Steckel v. State

• Decision Date: 28 April 1998
• Docket Number: 1997,Nos. 27 and 45,s. 27 and 45
• Citation: 711 A.2d 5
• Parties: Brian STECKEL, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. . Submitted:
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 5

711 A.2d 5

Brian STECKEL, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

Nos. 27 and 45, 1997.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: April 28, 1998.

Decided: May 22, 1998.

Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County, Cr.A. Nos. IN96-06-1760, 1761, 1763, 1765 through 1770 and 1773.

Appeal from Superior Court. Affirmed.

Jerome M. Capone and Joseph A. Gabay, Wilmington, for appellant.

Loren C. Meyers (argued), Chief of Appeals Division, William E. Molchen and Thomas E. Brown, Deputy Attorneys General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, for appellee.

Before VEASEY, C.J., WALSH, HOLLAND, HARTNETT, and BERGER, JJ., constituting the Court En Banc.

WALSH, Justice:

This is an automatic and direct appeal after a capital murder trial and a penalty hearing by the appellant/defendant, Brian D. Steckel ("Steckel"). On October 2, 1996, a jury convicted Steckel on three counts of murder first degree, ¹ two counts of burglary second degree, one count of unlawful sexual penetration first degree, one count of unlawful sexual intercourse first degree, one count of arson first degree, and one count of aggravated harassment, related to the rape and murder of Sandra Lee Long and to the harassment of Susan Gell.

Pursuant to 11 Del.C. § 4209(b)(1), a separate penalty hearing was conducted, at the conclusion of which the same jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of eleven to one. After consideration of the factors enumerated in 11 Del.C. § 4209(d), the Superior Court concurred with the jury's recommendation and imposed a sentence of death for each of the three convictions of first degree murder.

On appeal, Steckel challenges both the convictions and death sentences. We find no error with respect to either the guilt phase or the penalty phase of Steckel's trial and, therefore, affirm both the convictions and the death sentences.

I.

The evidence presented at trial reflected the following events. Around noon on September 2, 1994, Steckel gained entrance to Long's apartment under the pretense of needing to use her telephone. Once inside, he ripped the telephone cord out of the wall. He then savagely attacked Long, strangling her to the point of unconsciousness with both nylon stockings and a tube sock that had been brought for that purpose. Before losing consciousness, Long fought back, biting Steckel's finger hard enough to cause it to bleed profusely. Steckel next proceeded to rape Long anally, at one point achieving penetration with a flat-head screwdriver that he had also brought for that purpose. Long regained consciousness during this part of the attack.

When finished with the attack on Long, Steckel sought to conceal his crime by setting fire to the apartment in two places with the final item he brought to the crime scene, a cigarette lighter. On his way out, he locked the door behind him to minimize the possibility of escape or rescue. Despite heroic efforts of passersby, the fire consumed the apartment and killed Long even as she sought to escape the searing flames through her bedroom window.

That afternoon, The News Journal received a phone call from an anonymous male who claimed responsibility for Long's murder and named Susan Gell as his next victim. The News Journal immediately alerted Wilmington police, who contacted Gell and placed her in protective custody. Gell informed police that, over the course of the previous month, she had received threatening phone calls, which eventually had been traced to Steckel. According to Gell, these calls were lurid and sexual and included references to anal rape. Police soon concluded that Steckel was a likely suspect in the attack on Long, and they succeeded in apprehending him early the next morning.

Over the course of several interviews on September 3--during which police repeatedly advised him of his Miranda rights--Steckel confessed to the rape and murder of Long. His account of the incident was accurate down to the most disturbing details, including his use of the screwdriver and the manner in which he set fire to the apartment. He told police where to find the items used in the attack, which were recovered. Steckel's identity as the assailant was later confirmed through DNA testing and analysis of the bite marks inflicted by Long during the struggle.

