Stevens v. Casey

• Decision Date: 29 October 1917
• Citation: 117 N.E. 588,228 Mass. 368
• Parties: STEVENS v. CASEY, State Inspector of Buildings.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

228 Mass. 368

117 N.E. 588

STEVENS

v.CASEY, State Inspector of Buildings.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Oct. 29, 1917.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Worcester County; George A Sanderson, Judge.

Proceedings in superior court by Charles F. Stevens against John F. Casey, State Inspector of Buildings, to review acts of the latter as such inspector. Finding for defendant, and plaintiff brings exceptions. Exceptions overruled.

Chas. F. Stevens, Henry L. Parker, and Morton L. Lewis, all of Worcester, for petitioner.

H. C. Attwill, Atty. Gen., and Arthur E. Seagrave, Ass't Atty. Gen., for respondent.

RUGG, C. J.

It is provided by St. 1913, c. 655, § 20, that:

‘A building which is used, in whole or in part, as a * * * tenement house which has eight or more rooms or in which ten or more persons are accommodated or lodge or reside above the second story, the owner * * * of which is notified in writing by an inspector that the provisions of this act are deemed by him applicable thereto, shall be provided with proper egresses or other means of escape from fire, sufficient for the use of all persons accommodated * * * lodged or resident therein; but no owner * * * of such building shall be deemed to have violated this provision unless he has been notified in writing by such inspector what additional egresses or means of escape from fire are necessary.’

The plaintiff, being the owner of a certain building in Worcester, was notified by an inspector according to the statute that additional means of egress and other means of escape from fire were required by him under the authority of this statute the details of which were specified. Thereupon the plaintiff brought this proceeding under section 55, which provides that:

‘Whoever is aggrieved by the order, requirement, or direction of a building inspector * * * may * * * appeal to a judge of the superior court * * * for an order forbidding its enforcement; and * * * a hearing may be had before the court at such early and convenient time and place as shall be fixed * * * or the court may appoint three disinterested persons * * * to examine the matter and hear the parties; and the decision of said court or the decision, in writing and under oath, of a majority of said experts * * * may alter, annul or affirm such order, requirement or direction.’

Assuming in favor of the plaintiff (but without so deciding) that this is a ‘civil cause’ within R. L. c. 173, § 106, so that it may be brought here by exceptions, it does not appear that any wrong has been done to the landowner.

The statute was enacted as a police regulation for the protection from fire of the lives of human beings. Statutes of this general nature are within the constitutional power of the Legislature. The housing of large numbers of people in populous cities not adequately protected against fire risk has direct relation to the public health and public safety. Salem v. Maynes, 123 Mass. 372;Perry v. Bangs, 161 Mass. 38, 36 N. E. 683;Commonwealth v. Hayden, 211 Mass. 296, 97 N. E. 783;Goldstein v. Connor, 212 Mass. 57, 98 N. E. 701.

The initial decision of an inspector made under the statute, as to the kind of building which is in controversy, is not binding upon the owner as a finality under all circumstances. Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100,10 L. R. A. 116, 23 Am. St. Rep. 850;No. American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306, 29 Sup. Ct. 101, 53 L. Ed. 195. But the statute makes provision for a petition by the landowner for a review by the court or by three experts appointed by the court of the decision of the inspector. It is by virtue of that provision that the present landowner has had the decision of the inspector reviewed by the superior court. He cannot avail himself of that review and at the same time ask this court to strike down the statute as unconstitutional because it does not enable him to demand a trial by jury. Pitkin v. Springfield, 112 Mass. 509;N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Hardison, 199 Mass. 190, 85 N. E. 410,127 Am. St. Rep. 478. Doubtless if the landowner had not sought a review by the...