Stephens v. Stephens

• Decision Date: 24 August 2021
• Docket Number: NO. 2020-CA-00106-COA,NO. 2019-CA-01421-COA,2019-CA-01421-COA
• Parties: William Hays STEPHENS, Appellant v. Rachel STEPHENS, Appellee William Hays Stephens, Appellant v. Rachel Stephens, Appellee
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

328 So.3d 760

William Hays STEPHENS, Appellant

v.Rachel STEPHENS, Appellee

William Hays Stephens, Appellant

v.Rachel Stephens, Appellee

NO. 2019-CA-01421-COA

NO. 2020-CA-00106-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

August 24, 2021

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: TIMOTHY C. HUDSON, COURTNEY BRADFORD SMITH, Columbus, LINDSAY JO WILKINSON

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: LEE ANN SELF TURNER, ASHLYN BROWN MATTHEWS, Starkville

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., GREENLEE AND McDONALD, JJ.

GREENLEE, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. The Chancery Court of Oktibbeha County granted William and Rachel Stephens a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. The court entered its final judgment of divorce in June 2016, which incorporated a property settlement, child custody, and support agreement (PSA). The PSA required William to pay monthly child support in the amount of $2,500, maintain a minimum of $500,000 in a life insurance policy, and pay half of all of the children's medical expenses not covered by insurance.

¶2. When William failed to perform the actions ordered by the PSA, the chancery court granted Rachel's motion for contempt. William appealed the chancery court's judgment of August 2019 (Stephens I), which held him in contempt and denied his request to modify the child-support obligation.¹

¶3. In October 2019, Rachel filed a petition for contempt, enforcement, and other relief, alleging that William had failed to pay child support from the court's August 2019 order to the filing of the petition. William subsequently appealed the court's January 2020 order (Stephens II), judgment which held him in contempt for the seventh time.² The two appeals have been consolidated.

¶4. The appeals were consolidated, and we find no error in either order appealed from; therefore we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶5. William and Rachel Stephens were married on August 26, 2006. Three daughters were born of the marriage. In June 2016, the Stephenses were divorced on the ground of irreconcilable differences. During the divorce proceedings, the chancellor adopted PSA signed and agreed to by both parties. In the PSA, William and Rachel agreed that they would have joint legal custody of the children, with Rachel having physical custody. The PSA also provided that William would pay child support in the amount of $2,500 due on the 15th of each month, starting on July 15, 2016. William was required to pay half of all medical expenses not covered by insurance and to maintain a minimum of $500,000 in term life insurance for the children's benefit.

¶6. Compelling William to abide by the divorce decree had been challenging for Rachel and the court, with the court holding William in contempt seven times. William's first contempt citation for failure to comply with court orders occurred on October 26, 2016. On December 19, 2016, he was held in contempt again and ordered to pay his child support arrearage totaling $5,000. In February 2017, William petitioned the court to modify his child-support obligation, claiming a reduction in income and that the children's needs had decreased. The chancellor denied William's petition in July 2017. On July 7, 2017, the court held William in contempt for the third time and ordered him to pay $2,500 in past-due child support. At the time of William's fourth contempt citation on December 14, 2017, the court found that William owed $7,500 in child-support payments, not including the unpaid attorney's fees and costs that he was previously ordered to pay. On July 30, 2018, William was found in contempt for a fifth time after the court found that he owed $13,500 in child support.

¶7. William again moved for modification of his child support obligation in December 2018. He claimed that his income had significantly decreased and that a $2,500 monthly payment was unreasonable. In April 2019, Rachel filed a counter-petition for contempt, enforcement, and other relief. On August 7, 2019, after a hearing, the chancellor determined that William could pay the child support but deliberately failed to do so. The chancellor denied William's request for modification and held him in contempt for the sixth time for failure to pay child support and for failing to maintain the life insurance coverage. At the time of the chancellor's August 2019 order (Stephen I), the chancellor found that William owed $20,887.57 in delinquent child support and $3,982 in attorney's fees. The chancellor again ordered William to obtain the life insurance. The chancellor required William to pay the entire amount by September 6, 2019 or face incarceration. On September 6, 2019, William filed a notice of appeal and paid $24,687 as a supersedeas bond.

