Steed v. Imperial Airlines

• Decision Date: 25 July 1974
• Citation: 524 P.2d 801,115 Cal.Rptr. 329,12 Cal.3d 115
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 524 P.2d 801, 68 A.L.R.3d 1204 Elizabeth Ann STEED, a minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. IMPERIAL AIRLINES et al., Defendants and Respondents. L.A. 30055. In Bank

Page 329

115 Cal.Rptr. 329

12 Cal.3d 115, 524 P.2d 801, 68 A.L.R.3d 1204

Elizabeth Ann STEED, a minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. IMPERIAL AIRLINES et al., Defendants and Respondents.

L.A. 30055.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

July 25, 1974.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 28, 1974.

David H. R. Pain and Pain, Moody & Pippin, San Diego, for plaintiff and appellant.

Robert E. Cartwright, San Francisco, Edward I. Pollock, Los Angeles, Marvin E. Lewis, San Francisco, William H. Lally, Sacramento, Joseph W. Cotchett, San Mateo, Herbert Hafif, Claremont, David Daar, Los Angeles, and Leonard Sacks, Pico Rivera, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and appellant.

Carl A. Becker, Peter Abrahams and Dryden, Harrington & Swartz, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent Garrett Corp.

No appearance for other defendants and respondents.

WRIGHT, Chief Justice.

Elizabeth Ann Steed, a minor, appeals from a judgment for defendants entered by the trial court following its order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment in an action for the wrongful death of Elizabeth's stepfather, Ronald Steed.

The single issue raised on this appeal is whether a stepchild, treated in all respects as the natural child but not formally adopted by the deceased stepfather, may maintain an action for the wrongful death of the stepparent under Code of Civil Procedure section 377 which at the time the alleged cause of action arose limited such right of action to 'heirs' and 'personal representatives' of the deceased. ¹ We have concluded that Elizabeth does not qualify as a proper plaintiff within the meaning of the statute and that the judgment must be affirmed.

For purposes of the motion the parties stipulated to the factual matters which are pertinent to the issue of Elizabeth's status as a proper plaintiff under the statute. The stipulation is quoted in the margin. ² The motion for summary judgment and the stipulated facts challenge only Elizabeth's status as a plaintiff, and other matters such as responsibility for the wrongful death and the extent of the damages to the stepdaughter, if any, are not at issue on this appeal.

,2] It is well settled that the right to bring an action for the wrongful death of a human being is limited to the persons described in Code of Civil Procedure section 377. (Fuentes v. Tucker (1947) 31 Cal.2d 1, 9--10, 187 P.2d 752; Ruiz v. Santa Barbara Gas, etc., Co. (1912) 164 Cal. 188, 128 P. 330; Bond v. United Railroads (1911) 159 Cal. 270, 276, 113 P. 366; Salmon v. Rathjens (1907) 152 Cal. 290, 294, 92 P. 733.) The use of the word 'heirs' in section 377 has been narrowly interpreted as limiting this class of persons to those who would have been eligible to inherit from the decedent's estate had he died intestate. (Kunakoff v. Woods (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 59, 62, 332 P.2d 773.) The statutes of succession provide for inheritance by 'issue' (Prob.Code, §§ 221, 222), by adopted children from their adoptive parents (Prob.Code, § 257), and by illegitimate children from their mother and from their father if acknowledged by him (Prob.Code, § 255). There is, on the other hand, no provision for inheritance by dependent stepchildren. (Estate of Lima (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 396, 398, 37 Cal.Rptr. 404.) It is thus clear that when the word 'heirs' is construed in accordance with the laws of succession Elizabeth is to be excluded from the class of persons entitled to maintain an action for the wrongful death of decedent.

Plaintiff contends that the word 'heirs' is not to be construed in accordance with the common law meaning which limits it to those who would inherit in the event of intestacy. ³ The cause of action for wrongful death, however, is one which is wholly statutory in origin. (Kunakoff v. Woods, supra, 166 Cal.App.2d 59, 62, 332 P.2d 773.) In our view the limitation on those who may bring the action is one which is imposed by the Legislature and, absent a constitutional basis for departure from a clear expression of legislative intent, we are bound thereby. We find such clear expression in legislative history following the decision in Evans v. Shanklin (1936) 16 Cal.App.2d 358, 60 P.2d 554.

