Steambarge v. State
Decision Date | 23 April 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 42050,42050 |
Parties | James O. STEAMBARGE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Raeburn Norris, Houston, for appellant.
Jules Damiani, Jr., Dist. Atty., R. L. Wilson, Asst. Dist. Atty., Galveston, and Jim D. Vollers, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
The offense is destroying property belonging to another (Article 1350, § 1(a) Vernon's Ann.P.C.); the punishment assessed by the jury, three years' confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections, probated.
Article 1350, § 1(a), supra, reads as follows:
'It shall be unlawful for any person to wilfully injure or destroy, or attempt to injure or destroy, any property belonging to another, of any kind whatsoever, without the consent of the owner and lienholder, if any, thereon.'
Omitting the formal parts, the indictment in this cause reads as follows:
'* * * did then and there unlawfully and willfully attempt to injure and destroy and did willfully injure and destroy certain property belonging to another, to-wit, one (1) straight chair of the value of Fifty Dollars ($50.00), one (1) table of the value of Fifty-Five Dollars ($55.00), one (1) table of the value of Eighteen Dollars ($18.00), one (1) lamp of the value of Thirty-Five Dollars ($35.00), one (1) lamp of the value of Thirty-Seven Dollars and Fifty Cents ($37.50), two (2) hassocks of the value of Twelve Dollars ($12.00) each, one (1) vase of the value of Fifteen Dollars ($15.00), one (1) glass figurine of the value of Thirty-Nine Dollars ($39.00), belonging to Gale Van Hoy without the consent of the said Gale Van Hoy, the owner thereof.'
Initially, the appellant complains that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to quash the indictment since (a) the allegations are duplicitous in that in the same count the offense of an attempt to injure and destroy as well as the completed offense is alleged, and (b) it does not allege the manner or 'how' appellant allegedly attempted to injure and destroy and did injure and destroy the items enumerated.
First, we note that the indictment in the case at bar is in substantial conformity with the form set forth in Willson's Criminal Forms, 7th Ed., Vol. 7, Sec. 1863, p. 417, with the exception that the value of each article of property is here separately alleged. Such additional allegations have been held unnecessary. Lacy v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 412 S.W.2d 911.
It is clear that the indictment does not charge more than one offense. The provisions of Article 21.24, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P., that an indictment may not charge more than one offense does not prohibit alleging several ways in which an offense was committed or charging more than one offense based upon the same incident or transaction. See Vannerson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 408 S.W.2d 228; Rose v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 427 S.W.2d 609; Breeden v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 438 S.W.2d 105 (February 5, 1969).
In 30 Tex.Jur.2d, Indictment and Information, § 40, p. 605, it is said:
'Duplicity is the joinder of two or more distinct offenses in the same count, or the joinder in the same count of two or more phases of the same offense where the punishment is different. * * *
In the case at bar it is observed that under the provisions of Article 1350, § 1(a), that the offenses here are embraced within the same general definition and punishable in the same manner and we perceive no error in the indictment in this regard.
We further note that only the 'completed offense' was submitted to the jury in the court's charge.
We overrule Section (a) of appellant's first ground of error.
Prior to the 1951 amendment of Article 1350, supra, while an indictment need not have excluded the idea that it is covered by some other provision of the penal code, Adams v. State, 47 Tex.Cr.R. 35, 81 S.W. 963, it was held that the nature of the injury should be stated so it might be seen whether or not the injury came within the offenses 'otherwise provided for.' Todd v. State, 39 Tex.Cr.R. 232, 45 S.W. 596.
It is to Todd v. State, supra, that appellant directs our attention with reference to his claim that there was no allegation in the indictment as to manner and means.
At the time of the Todd case, the statute in question (Art. 791, P.C.1895) read as follows:
'If any person shall wilfully and mischievously injure or destroy any growing fruit, corn, grain or other like agricultural product, or if any person shall wilfully or mischievously injure or destroy any real or personal property of any description whatever In such manner as that the injury does not come within any of the offenses otherwise provided for by this Code, he shall be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars; provided that when the value of the property injured is fifty dollars or less, then he shall be fined not exceeding two hundred dollars.' (emphasis supplied)
In Todd this Court said, ...
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