Stein v. Metropolitan Transp. Authority

• Decision Date: 30 September 1981
• Citation: 110 Misc.2d 1027,443 N.Y.S.2d 340
• Parties: Andrew STEIN, Richard M. Kessel, Anthony Noto, Petitioners, v. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, Long Island Railroad Corporation and the New York City Transit Authority, Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 340

443 N.Y.S.2d 340

110 Misc.2d 1027

Andrew STEIN, Richard M. Kessel, Anthony Noto, Petitioners, v. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, Long Island Railroad Corporation and the New York City Transit Authority, Respondents.

Supreme Court, Special Term Nassau County, Part 1.

Sept. 30, 1981.

Andrew Stein, pro se.

Anthony Noto, pro se.

Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York City, for respondents.

Richard M. Kessel, pro se.

JOHN S. LOCKMAN, Justice.

This motion by Petitioners for declaratory judgment is denied. Their application for a temporary restraining order has been previously denied.

Petitioners appear pro se seeking a declaratory judgment invalidating certain fare increases adopted by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority ("MTA") and its subsidiaries, the Long Island Railroad Corporation ("LIRR") and the New York City Transportation Authority ("TA"). They contend that the fare increases are illegal by virtue of the Respondents' failure to comply with Transportation Law § 96 which requires common carriers to provide safe and adequate service. They also contend that the procedures followed in adopting the fare increases were improper in that Respondents failed to comply with Transportation Law § 84 and 17 NYCRR ("Transportation") Part 600.

Respondents contend that Petitioners lacked standing to challenge these fare increases citing inter alia Glen v. Rockefeller, 61 Misc.2d 942, 944, 307 N.Y.S.2d 46, aff'd on op. below 34 A.D.2d 930, 313 N.Y.S.2d 938; "It has long been established law of this State that, where, as here, the wrong complained of is, in fact a 'public injury', and the right violated is a 'public right', no private person (or number of persons) can maintain an action for an injunction, or for any other relief, unless he suffers a special injury different from that suffered by the public at large." Petitioners argue that they have suffered special injury by virtue of their status as commuters and passengers on the various transportation facilities operated by Respondents. This argument ignores the policy underlying the rule and therefor misses the point.

"There is one recurrent theme: the court as a policy matter, even apart from principles of subject matter jurisdiction, will abstain from venturing into areas if it is ill-equipped to undertake the responsibility and other branches of government are far more suited to the task." (Jones v. Beame, 45 N.Y.2d 402, 408-409, 408 N.Y.S.2d 449, 380 N.E.2d 277).

The courts are certainly ill-equipped to run a railroad and the legislature has recognized this fact by exempting the MTA from the Transportation Law.

"The jurisdiction, supervision, powers and duties of the department of transportation of the state under the transportation law shall not extend to the authority in the exercise of any of its powers under this title." (Public Authorities Law § 1266(8) (emphasis supplied)).

Not only is the MTA exempt from the Transportation Law provisions with regard to fares, but the MTA's enabling statute itself specifically governs the rate fixing function.

"Such fares, tolls, rentals, rates, charges and other fees shall be established as may in the judgment of the authority be necessary to maintain the combined operations of the authority and its subsidiary corporations on a self-sustaining basis."

Therefor, this court holds that the Petitioners lack standing to challenge the determination by the MTA that a fare increase was economically necessary. (Levine v. Long Island Rail Road, 38 A.D.2d 936, 331 N.Y.S.2d 451, aff'd 30 N.Y.2d 907, 335 N.Y.S.2d 565, 287 N.E.2d 272).

The fact that the determination by the MTA that a fare increase is an economic necessity and the exemption of the MTA from the provisions of the Transportation Law do not place Respondents beyond all challenge, however. The old rule relied on reluctantly in Glen v. Rockefeller, supra, which precluded all citizen action suits absent special and peculiar injury has been abrogated by the enactment of State Finance Law Article 7-A which authorizes citizen taxpayers to challenge alleged wrongful expenditures of State...