Stephens v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 04 May 1915
• Docket Number: No. 14017.,14017.
• Citation: 190 Mo. App. 673,176 S.W. 253
• Parties: STEPHENS v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

176 S.W. 253

190 Mo. App. 673

STEPHENS v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

No. 14017.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

May 4, 1915.

Rehearing Denied May 18, 1915.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; J. Hugo Grimm, Judge.

Action by Louis J. Stephens against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Nathan Frank, Louis B. Sher, and Richard A. Jones, all of St. Louis, for appellant. John T. Fitzsimmons, of St. Louis, for respondent.

NORTONI, J.

This is a suit on a policy of life insurance. Plaintiff recovered, and defendant prosecutes the appeal.

It appears the insured, Herman Fink died on November 30, 1909, that is, on the day succeeding the date of the policy and the questions for consideration arise: First, on a condition contained in the policy to the effect that the company assumed no obligation thereunder unless on said date, that is, the date of the policy, the assured is alive and in sound health; and, second, the effect to be given the attending physician's certificate contained in the proof of death relating to the cause of death and the nature of the disease from which the insured was suffering when the policy was delivered. The insured applied for the policy in suit before going to the hospital, but it was not issued until thereafter. On November 16th the insured Fink entered the city hospital in St. Louis, and upon examination was found to be suffering from cirrhosis of the liver and myocarditis. He continued in the hospital so suffering from such diseases until November 30th, on which day he died therefrom. Shortly before entering the hospital the insured applied for the insurance involved here in favor of plaintiff, Louis J. Stephens, who is mentioned as the beneficiary in the policy. The policy was issued after he entered the hospital, that is, of date November 29, 1909, and the agent without knowledge of the insured's condition of health, delivered it to plaintiff, the beneficiary. Plaintiff testifies that he knew the insured entered the hospital on the 16th day of November, 1909, and that he remained there under treatment until the date of his death, on the 30th of the same month, but said nothing of this to defendant's agent. In other words, plaintiff knew at the time, on the date of the policy and when it was delivered to him, that the insured was not in sound health, but was then under treatment in the hospital, and defendant did not know such fact. Among others, the policy contains a provision as follows:

"Provided, however, that no obligation is assumed by the company prior to the date hereof, nor unless on said date the insured is alive and in sound health."

Such conditions in life insurance policies were formerly sustained according to the full measure of their terms, as appear by reference to Misselhorn v. Mut. Reserve, etc., Life Ass'n, 30 Mo. App. 589, and, indeed, are likewise sustained even now when the contract of insurance does not fell within the terms of our statute as if made in another state, as will appear by reference to Bell v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 166 Mo. App. 390, 149 S. W. 33. But the broad doctrine of the earlier cases is modified by more recent decisions, which go to the effect that, in view of our statute, in order to render such condition available to defeat the insurance, it must appear that the insured was suffering at the time of the date or of the delivery of the policy, as the case may be, with a disease or diseases which contributed to his death. The statute (section 6986, R. S. 1909) referred to provides substantially that no representation made in obtaining or securing a policy of insurance on the life of any person shall be deemed material, or render the policy void, unless the matter misrepresented shall have actually contributed to the contingency or event on which the policy is to become payable, and, if it so contributed in any case, shall be a question for the jury. In view of this provision, the rule of decision is established to the effect that the conditions in the policy of the character of that above copied are unavailing to the company, unless it appear that the death of the insured resulted from the malady from which he was suffering at the time the policy was issued or delivered, for otherwise such condition would thwart the purpose of the statute and impinge the declared public policy of the state in respect of life insurance contracts. But such conditions are valid enough, and will defeat the insurance when it appears the assured was not in good health on the date of the policy, or at the time it was issued or delivered, as the case may be, and that the...