State v. Yarber
| Decision Date | 15 October 1999 |
| Citation | 5 S.W.3d 592 |
| Parties | (Mo.App. S.D. 1999) State of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Aaron Yarber, Defendant-Appellant. 22790 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Mississippi County, Hon. David A. Dolan
Counsel for Appellant: Irene Karns
Counsel for Respondent: Susan K. Glass
Opinion Summary: None
Following jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, and sentenced as a prior drug offender to fifteen years' imprisonment. Defendant appeals, presenting one point relied on.
Defendant contends that the State failed to make a submissible case "in that the presence of a small amount of cocaine-based substance concealed behind the bolt that secured the passenger seat of the car in which Mr. Yarber was riding does not show knowing and conscious possession, and thus will not sustain his conviction for that offense."
In reviewing to determine if evidence is sufficient, an appellate court considers the evidence together with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict, and disregards all contrary evidence and inferences. State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Mo.banc), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 997 (1993). In determining whether the evidence is sufficient, the court considers whether a reasonable juror could find each of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 411. An appellate court does not decide disputed facts, but may determine that the verdict was "based on sheer speculation." Id. at 414.
To support a conviction for possession of a controlled substance, the state must prove: (1) conscious and intentional possession of the substance, either actual or constructive; and (2) that the defendant was aware of the presence and nature of the substance. State v. Sours, 946 S.W.2d 747, 752 (Mo.App. 1997). Both elements may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Id. The State contends in its brief that the evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient, stating:
In the instant case, there was sufficient inculpatory evidence, in addition to the appellant's presence in the car, to convict him of possession of a controlled substance. The evidence presented at trial established that the appellant paid Garfield Mooney $15.00 to drive him from Sikeston to Charleston to the house of an unidentified person at 1:00 a.m. However, when they arrived in Charleston, the appellant could not locate the residence. Instead of returning to Sikeston, the appellant instructed Mooney to continue driving around and told him where to go and where to turn. As they were driving around, they encountered a young man standing near the street. The appellant instructed Mooney to stop, got out of the car, and stood talking with the man for less than a minute. He then returned to the car, and Mooney drove off. A few minutes later, Mooney was pulled over by Officer Palmer-Moody for an inoperable license plate lamp. During this traffic stop, the car was searched, and the cocaine was found under the passenger seat directly within the reach of the appellant. Mooney testified that the cocaine did not belong to him and that he had not placed it under the seat.
As such, the evidence presented at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, established that immediately after a late night encounter with a man on the street, crack cocaine was found in the car in which the appellant as riding, underneath the seat where he was sitting, directly within his reach. A reasonable juror could infer from this evidence that the appellant had paid Mooney to take him to Charleston to buy drugs. A reasonable juror could also infer from this evidence that the appellant purchased the drugs from the man on the street during their brief encounter. A reasonable juror could further infer from this evidence that the appellant had placed the crack under his seat during the traffic stop to avoid its detection. Because the jury here found the appellant guilty, it is clear that it made these logical and reasonable inferences based upon the evidence presented to it. [References to transcript omitted.]In State v. Ray, 747 S.W.2d 765 (Mo.App. 1988), defendant was charged with the possession of a controlled substance. He was a passenger in a vehicle which contained cocaine. After stating that possession and knowledge may be...
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State v. Arnold
...view); State v. Johnson, 81 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Mo.App.2002) (marijuana hidden in the “factory voids” of the vehicle); State v. Yarber, 5 S.W.3d 592, 593 (Mo.App.1999) (cocaine-based substance concealed behind the bolt that secured the passenger seat); State v. Mercado, 887 S.W.2d 688, 691 (Mo......
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State v. Glass
...). See State v. Ray, 747 S.W.2d 765, 766 (Mo.App.E.D.1988) (citing State v. Barber, 635 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Mo.1982) ); State v. Yarber, 5 S.W.3d 592, 593–94 (Mo.App.S.D.1999). There must be some incriminating evidence that the defendant knew of the 439 S.W.3d 843manufacturing process and that......
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State v. Buford, No. SD 29601 (Mo. App. 3/3/2010)
...testify, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant had constructively possessed the cocaine. Id. In State v. Yarber, 5 S.W.3d 592 (Mo. App. S.D. 1999), the defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance when a small baggie was found secured to a bolt be......
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State v. Buford
...there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant had constructively possessed the cocaine. Id. In State v. Yarber, 5 S.W.3d 592 (Mo. App. S.D.1999), the defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance when a small baggie was found secured to a bolt beneath the ......