Steckel stood trial on various charges arising from the incident. After an eleven day trial, a Superior Court jury found Steckel guilty of all counts. The trial proceeded to the penalty phase, where the jury was instructed that, by its guilty verdicts on the felony murder counts, the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See 11 Del.C. § 4209(e)(1)j. ²

At the penalty hearing, the State presented evidence that the following non-statutory aggravating circumstances existed: (i) the vicious circumstances surrounding the commission of the murder; (ii) premeditation and substantial planning; (iii) victim impact; (iv) Steckel's prior criminal record; (v) Steckel's other criminal activities, including obscene phone calls, assault, terroristic threats, and disorderly conduct; (vi) Steckel's plan and intent to escape from prison and commit murder as evidenced by his letters ³; (vii) Steckel's total cruelty and lack of remorse in writing seven letters to the victim's mother; (viii) Steckel's prison record regarding disciplinary actions and lack of respect toward authority; (ix) the victim was defenseless; and (x) the murder was committed without provocation.

The defense presented evidence that the following mitigating factors existed: (i) cooperation with police in confessing to the crime; (ii) history of alcohol and substance abuse; (iii) childhood neglect and emotional abuse; (iv) childhood sexual abuse; (v) limited education; (vi) diagnoses of Attention Deficit Disorder and Antisocial Personality Disorder, as testified to by psychiatrists; (vii) Steckel's value and contribution to his family; and (viii) remorse. Steckel testified during the presentation of this evidence and exercised his right of allocution pursuant to 11 Del.C. § 4209(c)(2).

The jury found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances by a vote of eleven to one. In reaching its independent decision, the Superior Court determined that the same statutory aggravating circumstance had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court found that all the nonstatutory aggravating circumstances presented by the State existed and were relevant. The court also determined the existence of all the mitigating circumstances presented by the defense and their relevancy, although some in a limited manner. The court noted, that, while testifying psychiatrists agreed that Steckel suffered from psychological disorders, they considered him to be a "dangerous individual" with the ability to distinguish right from wrong and capable of committing this murder. The Superior Court characterized Steckel's conduct as "exceedingly depraved, cruel and vicious" and concluded that the aggravating circumstances "clearly and heavily" outweighed the mitigating circumstances. On January 8, 1997, Steckel was sentenced to death.

II.

With respect to the guilt phase of the trial, Steckel contends that Superior Court erred by: (i) failing to sever the aggravated harassment count; (ii) failing to suppress a statement given by him to police and the evidence flowing from that statement; (iii) denying his motion for a mistrial; and (iv) refusing to merge his conviction for reckless felony murder into his conviction for intentional murder. We address these claims seriatim.

A.

Steckel argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion by failing to sever the aggravated harassment count because that charge pertains to a different victim, Gell, and is unrelated to the counts involving Long. See Super.Ct.Crim.R. 8(a). Steckel contends that he was prejudiced by the denial of severance because the jury was presented with inflammatory evidence of his sexual proclivity.

We find that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by denying severance. Severance is appropriate where the defendant may suffer prejudice because:

(1) the defendant was subject to embarrassment or confusion in attempting to present different defenses to different charges; (2) the jury may improperly infer a general criminal disposition on the part of the defendant from the multiplicity of charges; and (3) the jury may accumulate evidence presented on all offenses charged in order to justify a finding of guilt of particular offenses.

State v. McKay, Del.Supr., 382 A.2d 260, 262 (1978). However, "where evidence concerning one crime would be admissible in the trial of another crime, there is no prejudicial effect in having a joint trial." Bates v. State, Del.Supr., 386 A.2d 1139, 1142 (1978). Generally, evidence of one crime is admissible in the trial of another crime when it has "independent logical relevance" and its probative value outweighs prejudice to the defendant. Getz v. State, Del.Supr., 538 A.2d 726, 730 (1988); D.R.E. 404(b).

The harassment of Gell clearly has "independent logical relevance." The phone calls to The News Journal led police to Steckel because of his harassment of Gell. The evidence of the aggravated harassment was, therefore, admissible and, consequently, Steckel suffered no prejudice requiring severance. See Bates, 386 A.2d at 1142. Further, any prejudice to Steckel was diminished by the jury instructions. ⁴ See Skinner v. State, Del.Supr., 575 A.2d 1108, 1120 (1990). Finally, we note that severance is not mandated simply because the crimes were committed against different people and with a two week time lapse between them. See Howard v. State, 704 A.2d 278, 280-81 (1998); Younger v. State, Del.Supr., 496 A.2d 546, 550 (1985). Accordingly, we find no error in the denial of Steckel's motion for severance.

B.

Steckel asserts that his...