¶8. On October 14, 2019, Rachel filed another petition for contempt enforcement and other relief to recover child support that vested after the August 2019 order (Stephens I). The amount Rachel sought to recover totaled $7,500. Rachel also petitioned the court regarding William's failure to pay his share of the children's non-covered medical expenses of $426.82 and to require William to furnish proof that he had obtained life insurance as ordered by the court. After a hearing, the chancellor found in January 2020 that William owed an additional $10,650 in child support and $426.82 in non-covered medical expenses; the court also granted Rachel attorney's fees in the amount of $5,230.50. The court ordered that William be incarcerated immediately until he paid Rachel $11,076.82 (Stephens II). William filed a notice of appeal and paid $13,847 as a supersedeas bond.

¶9. As noted, these two cases have been consolidated on appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10. "Chancellors are afforded wide latitude in fashioning equitable remedies in domestic relations matters, and their decisions will not be reversed if the findings of fact are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record." Evans v. Evans , 75 So. 3d 1083, 1086 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Henderson v. Henderson , 757 So. 2d 285, 289 (¶19) (Miss. 2000) ). Unless the chancellor's decision was manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, or the chancellor applied an improper legal standard, we will not disturb a chancellor's factual findings. Wallace v. Wallace , 12 So. 3d 572, 575 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). When reviewing a chancellor's interpretation and application of the law, our standard of review is de novo. Tucker v. Prisock , 791 So. 2d 190, 192 (¶10) (Miss. 2001).

DISCUSSION

I. The August 2019 Order (Stephens I)

¶11. William claims that the chancery court erred when it denied his request to modify his child support obligation despite his inability to pay.

A. Denial of Modification Request

¶12. At the outset, we note that at the time William petitioned the court to modify his child support payments, William was in arrears and had failed to prove that he had paid them to Rachel. "The doctrine of clean-hands provides that he who comes into equity must come with clean hands." Andres v. Andres , 22 So. 3d 314, 320 (¶25) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cook v. Whiddon , 866 So. 2d 494, 498 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) ). "[T]he clean[-]hands doctrine prevents a complaining party from obtaining equitable relief in court when he is guilty of willful misconduct in the transaction at issue." Vincent v. Rickman , 167 So. 3d 245, 249 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Bailey v. Bailey , 724 So. 2d 335, 337 (¶6) (Miss. 1998) ).

¶13. However, "the entry of a judgment for arrearages cleanses the payor's hands" and allows the chancellor to consider the merits of the payor's request for modification. Dixon v. Dixon , 238 So. 3d 1191, 1198 (¶25) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Lewis v. Pagel , 172 So. 3d 162, 176 (¶32) (Miss. 2015) ). Here, the chancellor's entry of an order against William for the full amount of prior arrearage had the effect of cleansing William's hands for purposes of obtaining a remedy in equity. Therefore, the court could properly consider William's request for modification in Stephens I.

¶14. "A child support decree is never final." Howard v. Howard , 968 So. 2d 961, 969 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (internal quotation mark omitted). Where substantial and material changes in circumstances exists, Mississippi law is clear that parties may request child support modification. See Evans v. Evans , 994 So. 2d 765, 770 (¶16) (Miss. 2008) (citing Gillespie v. Gillespie , 594 So. 2d 620, 623 (Miss. 1992) ). One factor to consider in determining whether a material change has occurred "is the relative financial condition and earning capacities of the parties." Martin v. Borries , 282 So. 3d 472, 474 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Bailey v. Bailey , 724 So. 2d 335, 337 (¶7) (Miss. 1998) ). However, "the change in circumstances must be one that was not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the original judgment." Dixon , 238 So. 3d at 1198 (¶26) ; see also McEwen v. McEwen , 631 So. 2d 821, 821 (Miss. 1994) ; Tingle v. Tingle , 573 So. 2d 1389, 1391 (Miss. 1990). Unless a petitioner shows that he has performed the obligations in the original decree or that performance is wholly impossible, he may not petition for modification. Bailey , 724 So. 2d at 337 (¶6) (Miss. 1998). The party requesting modification bears the burden of proof. Id . ; see Adams v. Adams , 467 So. 2d 211, 214 (Miss. 1985).

¶15. William claims that his inability to pay child support entitled him to a downward modification. For this petition to modify child support, the chancellor could only consider evidence of events occurring subsequently to the court's order in July 2017 denying William's modification request. See Howard v. Howard , 913 So. 2d 1030, 1041 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that "[w]hile [a father was] precluded from relitigating any claim [that] was or could have been presented in his original motion to modify support obligations, [the father was] not precluded from showing a material change in circumstances occurring subsequent to the November 2001 opinion")....