Steele v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County

• Decision Date: 03 August 1961
• Citation: 15 Cal.Rptr. 116,56 Cal.2d 402,364 P.2d 292
• Parties: , 364 P.2d 292 Emmett T. STEELE, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Callfornia IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent; Litton Industrles, Inc. Et al., Real Partles In Interest. L. A. 26172.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 116

15 Cal.Rptr. 116

56 Cal.2d 402, 364 P.2d 292

Emmett T. STEELE, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Callfornia IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent Litton Industrles, Inc. Et al., Real Partles In Interest.

L. A. 26172.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Aug. 3, 1961.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 30, 1961.

Crowley & Rhoden, Hollywood, and Harold Rhoden, Los Angeles, for petitioner.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, William E. Lamoreaux, Asst. County Counsel, and Donald K. Byrne, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for respondent.

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, William A. Masterson, Trippet, Yoakum & Ballantyne, Frank B. Yoakum, Jr., Los Angeles, thomas H. Carver, South Pasadena O'Melveny & Myers and Philip F. Westbrook, Jr., Los Angeles, for real parties in interest.

PETERS, Justice.

Petitioner is the plaintiff in a civil action entitled Emmett T. Steele v. Litton Industries, Inc., et al., pending in the respondent Superior Court. The corporation, Charles B. Thornton, Roy L. Ash, Hugh W. Jamieson, and Electro Dynamics Stock Trust Fund, a partnership, are defendants in that action, and are also the real parties in interest in this proceeding. Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate to compel respondent court to vacate an order denying his motion, made pursuant to section 2031 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by which he sought authroty to inspect several unsigned depositions which had been taken in a separate and distinct action which was subsequently dismissed, and which depositions are either in the possession of the real parties or under their control.

The facts which were presented to the respondent court, and upon which it predicated its denial of the motion, are substantially as follows:

Jamieson, Thornton and Ash entered into an agreement in 1953, resulting in the acquisition by Litton Industries, Inc., of a business formerly owned by one Charles Litton. The three individuals formed a partnership for the purpose of holding the stock of the corporation. In 1958 disagreements occurred between the partners, resulting in an action filed by Jamieson, in which Thornton and Ash were named as defendants. In that action Jamieson sought declaratory relief, dissolution of the partnership, an accounting, damages, and other relief based upon the alleged breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and conversion. While that action was pending, Steele Filed an independent action in which he named Jamieson, Thornton, Ash, the partnership and the corporation as defendants. He alleged that he was associated in the original transaction and was to receive the same interest in the corporation as was received by the other individuals. His complaint was predicated upon alleged fraud and deceit, conspiracy and breach of contract, and prayed for declaratory relief. He also seeks to impose a constructive trust, based on a breach of fiduciary duty, and to obtain specific performance. Subsequent to the date on which Steele filed his action, depositions were taken in the Jamieson action, to which Steele was not and never has been a party. The depositions included those of Jamieson, Thornton and Ash, all of whom are defendants in the Steele action. Although the depositions were transcribed, they were never corrected or signed. In addition to obtaining the typed copies, the various attorneys involved in the Jamieson action (all of whom are also attorneys for one or more defendants in the Steele suit) obtained and have in their possession the respective notes of the shorthand reporter. Subsequent to the taking of the depositions, Jamieson, the plaintiff in that action, caused his complaint to be dismissed. Thereafter, and in preparation for the trial of his action, Steele moved respondent court for an order authorizing inspection and copying of the Jamieson, Thornton and Ash depositions. The order denying that motion is the basis of this proceeding.

Petitioner contends that he is entitled to inspection under the provisions of section 2031 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of the order denying discovery, the real parties urge that petitioner has not made a proper showing of good cause. The alleged failure to show good cause is predicated upon: (1) failure to show relevancy of the depositions to the 'issues' of the case; (2) failure to show that the depositions would be admissible at the trial of the action; and (3) failure to show necessity for inspection. From these premises the real parties conclude, in reliance upon Twin Lock, Inc. v. Superior Court, 171 Cal.App.2d 236, 340 P.2d 748, and the earlier cases cited therein, that an order requiring them to produce the unsigned depositions would amount to an unreasonable and unlawful search and seizure. They also claim that such an order would violate some undisclosed privilege. ...