Stephen M. v. Comm'r, Civil Case No. PWG-17-3515
| Decision Date | 21 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil Case No. PWG-17-3515 |
| Parties | STEPHEN M., v. COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Pursuant to Standing Order 2014-01, the above-captioned case has been referred to me to review the parties' motions and to make recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 301.5(b)(ix). ECF 3. I have considered the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff's Response, and Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. ECF 25, 28, 24. I find that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2018). This Court must uphold the decision of the Social Security Administration ("SSA") if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the SSA employed proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that the SSA's Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel be DENIED, and the Court AFFIRM the SSA's judgment pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Plaintiff has filed for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") three times, in 1988, 2000, and 2014. Tr. 2298. The SSA's denial of Plaintiff's 2000 application was ultimately affirmed by United States District Judge Roger Titus, following a Report and Recommendation by United States Magistrate Judge Thomas M. DiGirolamo. McFadden v. Barnhart, Civil No. RWT-04- 1516 (D. Md. July 25, 2005). Plaintiff filed his most recent application for DIB on April 18, 2014. Tr. 2586-87. His application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Tr. 2400-06. An ALJ dismissed Plaintiff's request for a hearing on September 2, 2016, under the doctrine of res judicata. Tr. 2298-2300. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on September 23, 2017, making the ALJ's dismissal the final, reviewable decision of the SSA. Tr. 2293-94. Plaintiff timely filed the instant action on November 27, 2017. ECF 1.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) governs motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). While the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a court has jurisdiction over the claim or controversy at issue, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion should be granted "only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Trentacosta v. Frontier Pac. Aircraft Indus., 813 F.2d 1553, 1558 (9th Cir. 1987)). In a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the pleadings should be regarded as "mere evidence on the issue," and courts "may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Id. (citing Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982); Trentacosta, 813 F.2d at 1558).
Plaintiff claims a variety of bases for subject matter jurisdiction, including: the Social Security Act, the United States Constitution, the Mandamus Act, federal question jurisdiction, and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The SSA argues that all of these bases are lacking. I agree, and discuss each in turn.
First, the SSA argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's appeal because the SSA properly applied the principle of res judicata to bar Plaintiff's claim. ECF 25-1 at 4-11. The Social Security Act ("the Act") provides, in relevant part:
Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Section 405(h) of the SSA further provides that "[n]o findings of fact or decision of the Commissioner of Social Security shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided." Id. § 405(h). Thus, § 405(g) is generally "the sole avenue for judicial review of all claim[s] arising under" the SSA. See Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 602 (1984) (quotation and citation omitted).
The SSA can apply the doctrine of res judicata to avoid claimants "indefinitely extend[ing]" the adjudication of their claims after a denial of benefits. Easley v. Finch, 431 F.2d 1351, 1353 (4th Cir. 1970). An ALJ can apply res judicata to dismiss a hearing request if the SSA "made a previous determination or decision . . . about [a claimant's] rights on the same facts and on the same issue or issues, and this previous determination or decision has become final by either administrative or judicial action." 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(c)(1). When a claimant appeals a dismissal on the basis of res judicata, "the district court has jurisdiction to determine, as appropriate, whether res judicata has properly been applied, or whether, though res judicata might properly have been applied, the claim has nevertheless been reopened." McGowen v. Harris, 666 F.2d 60, 66 (4th Cir. 1981) (citing Farley v. Califano, 599 F.2d 606, 608 (4th Cir. 1979)). The court's examination of the SSA's application of res judicata is an exercise of thecourt's "inherent jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction." Id. (citing Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry., 270 U.S. 266, 274 (1926)).
Here, the ALJ applied res judicata to dismiss Plaintiff's request for review because Plaintiff's current claim was based on "the same facts and same issues" as his 2000 application. Tr. 2300. The ALJ decision in Plaintiff's 2000 application evaluated his claim for DIB from his alleged onset date, August 7, 1987, through his date last insured, June 30, 1994. Tr. 74-75. Plaintiff's 2014 application covered the same time period. Tr. 2298.1 Therefore, the ALJ properly applied res judicata in dismissing Plaintiff's claim.
Plaintiff argues that because the listings for immune system disorders and mental disorders were revised after his 2000 application was denied, and because he alleges immune system and neurocognitive disorders, the ALJ should not have applied res judicata, but rather should have made a new substantive determination, as directed by the SSA's Program Operations Manual System ("POMS"), DI 27516.010. ECF 28 at 7-8, 11; ECF 28-1 at 38-39.2 The SSA argues that because the ALJ denied Plaintiff's 2000 application at step two of the five-step evaluation process, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, and did not reach the listings at step three, a new substantive decision is not necessary. ECF 25-1 at 8-9. I agree with the SSA.
In determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of DIB claims, the SSA has promulgated regulations that set forth a five-step sequential evaluation procedure. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. This five-step process, described by the Supreme Court in Bowen v. Yuckert, 482U.S. 137 (1987), begins with the ALJ determining whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity ("SGA"), which is defined for DIB claims in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1510, 404.1572. If the claimant is engaged in SGA, the claimant is not considered disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the ALJ proceeds to step two and examines the physical and/or mental impairments alleged by the claimant to determine whether the impairments meet the durational and severity requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 404.1520(c). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment that meets the duration requirement, the claimant is considered not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii).
If the impairment or impairments meet the durational and severity requirements, the ALJ's analysis proceeds to a third step—a consideration of whether the impairment or impairments, either severally or in combination, meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, which is known as the listing of impairments ("listings"). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2001). If one of the listings is met, disability will automatically be found without consideration of age, education, or work experience. If no listing is met, however, the ALJ moves to a fourth step and considers whether the claimant retains the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform past relevant work. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; Mastro, 270 F.3d at 177. If the claimant is not capable of performing his or her past relevant work, the ALJ moves to a fifth step and considers whether, based upon the claimant's RFC, age, education, and past work experience, the claimant is capable of some other work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v); Bowen, 462 U.S. at 142; Mastro, 270 F.3d at 177.
Here, at step one in Plaintiff's 2000 application, the ALJ found in Plaintiff's favor that he had not performed SGA. Tr. 78. Accordingly, the ALJ proceeded to step two and found that Plaintiff did not have a severe impairment, as defined by the regulations, because he "does not have an impairment that imposes even minimal restrictions on the claimant's ability to perform basic work tasks." Tr. 79. In accordance with the regulations, the ALJ ceased the evaluation process at step two and found Plaintiff not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). The ALJ's decision did not rely at all on the listings, which are only evaluated at step three of the evaluation process. Therefore, the ALJ's decision in Plaintiff's 2000 application need not be reassessed based on revisions to the listings.
The SSA's regulations allow cas...
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