Steinert v. Whitcomb

• Decision Date: 03 May 1911
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STEINERT v. WHITCOMB et al.

79 A. 675

84 Conn. 262

STEINERT

v. WHITCOMB et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

May 3, 1911.

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Gardiner Greene, Judge.

Action by Morris Steinert against James A. Whitcomb and others for injuries to person and property through negligence. Verdict for plaintiff for $50 only was set aside, and new trial granted, on plaintiff's motion, and defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Edwin S. Thomas, for appellants. Harry W. Asher, for appellee.

WHEELER, J. On motion the trial court set aside the verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $50, because the damages awarded were inadequate, and the defendants appeal from the granting of such motion. In determining this appeal "great weight is due to the action of the trial court, and every reasonable presumption should be made in favor of its correctness."

Our rule governing the action of the trial court over verdicts is perfectly clear. "It should not set aside a verdict where it is apparent that there was some evidence upon which the jury might reasonably reach their conclusion, and should not refuse to set it aside where the manifest injustice of the verdict is so plain and palpable as clearly to denote that some mistake was made by the jury in the application of legal principles, or as to justify the suspicion that they or some of them were influenced by prejudice, corruption, or partiality." Burr v. Harty, 75 Conn. 127, 129, 52 Atl. 724; Birdseye's Appeal, 77 Conn. 623, 625, 60 Atl. 111; Bradbury v. South Norwalk, 80 Conn. 300, 68 Atl. 321; Wyeman v. Deady, 79 Conn. 414, 416, 65 Atl. 129, 118 Am. St. Rep. 152.

The question of law arising upon the appeal is: Did the trial court err through its failure to properly apply this rule of law in deciding the motion to set aside the verdict? The ascertainment of this involves a consideration of the entire evidence.

On every appeal of this character the controlling question is whether the conclusion is one which the jury might reasonably have reached; one to which 12 honest men acting fairly and intelligently might reasonably have come. If it is, the verdict should stand; if it is not, it should be set aside.

The appellee urges that this court adopted a different rule in McKone v. Schott, 82 Conn. 71, 72 Atl. 570, when it is said that the court will set aside a verdict "only when the trial court misapplies or mistakes some principle of law, or manifestly abuses a discretion." The discretion referred to was a legal discretion, and the exercise of that involves consideration of whether there had been a disregard or misapplication of the rule which trial courts must follow in setting aside verdicts.

There has been no change in our rule; it is firmly intrenched in repeated decisions which illustrate the manner in which it has been applied.

The grounds of injury alleged were confined to injuries to the plaintiff's carriage, in that it was "badly broken, the front right wheel and the rear right wheel and axle broken and smashed," and to his person, in that he "was severely shaken and bruised ail over his body and his nervous system severely and dangerously shaken up."

The most that the evidence on either side tended to prove of the damage to the carriage was that two wheels were broken, one axle sprung, and several scratches made on the body of the carriage. It is true that the plaintiff testified that the carriage was all broken up; but he also testified he did not examine it after the accident and could not tell in what respect it was damaged.

No evidence was offered of the pecuniary damage to the carriage or the cost of its repair, except that the plaintiff testified that he gave the Holcomb Company "carte blanche to fix it, if it would cost $100, and that they subsequently rendered him a bill of $55, which he paid."

No evidence was offered of the character of the carriage, save that it had been made to order for the plaintiff two years previously.

No evidence was offered of the condition of the carriage at or before the time of the accident.

No evidence was offered of the charge or value of the several items of repair described in the bill. The Holcomb Company was a New Haven concern, and none of its officers or employés appeared as witnesses, and no explanation for the absence of such testimony was furnished.

The majority of the items of the bill are not found in the testimony of the damage to the carriage caused by this accident, and, since no charge is placed against the items of the bill, the jury had before them no evidence of the value of those repairs made to the carriage which apparently were not the result of the accident. These items were substantial and not inconsequential parts of the total charge. In addition, the charge is for resetting axles, when the evidence was that one axle only was sprung.

Had objection been made, the bill, without further proof, should have been excluded. It came in without objection and was to be considered by the jury, although it could furnish little or no assistance to them in fixing the...