Steadwell v. Warden, Connecticut Correctional Inst.

• Decision Date: 02 February 1982
• Citation: 186 Conn. 153,439 A.2d 1078
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Charles STEADWELL v. WARDEN, CONNECTICUT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, Somers.

Page 1078

439 A.2d 1078

186 Conn. 153

Charles STEADWELL v. WARDEN, CONNECTICUT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, Somers.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 5, 1981.

Decided Feb. 2, 1982.

Jon C. Blue, New Haven, for appellant (plaintiff).

Patricia M. Strong, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom on the brief, was Carl R. Ajello, Atty. Gen., for appellee (defendant).

Before PETERS, PARSKEY, ARMENTANO, SHEA and WRIGHT, JJ.

ARMENTANO, Associate Justice.

This case presents a question of first impression in this state concerning the extent to which presentence investigation reports in the possession of the department of correction are subject to disclosure under the Personal Data Act, General Statutes §§ 4-190 to 4-197.

The facts are not disputed. The department of correction (hereinafter D. O. C.) maintains personal data files concerning inmates in its custody. After July 1, 1977, when the Personal Data Act, Public Acts 1976, No. 76-421 § 9 (hereinafter the Act) became effective, the plaintiff, an inmate confined at the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers, filed a written request with the warden for disclosure of all personal data concerning him maintained by the D. O. C. ¹ Although the record does not reveal the nature of the data disclosed, the presentence investigation reports (hereinafter PSIs) were not disclosed pursuant to D. O. C. policy. ² Upon this refusal to disclose the plaintiff filed with the trial court a timely petition for disclosure of personal data pursuant to General Statutes § 4-195. ³ After a hearing the trial court denied the plaintiff's petition for disclosure, ⁴ ruling that it is beyond the power of the legislature to make a PSI accessible to the public because Practice Book § 917 provides that a PSI is not a public record. In his appeal from the judgment rendered the plaintiff claims that the Act requires the disclosure of PSIs and that this requirement is constitutional.

I

As a threshold issue the defendant has raised the jurisdiction of this court to address the subject matter of this appeal. The defendant claims that the present case is an administrative appeal and therefore should have been brought to this court by way of a certification for review.

"Appeals from final judgments or actions of the superior court shall be taken to the supreme court ... except for ... administrative appeals as provided for in section 51-197b ...." General Statutes § 51-197a. General Statutes § 51-197b, as amended to 1980, provides that appeals from a trial court's review of an administrative decision shall be taken to this court only by certification for review. ⁵ See Practice Book § 3135(b). The plaintiff filed a direct appeal in the present case. Therefore, the initial issue for resolution is whether this appeal is administrative within the meaning of General Statutes §§ 51-197a and 51-197b.

General Statutes § 4-195 provides that any person aggrieved by a refusal of disclosure may "petition the superior court .... for an order requiring the agency to disclose the personal data .... The court, after hearing and an in camera review of the personal data in question, shall issue the order requested unless it determines that such disclosure would be detrimental to the person or is otherwise prohibited by law." The petition filed under this section seeks an independent determination by the court of whether disclosure is required. ⁶ The hearing provided is the aggrieved party's first opportunity to contest the issue by presenting evidence. The agency decision does not result in a record which the trial court may review. See Practice Book §§ 3060P, 3087, 3088. Therefore, the present case is not an administrative appeal subject to the procedural restrictions for further review imposed by General Statutes § 51-197b. Accordingly a direct appeal was the proper course for review by this court.

II

The plaintiff claims that the Act requires the disclosure of PSIs. General Statutes § 4-193(g) provides that "(e)ach agency shall ... (e)xcept as otherwise provided in section 4-194, disclose to a person, upon written request, ... all personal data concerning him which is maintained by the agency." It is undisputed that the D. O. C. is an agency for purposes of the Act. ⁷ Accordingly, the trial court should have ordered the disclosure of all nonexempt personal data. " 'Personal data' means any information about a person's education, finances, medical or emotional condition or history, employment or business history, family or personal relationships, reputation or character which because of name, identifying number, mark or description can be readily associated with a particular person. 'Personal data' shall not be construed to make available to a person any record described in subdivision (3) of subsection (b) of section 1-19," which pertains to records of law enforcement agencies. ⁸ General Statutes § 4-190(i). ⁹

