Stenzor v. Leon
| Decision Date | 14 February 1955 |
| Citation | 279 P.2d 802,130 Cal.App.2d 729 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 27 Lab.Cas. P 69,137 Isidor STENZOR, Individually, and as a member, manager, and representative of the Los Angeles Cloak Joint Board of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, a voluntary, unincorporated association, and for and on behalf of each and all of the members thereof, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Joseph LEON, doing business under the fictitious name of Mamselle Modes of California, Defendant and Respondent. LOS ANGELES CLOAK JOINT BOARD, INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS UNION, Appellant, v. Joseph LEON, doing business as Mamselle Modes of California, Respondent. Arbitration between the Los Angeles Cloak Joint Board, of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, and Joseph LEON, doing business as Mamselle Modes of California. Civ. 20429, 20466. |
Basil Feinberg, Los Angeles, for appellant.
Phillip W. Silver, Los Angeles, for respondent.
Isidor Stenzor, on behalf of a certain labor union, appeals from a judgment of the superior court denying confirmation of two awards of an arbitrator. Joseph Leon, an employer, appeals from an order taxing costs which denied him certain claimed costs. The appeals have been consolidated.
Los Angeles Cloak Joint Board, International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, is a labor union and Isidor Stenzor is a member and manager thereof. Los Angeles Coat and Suit Manufactures' Association is an organization of coat and suit manufacturers. Joseph Leon was a member of the association but resigned therefrom on or about October 16, 1953. January 19, 1951, an agreement was entered into by and between the association and the union which became immediately effective and remained operative until April 30, 1954. Although Leon had a right to resign from the association, the contract provided that he should continue to remain personally and individually liable 'under and to the terms and provisions of the agreement,' regardless of his resignation, for the full term of the contract, but only while he continued to be a manufacturer of coats and suits. 1 In his letter of resignation, Leon stated that his firm
The contract provided for increases of wages whenever there was a rise of 5% in the cost of living index of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics above the level of February 15, 1948. The provision is set out below. 2 There were other provisions recognizing the union as the bargaining agent of all employees and the association as the bargaining agent of its members. They had acted in that capacity in the past and the agreement provided that they intended to continue bargaining in the future in the same capacity.
In April 1953, the union made request upon the association for a cost of living increase under section 12 of the agreement. As a result of negotiations the agreement was modified by increasing wages of craft workers $4 a week and floor workers $3 a week, effective November 2, 1953. There were certain other modifications which were deemed to be of value to employees.
Leon resigned October 16, 1953; October 22, the union made a written demand upon him that he increase wages 15%; October 30, Leon had a conference with a union representative in which the union repeated its demand for a 15% increase. Leon did further. October 27, the union communicated with Dan A. West, the Impartial Chairman, requesting that a hearing be arranged. The charge was that Leon had failed to increase wages by 15%. October 30, the Impartial Chairman set a hearing for November 6 and gave notice to Leon. The hearing was adjourned to November 10. Leon and his attorney appeared before the Impartial Chairman, denied that there was any controversy subject to arbitration and challenged the jurisdiction and authority of the Impartial Chairman to proceed in the matter. November 20, at the conclusion of the hearing, which was attended by Leon under protest, the Impartial Chairman rendered an award that Leon should pay employees in certain crafts $3.50 per week above their present wage and members of other crafts $4.50 per week above their present wage, said increases to be retroactive to July 1, 1953, and to be paid forthwith to all eligible workers. December 2, 1953, a supplemental award was made for the purpose of enforcing compliance with the November 20 award. The union petitioned the court for confirmation of the awards and Leon petitioned that they be vacated. The judgment of the court vacated the awards and the union has appealed.
One ground for vacating the first award was that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to determine the amount of wages which Leon should pay. This is the only ground of the decision which we need consider.
The powers of the arbitrator were derived from the agreement, Bierlein v. Johnson, 73 Cal.App.2d 728, 166 P.2d 644; Drake v. Stein, 116 Cal.App.2d 779, 254 P.2d 613; 6 C.J.S., Arbitration and Award, § 80, P. 219, and we therefore look to the agreement. All members of the association agreed to be bound by agreements entered into by the association with the union. All disputes between the association and its members and the union and its members were to be adjusted in the manner provided in the agreement. The union insists that Leon was bound by the original agreement until April 30, 1954 and it therefore contends that he was bound by the provisions for the increase of wages to meet increased cost of living and for the submission of wage disputes to the Impartial Chairman. Leon does not deny that he was bound by the agreement until April 30, 1954. The Impartial Chairman specifically found that Leon remained bound by the original agreement but that when he resigned he 'abrogated' the authority of the association to negotiate on his behalf for an increase of wages. The first finding was correct; the second was in direct conflict with the first and with the express provisions of the agreement. Moreover, in his letter of resignation while negotiations between the association and the union were under way, Leon recognized the authority of the association to negotiate terms which would be binding upon him until April 30, 1954. The union, while insisting that Leon was bound by the provisions for increase of wages and for submission of a dispute to the Impartial Chairman, denies that he was bound by the modifications agreed to by the association. Leon insists he was bound by the entire agreement and that the union was likewise bound. We think there can be no reasonable difference of opinion upon this point. The contract obligated Leon to abide by any modifications agreed to by the association with respect to a cost of living increase in wages during the life of the original contract. There was no evidence that he was unwilling to pay the increases in accordance with the modification. During the hearing he offered to prove that he had increased wages but the Impartial Chairman refused to receive the offered evidence. The modified agreement entered into by the association as the authorized representative of its members was just as binding as any other provision of the agreement. There was no basis in the agreement for the demand by the union that Leon pay a higher wage scale than the one agreed to by the association and the union. Since there was an existing, enforceable contract with respect to wages the union could not, through the Impartial Chairman or otherwise, create some new and different obligation with...
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