Stephenson v. Carlton
| Decision Date | 21 September 2000 |
| Docket Number | E1998-00202-SC-R11-CD |
| Citation | 28 S.W.3d 910 |
| Parties | JONATHAN STEPHENSON V. HOWARD CARLTON, WARDEN, ET AL.IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Appeal by Permission from the Court of Criminal Appeals Criminal Court for Johnson County No. 3207 Lynn W. Brown, Judge
John E. Herbison, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jonathan Stephenson. Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Kathy Morante, Deputy Attorney General; and Joe C. Crumley, Jr., District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
May 2000 Session, Heard at Nashville
We granted this appeal to determine whether the appellant's sentence of life without parole for first- degree murder was an illegal sentence and, if so, whether the appellant was entitled to habeas corpus relief. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We conclude, and the State concedes, that the sentence of life without parole was not a statutorily authorized punishment at the time the appellant committed the offense of first-degree murder and that the illegal sentence was properly challenged in a habeas corpus petition. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
E. Riley Anderson, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Frank F. Drowota, III, Adolpho A. Birch, Jr., Janice M. Holder, and William M. Barker, JJ., joined.
OPINIONWe granted this appeal to determine whether the appellant's sentence of life without parole for first-degree murder was an illegal sentence and, if so, whether the appellant was entitled to habeas corpus relief.
The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the dismissal after concluding that the petition did not state a basis for habeas corpus relief and that the petition, if treated as a suit for post-conviction relief, was barred by the statute of limitations.1
After reviewing applicable authority, we conclude, and the State of Tennessee concedes, that the sentence of life without parole was not a statutorily authorized punishment at the time the appellant committed the offense of first-degree murder. The sentence was, therefore, illegal and properly challenged in a habeas corpus petition. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Our holding does not, however, affect the appellant's separate conviction and 60-year sentence for the offense of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.
The appellant, Jonathan Stephenson, was convicted of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder in 1990. The jury imposed a sentence of death for the first-degree murder conviction and the trial court imposed a consecutive 25-year sentence for the conspiracy conviction.
This Court affirmed both convictions on appeal, but remanded for resentencing due to a fundamental error that occurred in the sentencing phase of trial, which rendered the jury's verdict a nullity. State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 556 (Tenn. 1994)2 . On remand, the parties reached an agreement by which Stephenson was sentenced to life without parole for the first-degree murder offense and to 60 years for the conspiracy offense. In 1998, Stephenson filed this habeas corpus suit challenging, among other grounds, the sentence of life without parole.
The grounds upon which habeas corpus relief is warranted are narrow. The writ will issue only when it appears upon the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered that a court lacked jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant or that the sentence has expired. Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). A habeas corpus petition may be used to challenge judgments that are void and not merely voidable. Id.; Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999).
A void judgment "is one in which the judgment is facially invalid because the court lacked jurisdiction or authority to render the judgment or because the defendant's sentence has expired." Id. We have recognized that a sentence imposed in direct contravention of a statute, for example, is void and illegal. State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 1978).
Prior to 1993, there were but two possible punishments for the offense of first-degree murder: life imprisonment (with the possibility of parole) or the death penalty. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202(b) (1991). The legislature in 1993 created a third possible punishment for the offense: life without parole. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202(c) (Supp. 1996). The new sentencing option was made applicable to offenses committed on or after July 1, 1993. See 1993 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 473, §§ 1.
In State v. Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d 726 (Tenn. 1998), we addressed the issue of whether a defendant who committed a first-degree murder prior to July 1, 1993, may be sentenced to life without parole. We held:
We conclude that the specific enabling provision of the 1993 act, which clearly states that the amendment applies to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 1993, controls, as a matter of statutory construction . . . . The defendant's crime occurred well before July 1, 1993. The statute in effect at that time . . . provided that upon the grant of a new trial, the available sentencing options were life imprisonment and death. There is no indication that the legislature intended that the option of life without parole apply retrospectively to offenses occurring before July 1, 1993. [Citation omitted]. Accordingly, . . . , the trial court lacked the statutory authority to instruct the jury that life without possibility of parole was a sentencing option in this case. Id. at 735-36 (emphasis added).
The first-degree murder committed by Stephenson...
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...... See State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817 (Tenn. 2002); State v. Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn.1994); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530 (Tenn.1994). 10 . Based upon an exhaustive review of the record and Rule 12 reports from trial judges in trials for ... Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tenn.2000). A new sentencing hearing has not been held. . 11. Upon post-conviction review Wilcoxson was granted relief as to ......
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Wlodarz v. State, E2008–02179–SC–R11–CO.
...(Tenn.2006) (granting habeas corpus relief to a prisoner because the judgment of conviction was void on its face); Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tenn.2000) (granting habeas corpus relief to a prisoner who pleaded guilty and accepted a sentence that was not statutorily authorize......
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State v. Stephenson
......In 1998, the defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his sentence of life without parole. In Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tenn.2000), this Court held that the defendant's sentence of life without parole was illegal because such sentence was not statutorily authorized at the time of the offense. We declared the sentence of life without parole void and remanded the case to the trial court for ......
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May v. Carlton
...... guarantees, this Court has ruled that the writ may be granted "only when it appears upon the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered that a court lacked jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant or that the sentence has expired." Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 911 (Tenn.2000). Stated differently, a petitioner must demonstrate that the judgment is "void" and not merely "voidable." Smith, 202 S.W.3d at 127 (citing Hogan, 168 S.W.3d at 755). An illegal sentence, one whose imposition directly contravenes a statute, is ......