State v. Young
Decision Date | 17 May 2019 |
Docket Number | No. 119,265,119,265 |
Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Paul B. YOUNG, Appellant. |
Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Sam Schirer, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.
Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before Arnold-Burger, C.J., Pierron, J., and McAnany, S.J.
In 1999, Paul B. Young was convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child under 14 years of age. As a result of this conviction, he was required to register for his lifetime under the Kansas Offender Registration Act, K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-4901 et seq. (KORA).
In 2010, Young pled guilty to two KORA violations. Then, in 2016, Young pled guilty to his third KORA violation.
On July 31, 2017, the State charged Young with his fourth KORA violation. Young was still on probation from his third KORA violation at the time of this fourth violation. The underlying sentence for his third KORA violation was a mitigated 61-month guideline prison sentence.
At a hearing on October 19, 2017, Young appeared with his attorney and waived his right to a preliminary hearing. He had no plea agreement with the State. Nevertheless, he informed the court that he wished to plead guilty. Before the hearing Young had signed an acknowledgment of his rights in which he stated that he understood that upon conviction of a fourth KORA violation the sentence the court could impose ranged from 55 to 247 months. The district court informed Young of his rights and his potential sentence and inquired if he understood those rights. Young had no questions about his rights and the consequences for entering a plea and expressed the desire to enter a guilty plea. He stated that the State's charging document was correct, and he agreed there was a factual basis for the charge. The district court found that Young "knowingly, intelligently, freely, and voluntarily waived his rights," accepted Young's plea, found him guilty as charged, and ordered a presentence investigation.
Before sentencing Young moved for a downward durational departure.
On December 7, 2017, the court held a combined hearing on Young's probation violation and for sentencing on his fourth KORA conviction. Young admitted to six probation violations in his prior case. The State recommended that Young's probation be revoked and that he serve his underlying prison sentence of 61 months.
Young agreed with his criminal history as reported to the court and agreed that his criminal history score was D. Based on that score, the sentencing grid range for his fourth KORA violation was 89-94-100 months.
Young's counsel argued that there were substantial and compelling reasons for the court to depart from the guidelines and impose a sentence of 36 months to be served concurrently with his 61-month sentence in his prior case. He argued that it would be manifestly unjust to do otherwise because the current conviction arose from an 11-day delay in registering after moving to a new address, that Young was otherwise in compliance with his registration requirements, and that Young took responsibility for his actions. He also addressed the probation violations related to Young's KORA violation conviction.
The State requested that the court impose the low number guideline sentence of 89 months but argued that Young's sentence should be served consecutively to his 61-month prison sentence in the prior case in which he violated probation because it would not be manifestly unjust to do so.
The district court declined to depart, finding that there were no substantial and compelling reasons to grant a departure from the guideline sentence for Young's current KORA offense. But the court imposed the "lowest minimum sentence" of 89 months in the custody of the Secretary of Corrections. In a separate hearing, the court ordered Young to serve his underlying prison sentence in the case in which he violated probation.
Young's appeal brings the matter before us.
Young contends on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in failing to find that manifest injustice would occur by allowing his sentence for his KORA violation to run consecutive to his sentence in his prior criminal case. He argues that it is unreasonable to imprison him for over a decade "on account of [his] inability to comply with filing deadlines." On the other hand, the State contends that we are without jurisdiction to consider this issue because Young's sentence was within the presumptive range.
Whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law over which our review is unlimited. State v. Smith , 304 Kan. 916, 919, 377 P.3d 414 (2016). We do not have discretionary power to entertain appeals from all district court orders. Kansas Medical Mut. Ins. Co. v. Svaty , 291 Kan. 597, 609-10, 244 P.3d 642 (2010). To the contrary, the right to appeal is entirely statutory. It is not contained in the United States or Kansas Constitutions. Subject to certain exceptions, our appellate courts have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal only if the appeal is taken in the manner prescribed by our statutes. Smith , 304 Kan. at 919, 377 P.3d 414 ; State v. Gill , 287 Kan. 289, 294, 196 P.3d 369 (2008).
K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6820(c) provides that an appellate court shall not review on appeal a sentence for a felony conviction that is (1) within the presumptive guidelines sentence for the crime or (2) the result of a plea agreement between the State and the defendant which the trial court approved on the record. State v. Sprung , 294 Kan. 300, 317, 277 P.3d 1100 (2012) ( ).
Here, Young was convicted of a KORA violation, a severity level 3 person felony. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-4903(a), (c)(1)(C) ; K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-4905(g). Because his crime was committed while on probation for a previous felony conviction, his sentence was required to run consecutive to other sentences by operation of law. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6606(c).
But Young argues that he is not appealing his presumptive sentences in either this case or in his probation revocation case. To the contrary, and relying on State v. Rose , No. 90,111, 2004 WL 117358, at *1 (Kan. App. 2004) (unpublished opinion), Young argues that he is challenging the court's decision not to make a special finding that would result in concurrent sentences in these two cases. He also relies on our Supreme Court's holding in State v. Ross , 295 Kan. 1126, 289 P.3d 76 (2012). The State does not discuss either of these cases in its appellate brief.
In Rose , an appeal brought by the State, the defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary, burglary, and felony theft. Sentences for these crimes are included in the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines sentencing grid. At the time Rose committed these crimes he was on parole for a 1991 robbery conviction, which carried a preguidelines indeterminate sentence of up to 20 years. Upon Rose's current convictions, the district court 2004 WL 117358, at *1. On appeal, the State contended the appellate court had jurisdiction to consider whether the district court abused its discretion in finding manifest injustice to support the imposition of concurrent rather than consecutive sentences. The court determined it had jurisdiction to consider the State's appeal because it was on a question reserved regarding a statute that had not previously been interpreted by the court.
The Rose court noted the holding in State v. Ware , 262 Kan. 180, 181-82, 938 P.2d 197 (1997), that the discretionary imposition of consecutive sentences is not an appealable issue. Ware had been convicted of felony murder, an off-grid crime, and aggravated robbery, an on-grid crime.
‘ ’ Rose , 2004 WL 117358, at *2.
But the Rose court distinguished Ware :
Rose , 2004 WL 117358, at *2,.
In Ross , another case Young relies on, the defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion in denying his request to have his sentence for felony murder (an off-grid sentence) run concurrent with his sentence for kidnapping (an on-grid crime). In considering the jurisdiction issue, the Ross court noted its prior decisions in Ware and in State v. Flores , 268 Kan. 657, 999 P.2d 919 (2...
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