Stern v. New Haven Community Schools

• Decision Date: 23 April 1981
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 80-30109.
• Citation: 529 F. Supp. 31
• Parties: David STERN, a Minor, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NEW HAVEN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, a Michigan School District, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

529 F. Supp. 31

David STERN, a Minor, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NEW HAVEN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, a Michigan School District, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 80-30109.

United States District Court, E. D. Michigan, S. D.

April 23, 1981.

Janet M. Tooley, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiffs.

James N. Martin, Mount Clemens, Mich., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES HARVEY, District Judge.

This matter is presently before the Court on motion by the remaining defendants, New Haven Community Schools, et al. A stipulated order of dismissal against Sommerville Communications Corporation was entered on June 11, 1981, wherein the parties agreed to dismiss the matter against said defendant without prejudice and to pursue same in state court.

Defendants' motion for summary judgment and/or to dismiss argues six propositions of law. They are:

I.) Plaintiffs' entire complaint must be stricken due to its failure to comply with F.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(1).

II.) The allegations in plaintiffs' amended complaint of common law torts do not give rise to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

III.) Plaintiffs have failed to state a cognizable claim because the amended complaint is based upon allegations of a conspiracy to deprive plaintiff. David Stern, of his rights, without the required allegations that the defendants conspired against the plaintiff based upon some class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.

IV.) The individual defendants possess a qualified good-faith immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

V.) The claims of plaintiffs Loren Stern and Loretta Stern, are totally without merit.

VI.) Defendant, New Haven Community Schools, is immune from § 1983 liability because the alleged injuries of the plaintiffs were inflicted solely by the employees or agents of defendant, New Haven Community Schools.

The following factual allegations may be discerned from the complaint.

The mirror in the boys' restroom at New Haven High School is of a two-way nature. On November 15, 1979, David Stern, a tenth-grade student, was observed through the two-way mirror buying marijuana from another student during school hours. The observation was made by Brett Harris, an employee of the school, who was acting under the direction of Joe Barnett, principal. Harris notified Barnett of the incident. Barnett thereafter called student Stern to his office. Barnett told Stern that if he cooperated and turned the marijuana over to him, then the police would not be notified. Stern cooperated fully. The other student initially denied everything and refused to cooperate. As a result, both students were reported to the police. The complaint does not allege what, if anything, transpired after notification of the police.

A formal notice of disciplinary action was sent to the Sterns. A meeting was held on November 26, 1979, with the Sterns in attendance. The result of the meeting was student Stern's suspension for the rest of the semester. The suspension also precluded him from any participation in extracurricular activities during the same period. The complaint does not allege anything about the conduct of the meeting itself or that an appeal from the meeting was available or taken.

Under the Michigan Public Meetings Act, M.S.A. § 4.1800 et seq. M.C.L.A. § 15.251 et seq., parents can elect to have such a meeting open or closed to the public. This section is not cited in plaintiffs' complaint but it is mentioned in their brief in response to this motion. The complaint, however, does allege that the Sterns elected to have the meeting closed to the public. Nevertheless, on or about November 28, 1979, an article appeared in the local newspaper (The Sommerville Communications Corporation, d/b/a The Review), stating that minor Stern had been expelled for the aforementioned reasons.

Plaintiffs do not state in their complaint that this is an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court surmised that fact in its Order of April 23, 1981. However, in a brief submitted in response to this motion, plaintiffs do indeed claim that this is such an action.

For the purpose of this opinion, the Court will assume that plaintiffs' complaint complies with F.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(1). It will further assume the factual allegations to be true and that they involve state action. Additional assumptions are made as the Court analyzes each plaintiff's personal claims.

DAVID STERN

The threshold question raised by defendants' motion is whether the factual allegations and legal claims can support an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the outset, the Court notes that the basic purpose of a Section 1983 damage award is to compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of a constitutional right or a federal law. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). There is no allegation that a federal law is involved. Plaintiff only claims he has been deprived of several substantive constitutional guarantees. The Court's scrutiny is limited accordingly.

