State v. Yoshida

Decision Date29 July 1960
Docket NumberNo. 4132,4132
Citation44 Haw. 352,354 P.2d 986
PartiesSTATE of Hawaii v. FRANCIS NOBORU YOSHIDA.
CourtHawaii Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Although the corpus delicti cannot be established by the extrajudicial confession of the defendant unsupported by any other evidence, it is not necessary to make full proof of it by evidence entirely independent and exclusive of the confession.

2. A voluntary confession may be received in evidence even though the corpus delicti is not fully established by independent evidence when the confession and the independent evidence taken together establish the corpus delicti and the truth of the admission or admissions in the confession relied on to augment and complete the proof of the corpus delicti is fortified by substantial independent evidence.

3. Where the evidence adduced upon a preliminary hearing is conflicting on the point of whether or not a confession was voluntarily made, the court's finding that the confession was voluntarily made is conclusive as to the preliminary question of admissibility if such finding is supported by more than a mere scintilla of evidence.

O. P. Soares, Honolulu, for plaintiff in error.

John H. Peters, Pros. Atty., City and County of Honolulu, and Frederick J. Titcomb and Mack F. H. Hamada, Deputy Pros. Attys., Honolulu, for the State, defendant in error.

Before TSUKIYAMA, C. J., and MARUMOTO, CASSIDY, WIRTZ and LEWIS, JJ.

CASSIDY, Justice.

This is an appeal from a conviction of the defendant on a charge of procuring and pimping in violation of R.L.H.1955, section 309-28. The defendant was found guilty by a jury under an indictment alleging that he 'did induce, compel and procure Purline Robinson, a female person, to practice prostitution, with the intent thereby to obtain and secure from said female person a portion of the gains earned by her in such practice.'

We have heretofore held that the only ruling properly reserved for consideration on this appeal pertains to the admission of a written confession. 44 Haw. 81, 351 P.2d 1097.

Evidence was adduced by the prosecution showing that on August 29, 1958, the defendant gave the police a statement, in question and answer form, which was reduced to writing and signed by him. In it, the defendant related that he had met Purline Robinson about five months before, that he became intimate with her and that they entered into an agreement calling for her to practice prostitution with the proceeds therefrom to be split between them. As he explained: 'She needed money, I needed money. So we came to an agreement. * * * I find a man that would want to go with her--for intercourse. * * * I would make the contacts and we would split fifty-fifty.' The defendant further admitted that on three or four occasions, the dates of which he could not recall, he had taken Purline Robinson to a place in the vicinity of the Waialae Drive-In Theatre in Honolulu and that on each of the occasions he had driven her elsewhere to have sexual intercourse with men he had made arrangements with for that purpose. He stated that the rate charged for each act was $10 or $12 and that 'I collected the money--sometimes she did.' He said that in the one week involved there were about fifteen acts and that he received $75 and she the rest. The defendant also stated that a Norman Texeira acted on his behalf three or four times in making arrangements with a 'customer' for Purline Robinson. He was asked if he knew what money arrangements Texeira had with Purline Robinson for lining up these customers, and he replied, 'He was doing it as a favor to me.'

The defendant objected to the admission of the written statement on two specific grounds; viz., (1) 'The corpus delicti in this case has not been proven,' and (2) 'The statement was not voluntarily made.' The objections will be taken up in the order stated.

The independent proof of the corpus delicti rested almost wholly on the testimony of Purline Robinson. As far as bearing on the issue to be first considered, it is summarized hereunder.

She was nineteen years old. She came to Honolulu in January, 1958, with the hope of making arrangements with her husband, who was living here, for a divorce. She lived with her husband for a month. They then parted and went their separate ways. She met the defendant some time in February and soon became intimate with him. In the middle of March he asked her if she wanted 'to work for him' and make some 'fast money.' He explained he meant for her to work as a prostitute. She refused the proposal and broke off relations with him. Later they made up, and near the end of June he again asked her to go to work for him. She agreed to do so when he threatened to write her parents on the mainland that she was working as a prostitute here. The defendant told her he would let her know when she was to begin work. On the evening of July 7, 1958, the defendant and one Norman Texeira called on and then drove her, in defendant's automobile, to Texeira's home back of the Waialae Drive-In Theatre, where a group of men were gambling in the basement. She was told by the defendant and Texeira that these men were the men she was to go with and that she was 'to play up' to them. Shortly after her arrival Texeira called her out of the house and after a conversation with him (which on objection she was not permitted to relate) she went to the defendant's car where he was waiting with one of the men who had been at the gambling game. The defendant drove her and this individual to another location, sometimes referred to in her testimony as 'the camp.' She entered a room and had intercourse with the man while the defendant waited in the car. Defendant later drove her back to the game and on six or seven other occasions during the course of the evening took her with one of the gamblers to the camp for the same purpose involved on the first trip. The men solicited were all strangers to her. The defendant also called for and took her to Texeira's place on the nights of July 8 and July 15. On each of those nights, with either Texeira or the defendant transporting her and a 'customer' to the place of assignation, there was a repetition of the routine that occurred on the night of July 7. She did not receive money from any of the men she had intercourse with. She was not given any money by the defendant or any one else and she had no direct knowledge that the defendant received any money from or on account of her activities.

