State v. Yang
| Decision Date | 14 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | A13-2333 |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Kai Yang, Appellant. |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
Affirmed
Ramsey County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chelsie Willett, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Chutich, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Ross, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
On appeal from his conviction of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, appellant argues that (1) the district court erred by denying appellant's presentence motion towithdraw his guilty plea, (2) appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel because his defense counsel had a conflict of interest when arguing the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, and (3) the district court abused its discretion by denying appellant's motion for a downward dispositional departure. We affirm.
Appellant Kai Yang entered a guilty plea to one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(c) (2012). During the plea hearing, Yang's counsel advised him of the rights he was waiving by entering the guilty plea and confirmed that Yang understood that he would be bound by the terms of the agreement. Yang stated that no one promised him anything other than the terms of the agreement as stated in the plea petition and that no one forced or bribed him to plead guilty. Yang's counsel informed Yang on the record at the plea hearing that he would be subject to a ten-year conditional-release term and that he would be required to register as a sex offender for ten years. As part of the plea, the parties agreed that they would argue the terms of the sentence at the sentencing hearing.
Prior to sentencing, Yang's counsel informed the district court and the state that Yang wished to withdraw his guilty plea, stating that Yang was adamant that he was not guilty, he felt he did not understand the full consequences of pleading guilty, and he felt he had been pressured into accepting the plea agreement. The district court continued the sentencing hearing so that the parties could submit memoranda on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
When the parties appeared for sentencing and to be heard on the motion to withdraw the plea, Yang's counsel argued for the motion to withdraw the plea. Yang's counsel stated that Yang's family members had coerced him into pleading guilty and that it was possible that Yang, a Hmong speaker, did not understand the full consequences of pleading guilty because of the language barrier. Yang had proceeded through the legal process with the assistance of an interpreter, but his counsel stated that he found it difficult to explain the legal system to Yang in his own language, and it was possible that Yang did not agree to the plea. Yang's counsel also submitted an affidavit from Yang in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In the affidavit, Yang stated that he made the plea without knowing all of the possible consequences, he did not believe that he was guilty of the crime, and his relatives pressured him into taking the plea. The state argued that Yang's counsel went through the plea petition with Yang in detail at the plea hearing, he had ample time to discuss his options with his attorney, he acknowledged on the record that he understood he would be bound by the terms of the plea petition, and he affirmed that no one forced him to accept the offer.
The district court found that Yang entered a "counseled plea" and that he had many opportunities to speak with his attorney. The district court stated that it allowed a recess during the plea hearing so that Yang could seek clarification from his counsel. The district court considered Yang's argument that his family coerced him to enter the guilty plea but also acknowledged that Yang stated at the plea hearing that no one had forced or coerced him into pleading guilty. The district court found that Yang did not meet his burden to withdraw his plea under the manifest-injustice standard.
Next, the district court read into the record the fair-and-just standard of Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, which governs plea withdrawals, and acknowledged that it must give due consideration to (1) the reasons advanced by Yang and (2) potential prejudice to the state if the district court granted the plea-withdrawal motion. But the district court did not explicitly apply the fair-and-just standard to the motion. The district court denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea and proceeded to sentencing.
Yang then requested a downward dispositional departure. Yang argued that (1) he provided financial support to his family, (2) he would do well in treatment, (3) he had little criminal history, and (4) he would remain law-abiding. The state argued that Yang's reluctance to take responsibility for his actions, as well as the recommendation in the presentence investigation (PSI) report, weighed against a downward departure. The district court denied the motion for the downward dispositional departure, stating that Yang's actions indicated that he would not do well in treatment and that he was angry and posed a safety risk to the victim and their children.
The district court sentenced Yang to the custody of the commissioner of corrections for a term of 48 months, credit for 24 days served, followed by a ten-year conditional release, and lifetime predatory-offender registration. This appeal follows.
The first issue Yang raises on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion by denying his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea without giving due consideration under the fair-and-just standard to the reasons advanced by Yang insupport of the motion. A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). Withdrawal is appropriate in two circumstances. First, a district court must allow a defendant to withdraw his plea at any time if "withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice." Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. Second, a district court may permit withdrawal before sentencing "if it is fair and just to do so." Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2; State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). In his motion to withdraw, Yang did not indicate whether he sought withdrawal under the manifest-injustice or the fair-and-just standard. But Yang brought his motion to withdraw prior to sentencing; so on appeal he argues that the district court erred in only considering the manifest-injustice standard and not giving due consideration to whether it would be "fair and just" to permit him to withdraw his plea.
While Yang raises the issue under the fair-and-just standard, he first argues that his plea was invalid because it was involuntary and unintelligent. If a plea is invalid, the manifest-injustice standard requires withdrawal. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1; see also Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 646 (). We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under the manifest-injustice standard de novo as a question of law. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. There are three requirements for a valid plea: "it must be accurate, voluntary and intelligent." Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 646 (quoting State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994)).
Yang argues that his family coerced him into pleading guilty by giving him an ultimatum: if he did not accept the plea, his family would stop providing financial assistance that Yang needed to pay his attorney. To find a plea to be involuntary due to coercion, the record must unequivocally support a finding that the coercion resulted in "overbearing the will of the defendant." Sykes v. State, 578 N.W.2d 807, 813 (Minn. App. 1998), review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998). The only statements in the record that support Yang's coercion argument are his own statements in his affidavit and the arguments advanced by his counsel. We conclude that the record does not support a conclusion that Yang's will was overborne by family pressures.
Next, Yang argues his plea was not intelligent because he did not fully understand the terms of his plea agreement. "The intelligence requirement ensures that a defendant understands the charges against him, the rights he is waiving, and the consequences of his plea." Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96 (citing State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983)). "'Consequences' refers to a plea's direct consequences, namely the maximum sentence and fine." Id. If promises regarding the consequences a defendant will face by pleading guilty induce a plea and those promises cannot be fulfilled, then the plea is invalid. See State v. Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d 42, 43 (Minn. 2000) ().
Yang supports his unintelligent-plea argument in his affidavit to the district court by stating that he did not learn that he would be imprisoned for 48 months until he participated in the PSI. But the record amply supports the conclusion that Yang entered an intelligent plea. Yang signed the plea petition, which states that the maximum penaltyfor the crime is imprisonment for 15 years and requires predatory registration and a period of conditional release. The plea petition does not guarantee a probationary sentence or state that the parties have agreed to particular terms of the sentence. Further, during the plea hearing, the parties stated that they would...
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