State v. Young, No. A04-0613.

Decision Date02 March 2006
Docket NumberNo. A04-0613.
Citation710 N.W.2d 272
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jeffery Lamar YOUNG, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Bradford William Colbert, St. Paul, for appellant.

Mike Hatch, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Robert M.A. Johnson, Anoka County Atty., Robert D. Goodell, Asst. County Atty., Anoka, for respondent.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

ANDERSON, G. BARRY, Justice.

Jeffery Lamar Young appeals from his convictions of first-degree felony murder, second-degree intentional murder, second-degree assault, and kidnapping. Young requests a reversal of his murder convictions based on insufficient evidence. In the alternative, alleging error on several grounds, Young seeks a new trial. Because sufficient evidence sustains the murder convictions and there is no error warranting a new trial, we affirm.

This direct appeal arises out of the murder of Curtis Anthony, the assault and kidnapping of Precious Franklin, and the assault and kidnapping of R.E., Franklin's son. Anthony was attacked and shot at Franklin's apartment in the early morning hours of November 3, 2002. He later died as a result of the gunshot wound. Lennell Martin was also convicted of Anthony's murder. See State v. Martin, 695 N.W.2d 578, 582 (Minn.2005).

Anthony, at the time of his death, had been living with Franklin and her son, R.E., for about two months. Anthony had previously been involved in a relationship with Monique Frye and they had a daughter together. Frye is a cousin of Martin and Young. Frye had previously called Martin and Young when she had problems with Anthony "so they could talk to [Anthony] and calm him down." Frye eventually applied for a restraining order against Anthony. She testified that she applied for the order because Anthony threatened to shoot her and her boyfriend. Frye also testified that Young had encouraged her to use the court system to resolve her issues with Anthony and that Young had once calmed Anthony when Anthony began to get belligerent with the police. The day before Anthony's death, Anthony went to his daughter's dance studio, an area included in the order.

On the morning of November 3, 2002, at approximately 4:00 a.m., Franklin awoke and went to check on R.E. She noticed that her kitchen light was on and when she entered her kitchen she was confronted by a man holding a gun and a man holding a knife. Franklin testified that she did not know the men. She screamed and ran into the bedroom, waking Anthony. The two men followed Franklin into the bedroom, pointing the gun at both Anthony and Franklin. R.E. entered the bedroom and joined Franklin and Anthony on the bed. Franklin and Anthony pleaded with the men for R.E.'s safety. The man with the gun took Franklin's arm and placed her and R.E. in the bathroom. While in the bathroom, Franklin heard the men "interrogating" Anthony and she heard Anthony say "I don't know where" and "cousin." She also heard Anthony "making noises like he was hurt."

During this time, Franklin's upstairs neighbor had heard Franklin's scream and had walked outside the building to investigate. He saw a greenish-colored Cadillac parked near the apartment building. He came back inside and knocked at Franklin's door. While at the door, the neighbor heard a man say, "That's my money." Franklin heard a knock on her door, followed by a gunshot and noises as if people were running out of the apartment. The neighbor also heard the gunshot and ran upstairs to his apartment to call the police. Franklin emerged from the bathroom and saw Anthony bent over, bleeding heavily and having difficulty breathing. Franklin testified that Anthony told her, "Call the police. Jeff and Lenair" or "Call the police. It's Jeff and Lennell." By the time the police arrived Anthony was unable to say anything more than that he could not breathe. He stopped breathing within minutes of the arrival of the police.

The police officer who spoke with Franklin at the scene testified that Franklin told him that there were two perpetrators and that one perpetrator's name was "Lenny" or "Lennell." Franklin was later interviewed by a detective who testified that Franklin stated that Anthony had told her to call the police and tell the police "Jeff and Lenair or Lennell." Franklin later approached the detective and told him she had spoken with Anthony's sister and that "Jeff and Lennell" were cousins of Anthony's former girlfriend. Police spoke with Frye, who gave them the full names of Young and Martin. Later that day, Franklin identified Martin out of a photographic lineup as the perpetrator who had carried the gun. After she made that identification, she pointed to another picture on the lineup and indicated that she thought that was the other suspect "but I told them that I wasn't absolutely positive but some of the traits were similar." Franklin testified that at that point the police told her "No. No. The second suspect isn't on this one." The next day, Franklin identified Young out of a separate photographic lineup.