PSIs result from a presentence inquiry ¹⁰ into the circumstances of the offenses the attitude of the victim or his immediate family, the criminal record, social history and present condition of the defendant, and, if desirable, the mental and physical state of the defendant. General Statutes § 54-91a (formerly § 54-109); Practice Book § 911. "Their sole purpose is to enable the court, within the limits fixed by statute, to impose an appropriate penalty, fitting the offender as well as the crime." State v. Gullette, 3 Conn.Cir. 153, 167, 209 A.2d 529 (1964). While an inmate is serving his sentence in the custody of the D. O. C. the PSI is part of the master file and is used frequently by the D. O. C. in making decisions affecting the inmate. It is clear from the foregoing that the PSI is personal data maintained ¹¹ by an agency and therefore should be disclosed unless exempted from disclosure.

III

"If an agency determines ... that nondisclosure to a person of personal data concerning him is ... permitted or required by law, the agency may refuse to disclose that personal data, and shall refuse disclosure where required by law." General Statutes § 4-194 (a); see General Statutes § 4-195. The trial court held that Practice Book § 917, which limits postsentencing access to PSIs to certain nonpublic contexts, is a law requiring nondisclosure to the plaintiff. Practice Book § 917 provides that "(t)he presentence investigation report shall not be a public record and shall not be accessible to the public. It shall be available initially to the parties ... for use in the sentencing hearing and in any subsequent proceedings wherein the same conviction may be involved, and it shall be available at all times to the following: (1) The department of adult probation; (2) The correctional or mental health institution to which the defendant is committed; (3) The board of parole; (4) The board of pardons; (5) The sentence review division of the superior court; (6) The judicial review council; (7) Any court of proper jurisdiction where it is relevant to any proceeding before such court. Such court may also order that the report be made available to counsel for the parties for the purpose of such proceeding; (8) Counsel for the defendant and the prosecuting authority during negotiations relating to other offenses pending against the defendant or subsequently charged against him; and (9) Counsel for the defendant in a sentence review hearing or habeas corpus proceeding upon counsel's request to the department of adult probation." This provision protects the defendant, the plaintiff herein, by maintaining the nonpublic character of the PSI, but permits the defendant; see Practice Book §§ 915, 917; access to the report in the broad class of "subsequent proceedings wherein the same conviction may be involved," as well as in plea bargaining concerning other offenses. ¹² See Orland, Connecticut Criminal Procedure § 2328. The trial court ruled that the Act cannot permit "public review" of PSIs by the plaintiff because no statute can supersede a court rule in controlling the judicial department in the performance of its duties. See State v. Clemente, 166 Conn. 501, 510-11, 516, 353 A.2d 723 (1974); State Bar Assn. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 232, 140 A.2d 863 (1958). The implication of this ruling is that the Act, in permitting "public" disclosure, violated the separation of powers provided by the constitution of Connecticut, article second.

Disclosure under the Act does not result in public review of PSIs. It permits access to a person only for the purpose of his reviewing the accuracy of personal data pertaining to him which is maintained by an agency. See General Statutes § 4-193. Accordingly, the plaintiff's access to the PSI pertaining to him does not violate Practice Book § 917 insofar as it forbids public disclosure of PSIs. The other provisions of Practice Book § 917, however, if applicable to these circumstances, would preclude the plaintiff's access to his PSI because disclosure of the PSI on file at the D. O. C. is not within the categories of permitted access set forth in Practice Book § 917.

The Superior Court is empowered to adopt and promulgate rules "regulating pleading, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings in courts in which they have the constitutional authority to make rules, for the purpose of simplifying proceedings in the courts and of promoting the speedy and efficient determination of litigation upon its merits. Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right ...." General Statutes § 51-14 (a). The Act creates a substantive right of access to personal data maintained by agencies which does not encroach upon the operation or structure of the courts. Just as the general assembly lacks the power to enact rules governing procedure that is exclusively within the power of the courts; Conn.Const., art. V § 1; State v. Clemente, supra, 510-11, 516, 353 A.2d 723; so do the courts lack the power to promulgate rules governing substantive rights...