with the Valdese Police Department observed defendant, then seventeen, sitting on a sidewalk on Main Street in Valdese, North Carolina. Because defendant appeared to be of school-age, Officer Moss stopped and asked for his name and what he was doing. Defendant appeared nervous, continuously putting his hands in his pockets. After Officer Moss patted him down and asked whether he could look in defendant's backpack, defendant replied, “sure.” In defendant's backpack, Officer Moss found loose coins, a plastic bag with coins and jewelry, and an old class ring. Officer Moss then drove defendant to the police department and called defendant's mother, who arrived later and took defendant home.

On 20 November 2009, Detectives David Stikeleather and David South with the Burke County Sheriff's Office, dressed in plain clothes and driving an unmarked vehicle, arrived at defendant's home and asked to speak with him. At that time, defendant had been identified as a possible suspect in several

[727 S.E.2d 385]

breaking or entering cases. Because defendant had friends visiting his home, the detectives asked defendant to ride in their car with them. The detectives told defendant he was free to leave the vehicle at any time, and they did not touch him. Defendant sat in the front seat of the vehicle while it was driven approximately two miles from his home. When the vehicle was stopped, Detective South showed defendant reports of the break-ins. The detectives told defendant that, if he was cooperative, they would not arrest him that day, but would turn in their paperwork to the district attorney. Defendant gave a statement admitting to committing the break-ins.

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This Court's review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is limited to determining whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and whether its conclusions of law are legally correct, reflecting a correct application of legal principles to the facts found. State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001). Because defendant fails to challenge any of the trial court's findings of fact, this Court is limited to a de novo review of the trial court's conclusions of law. See State v. Carter, ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 711 S.E.2d 515, 520,motion to dismiss appeal allowed and disc. review denied,365 N.C. 351, 718 S.E.2d 147 (2011).

On appeal, defendant first argues that he was “in custody” during his 20 November 2009 encounter with Detectives South and Stikeleather and that his inculpatory statements were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Defendant specifically argues that he was in custody because he knew he was a suspect after the detectives confronted him with the case files from recent break-ins, because Detective South told defendant that if he was cooperative, the detectives would not arrest him that day, which he contends implied he would be arrested if he attempted to leave, and because he was driven two miles from his home. We conclude that, considering the totality of the circumstances, defendant was not in custody at the time he made the inculpatory statements.

The trial court's determination that a person is in custody under Miranda is a conclusion of law. Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 336, 543 S.E.2d at 826. The Miranda rule “was conceived to protect an individual's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in the inherently compelling context of custodial interrogations by police officers.” Id. In addition to the warnings required under the Miranda decision, N.C.G.S. § 7B–2101(a) requires specific warnings in the context of custodial interrogation of a juvenile. Before warnings are required under Miranda and N.C.G.S. § 7B–2101(a), a juvenile must be in custody. In re W.R., 363 N.C. 244, 247, 675 S.E.2d 342, 344 (2009). The appropriate inquiry for determining whether a defendant is in custody is, based on the totality of the circumstances, whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 339, 543 S.E.2d at 828. “This determination involves an objective test, based upon a reasonable person standard, and is to be applied on a case-by-case basis considering all the facts and circumstances.” Carter, ––– N.C.App. at ––––, 711 S.E.2d at 520 (internal quotation marks omitted). “While no single factor...