The day after Anthony was shot, Young and Martin voluntarily went to talk to the police. In his statement to police, Young said he did not know where Anthony lived and that he was at his sister's home at the time Anthony was killed. Blood found in Martin's vehicle, a blue-green Cadillac, matched Anthony's DNA profile. Other blood found in the vehicle contained a mixture of DNA profiles. The predominant profile in the mixture matched Anthony's profile, and Young and Martin could not be excluded as contributors to the mixture. Young's fingerprint was found on the driver's window in Martin's car. In addition, a handwritten note containing directions to Franklin's apartment was found in Young's vehicle. A handwriting expert testified that there were indications that Young had written the note but was unable to make a positive identification of the author. At trial, Young presented expert testimony that no blood had been found in his car or on his or Martin's clothing. In addition he presented the testimony of three character witnesses.

Young was convicted of first-degree felony murder, second-degree intentional murder, two counts of second-degree assault and two counts of kidnapping. He was acquitted of first-degree premeditated murder. Young was sentenced to life imprisonment for the first-degree felony murder conviction. The district court imposed sentences of 36 months imprisonment for each of the assault convictions and sentences of 36 and 58 months for the kidnapping convictions. Each of these four sentences was imposed concurrently with Young's life sentence. Young directly appeals his convictions to this court.

Young raises the following six issues on appeal:

1. Was the evidence sufficient to support Young's convictions of first-degree felony murder and second-degree intentional murder?

2. Did the state commit misconduct in closing argument, and, if so, does such misconduct constitute reversible error?

3. Did the district court commit reversible error when it permitted the state to introduce Franklin's previous identification of Young?

4. Did the district court commit reversible error by denying Young's motion to remove a juror for cause?

5. Did the district court's admission of Anthony's hearsay statement constitute reversible error?

6. Did the district court commit reversible error by refusing the jury's request during deliberations for a transcript of Franklin's testimony?

I.

Young was convicted of first-degree felony murder, Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) (2004); the underlying felony was burglary. Young was also convicted of second-degree intentional murder, Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2004). Both of these crimes require an intentional killing. See Minn.Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(3), 609.19, subd. 1(1). Young argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he committed Anthony's murder intentionally, and therefore he asks this court to reverse his convictions of first and second-degree murder. The state argues that there is sufficient evidence to show that Martin intentionally killed Anthony and that Young is liable as an accomplice under Minn.Stat. § 609.05 (2004).

When reviewing sufficiency of evidence, we inquire "whether, given the facts in the record and any legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a jury could reasonably find that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense." State v. Pierson, 530 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Minn.1995). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn.1989).

To convict Young under Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) or Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1), the state must prove that Young, or someone for whose crimes Young is liable under Minn.Stat. § 609.05, caused the death of Anthony "with intent to effect the death of [Anthony] or another." Minn.Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(3), 609.19, subd. 1(1). In this case, the state did not seriously pursue the theory that Young actually shot Anthony, and instead argued, both to the jury and on appeal, that Young is liable for the crimes of Martin under section 609.05. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to support Young's convictions if there is: (1) sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably find that Martin caused the death of Anthony with the intent to effect the death of Anthony, and (2) sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably find Young liable for Martin's crimes under section 609.05.

A. Whether sufficient evidence exists for the jury to reasonably find that Martin possessed the requisite intent to kill.

Martin had the intent required by Minn.Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(3), 609.19, subd. 1(1), if he either had a purpose to kill Anthony or believed that his actions, if successful, would kill Anthony. See Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2004). "Intent is an inference drawn by the jury from the totality of circumstances." State v. Raymond, ...

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