State v. Young

• Decision Date: 15 July 2015
• Docket Number: 2015-UP-345
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: The State, Respondent, v. Steve Young, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2013-002417

The State, Respondent, v. Steve Young, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2013-002417

No. 2015-UP-345

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

July 15, 2015

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Heard April 13, 2015

Appeal From Lexington County Steven H. John, Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Matthew C. Buchanan, of the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Steve Young appeals the circuit court's decision to toll his probation while he is incarcerated for committing criminal offenses that were not a violation of his probation. Specifically, Young contends the circuit court abused its discretion in tolling his probation because the State did not charge him with any violations of his probation and the circuit court did not find any violations other than his willful failure to remain current on his financial obligations. We affirm.

We find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the tolling of Young's probation. See State v Miller, 404 S.C. 29, 33, 744 S.E.2d 532, 535 (2013) ("The determination of probation matters lies within the sound discretion of the [circuit] court. An appellate court will reverse the [circuit] court's decision where there has been an abuse of discretion." (citations omitted)). First, we find tolling was proper because the circuit court found Young willfully violated the terms of his probation. According to our supreme court, the general rule in most jurisdictions is that tolling is appropriate when authorities cannot supervise the probationer due to his wrongful acts because he "should not be allowed to profit from his own misconduct which prevents supervision by probationary authorities." 404 S.C. at 37, 744 S.E.2d at 537. In Miller, the court held "[t]he references to tolling by our own appellate courts have . . . focused on fault-based grounds. Thus, . . . the tolling of probation must be premised on a violation of a condition of probation or a statutory directive." Id.

Unlike the probationer in Miller, who was involuntarily committed to a sexually violent predator program, Young was imprisoned for voluntarily committing criminal offenses. Importantly, the circuit court found Young violated the terms of his probation by willfully failing to make required restitution and fee payments. Although the circuit court found Young had violated his probation, it did not revoke his probation because the subject of the hearing was a motion to toll. Young should not be allowed to profit from his own misconduct by having his probationary term continue to run while he is not under probationary supervision. See 404 S.C. at 37, 744 S.E.2d at 537. Therefore, the circuit court's decision to toll his probation complied with the supreme court's holding in Miller. Id.

Second we note the circuit court hearing did not implicate Young's due process rights because it was a motion hearing, not a revocation hearing. See, e.g. Dangerfield v....