Purline Robinson identified an individual brought into the courtroom while she was on the witness stand as one of the men who had been transported with her from the gambling game to the camp by the defendant. She knew him only by the name of Daniel. Daniel was called by the prosecution. He was the only other witness contributing any independent evidence in proof of the charge. He denied that he had been at the place where the gambling occurred, but testified that on an evening in the summer of 1958, the defendant and Norman Texeira accompanied by Purline Robinson drove up to the place where he lived, that the two men approached him and, with Texeira as spokesman, asked him if he 'wanted a woman.' He said he asked them, 'How much?' and that, on being told the charge was $10, he accepted the proposal. He said he was told to get the money, that he did so and thereupon he and the woman went into a room and had sexual intercourse. He testified he paid Purline Robinson $10 and that she and the two men left in the automobile they had come in.

The two elements constituting the corpus delicti here involved are: (1) The inducement of a female to practice prostitution, and (2) The accompanying intent to participate in the earnings from such practice.

The prosecution's evidence aliunde the confession directly establishes that the defendant prevailed upon or induced Purline Robinson to practice prostitution and no question has been raised respecting the sufficiency of the independent proof on this element of the offense. It is appellant's contention however that, independent of his confession, 'there was not a scintilla of evidence from which it could be properly inferred that defendant ever intended to obtain and secure from her a portion of her earnings as a prostitute' and that, therefore, 'since the corpus delicti was never established, the admissions and confessions of the defendant were improperly used to procure his conviction.'

Appellant's contention calls first for consideration of the proposal underlying it to the effect that a confession of an accused may not be used in any respect to obtain or support a conviction unless each of the essential elements of the corpus delicti is established by independent proof. A similar contention was made in Republic of Hawaii v. Tokuji, 9 Haw. 548. The court by-passed ruling on the point but made the discerning comment that it 'does not appear to have been invariably held in other courts, that the principle of law contended for is correct.' That decision was rendered in 1894. Since then there have been two cases in this jurisdiction, Territory of Hawaii v. Sumngat, 38 Haw. 609 and Territory v. Hart, 24 Haw. 349, involving the general subject under consideration, but in neither was the precise issue here presented squarely raised or passed on by the court. In the same period a great number of decisions have been rendered on the subject in other jurisdictions. See 127 A.L.R. 1130 and 45 A.L.R.2d 1316. There is no uniformity in the holdings. At one extreme, Massachusetts permits a conviction to rest on a naked confession. Commonwealth v. Kimball, 321 Mass. 290, 73 N.E.2d 468. In Pennsylvania, at the other extreme, a confession may not be taken into consideration unless the corpus delicti is proved beyond a reasonable doubt by independent evidence. Commonwealth v. Puglise, 276 Pa. 235, 120 A. 401. From the welter of available cases with holdings ranging the full course between these extremes...

To continue reading

Request your trial
34 cases
  • State v. Hafford
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 7 Marzo 2000
    ...v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 940 (7th Cir. 1988) ("corpus delicti rule no longer exists in the federal system"); State v. Yoshida, 44 Hawaii 352,357-58, 354 P.2d 986 (1960) (adopting trustworthiness rule); State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 222, 235-36, 337 S.E.2d 487 (1985) (same). Following these auth......
  • State v. Bishop
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • 6 Marzo 2014
    ...v. Hafford, 252 Conn. 274, 746 A.2d 150, 174 (2000); Harrison v. United States, 281 A.2d 222, 224–25 (D.C.1971); State v. Yoshida, 44 Haw. 352, 354 P.2d 986, 990–92 (1960); State v. Heiges, 806 N.W.2d 1, 13 (Minn.2011); State v. True, 210 Neb. 701, 316 N.W.2d 623, 625 (1982); State v. Zysk,......
  • State v. Shon
    • United States
    • Hawaii Supreme Court
    • 4 Octubre 1963
    ...ruling on its voluntariness 3 is therefore unassailable. State v. Ponteras, 44 Haw. 71, 80-81, 351 P.2d 1097, 1102; State v. Yoshida, 44 Haw. 352, 364-365, 354 P.2d 986, 993; State v. Foster, 44 Haw. 403, 412-413, 354 P.2d 960, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Culombe v. Connecticut, 36......
  • State v. Aten
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 27 Noviembre 1996
    ...v. State, 17 Wis.2d 468, 117 N.W.2d 626, 633 (1962) cert denied, 375 U.S. 873, 84 S.Ct. 36, 11 L.Ed.2d 104 (1963); State v. Yoshida, 44 Haw. 352 354 P.2d 986, 990-91 (1960).99 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966). Miranda applies only if a ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT