State v. Youngren, 39927
| Decision Date | 23 December 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 39927,39927 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Dale R. YOUNGREN, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
Where both the court and the county attorney have expressed misgivings concerning the propriety of prosecuting a criminal charge, and on the recommendation of the county attorney the court has accepted a plea of guilty to a lesser offense, and after a presentence interrogation the court finds the plea was improvidently entered, the remedy is not to reinstate the original charge but to require defendant to stand trial on the lesser offense.
D. O. Comer and D. W. Hassenstab, Hutchinson, C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Henry Feikema, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Robert W. Mattson, Atty. Gen., Gerard Snell, Sol. Gen., St. Paul, for respondent.
Defendant appeals from a conviction for rape for which he was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 7 to 30 years in the State Prison. He was originally charged with having raped one Karen Braun on April 3, 1963, in Sibley County. The information alleged that the victim's resistance was forcibly overcome. In July 1964, defendant was arrested in Florida, waived extradition, and was brought to Minnesota for trial. At a preliminary hearing in the criminal division of the probate court the victim testified among other things that she consumed no alcohol the night of the offense, she had visited no saloons or taverns that evening, and defendant had not kissed her prior to the crime. At that hearing in the presence of defendant's counsel the county attorney moved to amend the complaint to charge that 'the resistance of the said Karen Braun was prevented by her fear that the said Dale Youngren would inflict immediate and great bodily harm upon her,' bringing the charge within paragraph (3) rather than paragraph (2) of Minn.St. 617.01. Over defendant's objection that motion was granted.
In September 1964 the defendant was arraigned on the amended information and pled not guilty. The following month counsel for defendant appeared before the district court and stated that his client was prepared to plead guilty to the crime of assault in the second degree. 1 Thereupon, the county attorney recommended that defendant's request be honored for reasons set forth in an accompanying affidavit, advising the court that the victim had committed perjury at the preliminary hearing in important particulars referred to above, which, in the words of the county attorney, would make a prosecution for rape 'border upon an unjust undertaking.' 2 In response the court stated:
'* * * (T)he Court is also of the opinion that the interest of justice will be served by accepting the plea which has been offered at this time * * *.
'* * * (Y)our plea of guilty will be recorded.'
The defendant was then sworn and a presentence interrogation was conducted by the court. In the course of the examination defendant stated that he was intoxicated the night of the offense and didn't know what he was doing or whether he intended to harm the victim. He did not observe any evidence that she had been injured. At that point the court stated:
'Under these circumstances, gentlemen, I have my doubts whether we should accept his plea.'
Thereupon the following colloquy occurred:
'MR. SCOTT (county attorney): I think, Your Honor, if it please the Court, the statement the accused has made with reference to your inquiry would seem to indicate great inconsistencies to a plea of guilty to any charge. For this reason I would request the Court to allow me to withdraw my recommendation on the acceptance of a lower charge with the idea the State will have to proceed as if this application had not been made.
'THE COURT: The plea of guilty to the charge as stated is set aside and also the Court vacates its order accepting the plea to the assault charge leaving the charge as originally filed stand and the plea of not guilty to the crime charged therein will stand of record and this matter will proceed for trial as soon as counsel for the Defendant and the State can arrange for that.'
Nothing in the record shows that either defendant or his counsel objected to the ruling or questioned the order reinstating the rape charge.
We have in a number of recent cases stressed the impropriety of accepting a plea of guilty where statements made by the defendant at the time of arraignment or sentencing are inconsistent with his guilt. 3 While we do not necessarily agree that the defendant's answers required the court to rule as it did, it was nevertheless the court's duty and prerogative to set aside the plea if he concluded that there was an inconsistency. However, by refusing to accept a plea of guilty to assault, the court was not compelled to reinstate the charge of rape. As we view the matter, upon the request of the prosecutor that the court accept a plea of guilty to a lesser offense because he believed the more serious charge to be unwarranted, followed by the defendant's entering a plea and the court's formally accepting and recording it in the minutes, there was under the circumstances an abandonment of the original charge which foreclosed further proceedings with respect to that offense. 4
We recognize that ordinarily a defense of the kind here considered must be affirmatively asserted in the trial court or it is waived. However, where both the court and the prosecutor have expressed grave misgivings concerning the justice and propriety of proceeding with the prosecution, and the court in attempting to protect defendant has refused to accept a plea of guilty to a lesser charge and has thereby unwittingly exposed defendant to a maximum term of 30 years rather than 5 years, the result is so unfair as to justify our granting relief. Accordingly, we hold that the defendant's conviction for rape is reversed and he is herewith discharged with respect to that offense. However, the matter is remanded to the district court with leave to proceed with the prosecution against the defendant for assault in the second degree, as to which defendant may elect to plead guilty or stand trial.
In the event defendant is convicted, he will be given credit on any sentence thereupon imposed for the term he has already served as well as for the time he was held in custody pending his first trial. § 609.145.
Reversed and remanded.
APPENDIX
The affidavit reads as follows:
'William P. Scott, County Attorney for Sibley County, Minnesota, being first duly sworn, on oath deposes and says:
'On October 8, 1964, the...
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