Steinberg v. City of Atlanta
| Decision Date | 08 June 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. A94A0241,A94A0241 |
| Citation | 213 Ga.App. 491,444 S.E.2d 873 |
| Parties | STEINBERG v. CITY OF ATLANTA. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Decker & Hallman, Richard P. Decker, W. Winston Briggs, Atlanta, for appellant.
Kendric E. Smith, Sarah I. Mills, Michael V. Coleman, Joe M. Harris, Jr., Atlanta, for appellee.
Plaintiff Sam Steinberg was injured in the parking lot of the Atlanta Civic Center after a performance of the Atlanta Ballet when he tripped and fell over a rope which had been strung between a fixed post and a traffic barrel for the purpose of controlling traffic. Plaintiff sustained deep skin abrasions and lacerations which required surgery and filed a negligence action against the City of Atlanta. At trial, at the close of plaintiff's case and again at the close of all the evidence, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the grounds of governmental immunity and the lack of ante litem notice. In both instances, the court reserved its ruling on the motions until after the jury returned its verdict.
The court charged the jury solely on the question of negligence, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $10,000. The court then charged the jury on the question of governmental immunity, and the jury returned a verdict for defendant, specifically finding that the Civic Center was operated by defendant primarily for public service. The trial court concluded that the jury's second verdict was tantamount to a determination that the operation of the facility was a governmental function of the City of Atlanta. Therefore, the court construed the verdict taken in two parts, to be a verdict for defendant, finding that were it not for the governmental defense, plaintiff would be entitled to a verdict for $10,000. The court explained that this unusual procedure was employed in the event an appellate court determined the trial court erred in instructing the jury on governmental immunity, there would be no need for a new trial. The court then entered judgment on the verdict in favor of defendant. After entry of judgment, the court ruled on defendant's motion for directed verdict. Finding that the evidence demonstrated that the Civic Center was operated primarily for the public benefit, the court held, as a matter of law, that the operation of the Civic Center is a governmental function of the City of Atlanta, and therefore, defendant was immune to suit for the negligence of its employees in the performance of that function. Accordingly, a directed verdict was entered in favor of defendant on governmental immunity. On the question of ante litem notice, the court denied defendant's motion for directed verdict. This appeal followed, plaintiff enumerating as error the trial court's determination that defendant was immune from suit based on sovereign immunity, as a matter of law, and the grant of defendant's motion for directed verdict after the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $10,000.
1. We will first consider plaintiff's contention that the court had no authority to direct a verdict after the jury returned a verdict in his favor. Plaintiff argues the court should have either granted the motion for directed verdict prior to the jury's verdict or, after the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, entered judgment on the verdict in favor of plaintiff and then granted defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, if one had been properly made by defendant. We disagree.
OCGA § 9-11-50(b) Mayor, etc., of Savannah v. Palmerio, 242 Ga. 419, 421(1), 249 S.E.2d 224 (1978). Thus, the trial court did not err in deferring its ruling on the motion for directed verdict until after the verdict was returned. See Brandvain v. Ridgeview Institute, 188 Ga.App. 106(1a), 372 S.E.2d 265 (1988).
2. Plaintiff also contends the court erred in ruling that defendant was immune from suit based upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity as a matter of law. Plaintiff argues that there was ample evidence that the Civic Center was maintained as a revenue enhancing facility, in addition to proof of defendant's negligence, to support the jury's...
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