Stevens v. Gravette Medical Center Hosp.

• Decision Date: 23 February 1998
• Docket Number: Civil No. 97-5067.
• Citation: 998 F.Supp. 1011
• Parties: Michael STEVENS, Plaintiff, v. GRAVETTE MEDICAL CENTER HOSPITAL, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas

998 F.Supp. 1011

Michael STEVENS, Plaintiff, v. GRAVETTE MEDICAL CENTER HOSPITAL, Defendant.

Civil No. 97-5067.

United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Fayetteville Division.

February 23, 1998.

Charles Fuqua, Springdale, AR, for Plaintiff.

Ralph C. Williams, Bentonville, AR, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

H. FRANKLIN WATERS, District Judge.

This case is before the court on plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law, declaratory judgment, injunction and additur. Plaintiff also asks for an award of attorney's fees and costs.

Background.

Plaintiff, Michael Stevens (Stevens), filed this action against his former employer, Gravette Medical Center Hospital. The complaint asserted the following causes of action: sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII; fraud under Arkansas common law; and sex discrimination and retaliation under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act.

Stevens is a male nurse. He began working for defendant in May of 1995. Initially he worked only part-time but later worked full-time. In June of 1996, Stevens contended he applied for a supervisory position but was denied the position because he was a male and was told he could not work with obstetric/gynecological (ob/gyn) patients. On July 8, 1996, Stevens filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). After he filed his EEOC charge, Stevens alleged that the defendant retaliated against him in a number of ways including strictly scrutinizing his job performance. He contended defendant made his working environment so intolerable that he was forced to resign on March 23, 1997.

The trial of this matter began on February 9, 1998, and concluded on February 11, 1998. Stevens requested jury instructions only on the Title VII claims. He also agreed that he was entitled to no more than $1680.00 in back wages which represented the difference in the wages he received and those he would have received had he been promoted in June of 1996 through the date of his resignation. He stipulated that he was entitled to no wages or fringe benefits after the date of his resignation. Further, he made no request for reinstatement. He did seek compensatory damages in the form of mental distress, anxiety, etc., and also sought punitive damages.

After the close of the evidence, the jury was instructed on the following three claims: (1) denial of promotion; (2) retaliation; and (3) constructive discharge.

The jury was given a number of interrogatories to answer regarding the three claims. The promotion claim was addressed in interrogatory number 1. In answering that interrogatory, the jury found that Stevens' gender was a motivating factor in defendant's decision to deny him the promotion but it also found the defendant would have in any event denied him the promotion. In other words, the jury found the defendant would have denied Stevens the promotion without considering his gender.

The retaliation claim was addressed in interrogatory number 2. The jury found in defendant's favor on this claim.

The constructive discharge claim was covered by interrogatory number 3. In answer to this interrogatory, the jury found Stevens had been constructively discharged but found the "defendant would have created such an intolerable environment that plaintiff was forced to resign regardless of his complaints of gender discrimination."

Given its answers to the prior interrogatories, the jury, following the court's instructions, did not award lost wages or employment benefits and did not award actual or punitive damages. After the verdict was read and the jury discharged, the court advised the attorneys that in light of Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) it doubted plaintiff would be entitled to an award of attorney's fees. The parties were directed to file simultaneous briefs on this issue and also to address whether Stevens was entitled to an award of nominal damages or what form the judgment should take. The court has now received the briefs of the parties.

Discussion.

We will address first the scope and form of judgment that should be entered. Second, we will address the plaintiff's entitlement to an award of fees.

1. Scope and Form of Judgment.

Stevens first argues that, as a matter of law, where a jury finds that sex was a motivating factor in the employer's decision but that it would have made the same decision regardless of plaintiff's sex, the court must enter a judgment for one dollar nominal damages. Second, he argues he is entitled to a declaratory judgment setting forth the jury's finding that the defendant had engaged in a pattern and practice of unlawfully discriminating against its employees on the basis of sex. Third, Stevens requests an injunction restraining the defendant from further sex based discrimination. In this regard, Stevens suggests that the court's order should clearly state that defendant, its officers, servants, employees, and attorneys or any persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order, shall refrain from using sex based criteria as a factor in making employment and promotional decisions.

Under Title VII, as amended and supplemented by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166, § 102 (1991), creating 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, an aggrieved person may recover general compensatory damages in addition to the traditional employment discrimination remedy of back pay and reinstatement or front pay and punitive damages. Both punitive and general compensatory damages are expressly limited to certain dollar amounts depending upon the size of the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b). The jury is not advised of the statutory limits. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2). Of course, perhaps the biggest change enacted in 1991 was the grant of a right to jury trial in cases of intentional discrimination if the plaintiff is seeking compensatory or punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c).

The consequences of the "same decision" finding was also altered by the 1991 amendments. Prior to the amendments, pursuant to Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), an employer who acted partly for discriminatory reasons could completely avoid liability by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have made the same employment decision in the absence of the discriminatory motivation.

After the amendments, an employer may no longer avoid liability by showing it would have made the same decision but may limit the remedies available. Section 2000e-2(m) now provides that "an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that ... sex ... was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). Although it is clear such a finding establishes liability, the remedies that may be granted the aggrieved party are specifically limited. In this regard, § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) provides as follows:

(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court-

(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and

(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A).

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

Mixed-motive analysis applies when the plaintiff shows a specific link between the discriminatory animus and the challenged decision sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable trier of fact that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated the challenged decision. See e.g., Philipp v. ANR Freight System, Inc., 61 F.3d 669, 673 (8th Cir.1995). In other words, this analysis applies "only in `dual-motive' cases where the complainant produces `evidence that directly reflects the use of an illegitimate criterion in the challenged decision.'" Carroll v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 78 F.3d 352, 357 (8th Cir.1996) (quoting Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 996 F.2d 200, 202 (8th Cir.1993)). "Direct evidence means evidence showing a specific link between an improper motive and the challenged employment decision." Id. (citing Parton v. GTE N., Inc., 971 F.2d 150, 153 (8th Cir.1992)).

As we noted above, the jury found Stevens had been subjected to discrimination when denied a promotion and when he was constructively discharged. However, it also found that the employer would have taken the same employment actions absent the discriminatory consideration.

Thus, having technically prevailed on liability but having failed to show an entitlement to compensatory damages, the question becomes what type of relief the plaintiff should be awarded. As noted above, Stevens first argues that as a matter of law he is entitled to an award of nominal damages.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has on a number of occasions approved, and even directed, the judicial entry of nominal damages when an award of actual damages cannot be sustained. For instance, in Parton v. GTE North, Inc., 971 F.2d 150 (8th Cir.1992) the Eighth Circuit held that nominal damages were appropriately awarded where a Title VII violation is proved even though no actual damages were shown. Id. at 154. See also, Jasperson v. Purolator Courier Corp., 765 F.2d 736, 742 (8th Cir. 1985).

However, these cases did not involve the application of the 1991 statutory amendments. As one well-known treatise points out, "[n]ominal damages are traditionally awarded in a case in which compensatory relief is available and where liability has been established, but where the...