Steitenroth v. City of Jackson

• Decision Date: 24 April 1911
• Docket Number: 15,140
• Citation: 54 So. 955,99 Miss. 354
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: MRS. T. A. STEITENROTH ET AL. v. CITY OF JACKSON

54 So. 955

99 Miss. 354

MRS. T. A. STEITENROTH ET AL. v. CITY OF JACKSON

No. 15,140

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 24, 1911

APPEAL from the chancery court of Hinds county, HON. G. G. LYELL Chancellor.

Suit for damages by Mrs. T. A. Steitenroth et al. against the city of Jackson in the circuit court which was removed to chancery court by injunction. From a decree perpetually enjoining the suit, complainant appeals.

The facts are: Some years before the institution of this suit the waterworks system operated in the city of Jackson was owned by a private corporation, and during the time it was so owned certain parties ran a private pipe line a half mile or more beyond the city limits in order to secure water facilities. Later other parties tapped this private line in order to secure water. There after the city bought out the waterworks plant and operated it. There was one tap line, which served several parties, some of whom refused to pay their water rent. The manager of the city waterworks asked permission to come upon their premises and cut their water off at the hydrant, because of nonpayment of rent; but permission was refused. Thereupon the city informed all the owners along the tap line that after the end of the quarter, if all arrears had not been adjusted the entire tap line would be cut off from service. Nothing was done toward adjusting the water rents, and at the date stated the entire tap line was cut off. Appellants, who had paid all their water rents prior to the beginning of the new quarter, were deprived of their water by reason of having the entire line cut out. After about two or three weeks the delinquents gave the city permission to come in and cut the water off at their hydrants. This was done, and water service continued to appellant and all others who had paid their dues. Appellants brought suit for damages in the circuit court. The case was removed to the chancery court by injunction, and the decree enjoining the suit was made perpetual. The contention of the city is that it was under no obligation to supply water to nonresidents, and, if it did contract with them to do so, it had a right to terminate the contract at the end of any rental period.

Affirmed.

Watkins & Watkins, for appellant.

The city of Jackson had the implied right to furnish water to the persons in the suburbs of the city, though outside of its corporate limits.

Section 3339 of the Code of 1906 gave appellee, the city of Jackson the right to erect, purchase, maintain and operate waterworks, and to regulate the same. It will be noted that this is the express grant of power under which the city acted in acquiring the water plant of the light, heat and water company. It will further be noted that the powers of a municipality are of two kinds; those which are expressed and those which arise by implication, or natural inference. It is our position in this case that the city of Jackson having the express statutory right to acquire a waterworks system for the purpose of supplying water to its inhabitants, and it having exercised this express grant by purchasing the waterworks system referred to, that in view of the fact that the waterworks system which it acquired was supplying through pipes already laid, either at the expense of private persons or at the expense of the company persons living just outside of the corporate limit, that by natural inference and by necessary implication the municipality had the right to continue this service, and with a view of presenting this principle to the court, we will direct your attention to the authorities sustaining our view.

It will be noted in this connection that the power of the city to furnish water to its inhabitants is not a governmental power that it is not exercising a power of sovereignty. It is most generally stated that in the exercise of matters of sovereignty or in the exercise of its governmental functions, such as the levying of taxes, the enforcement of its criminal ordinances, the exercise of its police power and similar governmental functions that a municipality has no extra territorial functions; but we respectfully submit that there may arise, and often does arise, cases in which a municipality exercising not governmental, but purely a business function, is not limited by corporate limits. A municipality has other functions than that of a sovereignty. It exercises governmental functions, and, again, it has the right to exercise and carry on business, and in carrying on and operating its business functions it is subject to the same rules and regulations as a private individual or corporation would be, and is not confined within the boundaries of municipal limits.

This principle is illustrated in a decision of this court in the case of Lester v. Jackson, reported in 69 Miss., p. 887. The city of Jackson had no right by express grant to own a park for municipal purposes, either within the said limits or without. Mrs. Ellen Moore, the widow of Gov. Poindexter, devised to the city to be used for a public park certain property, then outside of the city limits, and the question arose as to the right of the city to accept the devise, and the court held that by necessary implication the municipality had the right to accept the gift, upholding at the same time the distinction between the exercise by a municipality of its governmental powers and the powers which it exercises in common with other corporations. The court uses the following language: "It is true the city may not have the same power of police over the park without its limits that it would over one within them, but the laws of the state would be in full operation there, and the right of the town, as owner, would be protected by them as are the property rights of natural persons. The fallacy in the argument of counsel for appellant seems to us to rest in the assumption that a town may not own property, however necessary or convenient to its corporate purposes, unless it may exercise rights of sovereignty over it. All acts of municipality, by which parts of the sovereign power of the state delegated to it are exercised, must, of course, be performed within the territory over which the power is delegated; but a right to own property is not a sovereign right. One state may own land in another, but it can exercise no governmental control over it; for, as to such land, it stands in the position of a private person. So a city owning a park without its limits could exercise over it only those rights and powers which spring from ownership."

It will only be necessary in this case to observe the distinction between the sovereign power of a municipality and its pure business functions, and it will be found that those cases, for the most part, which limit a municipality to its own boundaries, refer primarily to the exercise of the power of sovereignty delegated to it by the state. This principle is well illustrated in the case of Schneider v. City, 99 Am. St. Rep. 996. The municipality had the express power under its charter to work and keep in repair its streets in order that the same should be safe and convenient for passage. It sought to buy a stone quarry some seven miles from the city limits for the purpose of quarrying rock and stone for transportation to the city to be used in the repair of its streets. The exercise of this power on behalf of the city was contested, and it was said, just as is contended in this case, that a city cannot contract beyond its corporate limits; about which the court has the following to say:

"It would not be profitable to examine at length the numerous cases called to our attention. It seems sufficient to say that, in the main, they hold...