In the Evans case, indistinguishable in principle from the cause before us, an elderly and indigent mother, entitled pursuant to statutory law to support from her adult son, sought to recover in a wrongful death action from those responsible for the son's death. The plaintiff, however, was not an heir of the decedent as upon his death he also left surviving two adult sons and an estranged wife whom he had not supported 'for a long time.' Plaintiff there contended, consistent with plaintiff's views in the instant case, 'that the intent of the Legislature, as expressed in . . . (Code Civ.Proc., § 377), was to provide a right of action to each member of the family who was receiving or could have a right to expect to receive comfort, support and protection from the deceased.' (Id., at pp. 360--361, 60 P.2d at p. 555.) The court examined and reviewed the law for an expression of legislative intent in support of the plaintiff's contention. Relying on this court's expressions of views in earlier cases (Redfield v. Oakland C.S. Ry. Co. (1895) 110 Cal. 277, 290, 42 P. 822; Estate of Riccomi (1921) 185 Cal. 458, 460, 197 P. 97; Ruiz v. Santa Barbara Gas, etc., Co., supra, 164 Cal. 188, 191--192, 128 P. 330), the court in Evans held that 'heirs' meant Only heirs, stating 'Though we might feel that considerations of social security and social justice should dictate that a mother situated as was the plaintiff mother here, living with and dependent upon her son for support and maintenance, remembering the son's separation from the latter's wife, Coupled with his legal obligation during his lifetime under the provisions of section 206 of the Civil Code to maintain his mother, should have a right to bring an action for damages occasioned by the wrongful death of her son; nevertheless, the decision of the Legislature as to how far it will extend the right is conclusive. . . . The remedy . . . must come from the legislature.' (Evans v. Shanklin, supra, 16 Cal.App.2d 358, 362--363, 60 P.2d 554, 556; italics added.)

3] Despite the strong appeal to the Legislature, both by the court and by the unusual equities appearing in Evans, the Legislature failed to respond in any manner which would warrant a broader interpretation of 'heirs' by the time the cause of action herein arose. In the exercise of a judicial function, we should not assume the prerogative of making changes in a statute when the Legislature, by strong implication, has elected not to do so. ⁴ Although the clear expression of legislative intent is determinative of the issue of statutory construction, we nevertheless deem it desirable to put to rest claims that those who are entitled to bring an action for wrongful death, that is, those who are to be deemed 'heirs,' are those who are dependent upon and thereby injured by the decedent's death. The heirs' right of action, however, is not predicated on a dependency relationship--an heir who is not a dependent is equally authorized with one who is a dependent to bring a wrongful death action although the amount of their recoveries may differ. (See Syah v. Johnson (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 534, 55 Cal.Rptr. 741.) Likewise, one who is a dependent but not an heir is not entitled to maintain an action. (Evans v. Shanklin, supra, 16 Cal.App.2d 358, 60 P.2d 554.)

6] Superficial language in Redfield v. Oakland C.S. Ry. Co., supra, 110 Cal. 277, 42 P. 822, is relied upon in support of the contention that injury because of the death of the decedent is the crucial element. It is said in that case: '(T)he word 'heirs' in the statute is intended to limit the right of recovery to a class of persons who, because of their relation to the deceased, are supposed to be injured by her death.' (Id., at p. 290, 42 P. at p. 825.) A careful reading of Redfield, however, does not support the argument that the word heirs is intended to include anyone who, because of a particular relationship to the deceased, merely suffers some injury by reason of the death of the decedent. The question in that case was whether natural children were required to be in a position to actually inherit from their deceased mother in order that they might qualify as heirs within the meaning of section 377. In holding that it was not necessary for such children to be entitled to receive any share of the decedent's estate, this court noted, inter alia, that a recovery in a wrongful death action was not a recovery of a portion of the estate or for the injuries inflicted on the decedent, but rather for injuries actually suffered by the heirs of the decedent by reason of the latter's death. It was in this context that the court spoke of those who were 'supposed to be injured' by the death of the decedent. It is particularly significant that in so speaking the court referred only to Heirs who were supposed to be injured.

Redfield stands for the proposition that a wrongful death action can be maintained only by a person who, In addition to being an heir, also suffered some injury. 'It is settled by the decisions that an action of the character authorized by section 377 . . . is one solely for the benefit of the heirs, by which they may be compensated for the pecuniary injury suffered by them by reason of the loss of their relative. . . .' (Ruiz v. Santa Barbara Gas, etc., Co., supra, 164 Cal. 188, 191--192, 128 P. 330, 332.)

There is likewise no justification for reliance upon the rationale of Clevenger v. Clevenger (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 658, 11 Cal.Rptr. 707. That case dealt with dependency questions and suggests a basis upon which a stepchild might look to a putative parent for support. It involved claims for support asserted in divorce proceedings in behalf of an illegitimate child of the wife against her husband. It was urged that because he recognized and...