Counts II through V of the complaint, each at some point, refer to the alleged communication by defendants of the Board meeting and the subsequent publication thereof in The Review. Counts II and III claim that the communication and/or publication "constituted an invasion or intrusion of plaintiff minor David Stern's privacy in that it, among other things, disclosed embarrassing private facts and intruded into his seclusion or solitude." Plaintiff maintains that this allegation states a federally recognized claim. Relying solely on Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), plaintiff argues that "privacy is itself a constitutionally protected right."

In the context of this case, the Court must reject plaintiff's broad allegation. Cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976). The Court notes initially that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not concerned with a violation of only state law. Sigler v. Lowrie, 404 F.2d 659 (CA 8, 1968). Similarly, mere state action does not satisfy the requirements of Section 1983. See, Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980). It is only when a violation of state law results in an infringement of a federally protected right that a cause of action can be maintained under this section. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976); Gore v. Wochner, 475 F.Supp. 274 (D.C.Mo., 1979) aff'd 620 F.2d 183 (CA 8, 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 875, 101 S.Ct. 218, 66 L.Ed.2d 96.

In the instant matter, neither the "privacy" allegedly invaded nor the "interest" allegedly infringed is "secured by the Constitution of the United States." Cf. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284, 100 S.Ct. 553, 558, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196, 81 S.Ct. 473, 488, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (Harlan, J. concurring); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1039, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945). The privacy allegedly invaded does not involve those "zones of privacy" which emanate from "specific constitutional guarantees;" nor does it deal with those substantive aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment which are "`fundamental' or `implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-713, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1165-1166, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976). Rather, the "privacy" which plaintiff claims to have been invaded and the "interest" which plaintiff attempts to vindicate derive their legal foundations from traditional state tort law. See, Beaumont v. Brown, 401 Mich. 80, 257 N.W.2d 522 (1977); Earp v. City of Detroit, 16 Mich.App. 271, 167 N.W.2d 841 (1969). This traditional common law cause of action, standing alone, is not cognizable under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Paul v. Davis, supra; McNally v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 69, 76-79 (CA 8, 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 855, 97 S.Ct. 150, 50 L.Ed.2d 131; Travers v. Paton, 261 F.Supp. 110 (D.Conn., 1966), and cases cited therein.

Count IV appears to be directed at former defendant Sommerville Communications Corporation. Count V states a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. For the previously stated reasons, this is not a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, Robinson v. McCorkle, 462 F.2d 111, 114 (CA 3, 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1042, 93 S.Ct. 529, 34 L.Ed.2d 492. Rather, it is a common law cause of action which is recognized by the State of Michigan. Warren v. June's Mobile Home Village and Sales Inc., 66 Mich.App. 386, 239 N.W.2d 380 (1976); Jankowski v. Mazzotta, 7 Mich.App. 483, 152 N.W.2d 49 (1967). Assuming Counts II through V also allege an action for defamation, the conclusion that no federal claim is raised, must still apply. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976); Brainerd v. Potratz, 421 F.Supp. 836, 840 (N.D.Ill., 1976), aff'd 566 F.2d 1177 (CA 7, 1977).

The Court now turns to Count I of the complaint. Paragraph 14 alleges that:

The defendants conspired together to deprive and did deprive minor DAVID STERN of his rights, privileges, and immunities secured by him under the constitution and laws of the United States specifically including, but not limited to:

(a) Plaintiff minor DAVID STERN's right to be free of a deprivation of liberty without due process and equal protection, as provided by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

(b) Plaintiff minor DAVID STERN's right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure as provided by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

(c) Plaintiff minor DAVID STERN's right to the privacy and integrity of his person, as protected by the penumbra of rights secured under the first Ten Amendments to the United States Constitution.

(d) Plaintiff DAVID STERN's right to be free of excessive and disproportionate punishment beyond the authority of the defendants and in violation of the Eighth Amendment in the form of publicity and

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