Stevenson v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 03 August 2020
• Docket Number: No. 05-18-01535-CV,05-18-01535-CV
• Citation: 608 S.W.3d 109
• Parties: Susan STEVENSON, Individually and as Parent of the Minor Child, Abygail Alana Jane Harris, Deceased, Appellant v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

608 S.W.3d 109

Susan STEVENSON, Individually and as Parent of the Minor Child, Abygail Alana Jane Harris, Deceased, Appellant

v.FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Appellee

No. 05-18-01535-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

Opinion Filed August 3, 2020

John Foster Melton, Michael W. Balcezak, The Melton Law Firm, PLLC, Austin, for Appellant.

Michael W. Eady, Elizabeth Brabb, Thompson Coe Cousins & Irons, L.L.P., Austin, Adolfo Ruiz Rodriguez Jr., Wilson Cates Aurbach, The Rodriguez Firm, PC, Dallas, for Appellee.

Before Justices Osborne, Partida-Kipness, and Pedersen, III

OPINION

Opinion by Justice Osborne Susan Stevenson, individually and as parent of the deceased minor child Abygail Alana Harris, appeals the trial court's amended final judgment in favor of Ford Motor Company, dismissing her wrongful-death and survival claims against Ford and ordering a take-nothing judgment. Stevenson raises one issue on appeal arguing the trial court erred when it granted Ford's traditional motion for summary judgment. Stevenson makes two alternative arguments in support of her sole issue: (1) the trial court did not conduct the proper choice-of-law analysis and incorrectly applied the Texas products-liability statute of repose; and (2) even if the trial court correctly concluded Texas substantive law applies, the decedent's minority status tolled the Texas products-liability statute of repose as to Stevenson's survival claims. We conclude the trial court did not err. The trial court's amended final judgment is affirmed.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL CONTEXT

On April 18, 1999, Ford released to Jim Bass Ford, Inc., a Texas dealership, the 1999 Ford Explorer involved in this case. That Explorer was designed in Michigan and assembled in Missouri. Jim Bass Ford subsequently sold the Explorer to a consumer on July 1, 1999. At some point, Anthony Harris acquired ownership of the Explorer.

On July 26, 2015, Kanda Foster, a Texas resident, was driving the Explorer in Virginia. Abygail Harris, a minor, and her father, Anthony Harris, both Texas residents, were passengers in the Explorer. Abygail Harris was not properly restrained by her seatbelt. Anthony Harris was asleep in the vehicle. Allegedly, Foster fell asleep while driving and lost control of the Explorer, causing it to roll over and strike a guardrail. Abygail Harris was ejected from the Explorer and sustained fatal injuries.

On July 26, 2017, Stevenson, Abygail Harris's mother, filed her original petition alleging: (1) wrongful-death and survival claims against Ford based on strict products liability due to a design defects theory of liability; and (2) wrongful-death and survival claims against Foster and Anthony Harris based on a negligence theory of liability. On August 18, 2017, Ford filed its original answer generally denying the allegations and asserting, inter alia , the affirmative defense that Stevenson's wrongful-death and survival claims were barred by the Texas products-liability statute of repose.

On November 17, 2017, Ford filed a traditional motion for summary judgment on its affirmative defense that the Texas products-liability statute of repose barred Stevenson's wrongful-death and survival claims against it. Ford maintained that: (1) under the proper choice-of-law analysis, Texas law applied to Stevenson's wrongful-death and survival claims against Ford; (2) section 16.012(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code imposed a fifteen-year statute of repose in products-liability actions, which applied to Stevenson's wrongful-death and survival claims against Ford; and (3) Abygail Harris's minority status did not toll the Texas products-liability statute of repose. Stevenson filed a response to the motion for summary judgment arguing that, under the proper choice-of-law analysis, Virginia or Michigan law applied. Stevenson maintained that Michigan does not have a statute of repose and Virginia's statute of repose does not apply to products-liability claims. In the alternative, Stevenson argued that the Texas products-liability statute of repose was tolled because Abygail Harris was a minor and under Virginia law, her non-party, minor brother would also have a wrongful-death claim.

On March 8, 2018, the trial court granted Ford's traditional motion for summary judgment. Ford filed a motion to sever Stevenson's wrongful-death and survival claims against Ford from her claims against Foster and Anthony Harris, which the trial court granted. Stevenson then appealed the resulting final summary judgment.

II. JURISDICTION

As a preliminary matter, although neither party raised an issue relating to jurisdiction, we address this Court's jurisdiction. The trial court's November 26, 2018 order granting Ford's unopposed motion to sever and for entry of final judgment stated, "It is further ORDERED that contemporaneous with this Order, the [trial court] shall enter Final Judgment on [Stevenson's] claims and causes of action against [Ford]." The severance order contemplated that a separate final judgment would be signed. However, the record before the Court did not contain any further document that would constitute the final judgment referenced in the severance order.

An appellate court is obligated to review sua sponte issues affecting its jurisdiction. Saleh v. Hollinger , 335 S.W.3d 368, 370 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied). Appellate jurisdiction is never presumed. Id. As a general rule, Texas appellate courts have jurisdiction only over final judgments. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Generally, the severance of an interlocutory judgment into a separate cause makes it final. See Diversified Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Hill, Heard, O'Neal, Gilstrap & Goetz, P.C. , 63 S.W.3d 795, 795 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam) ; Wise v. Mitchell , No. 05-15-00610-CV, 2016 WL 3398447, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 20, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.). However, if the severance order contemplates additional proceedings will occur in the severed matter, the interlocutory judgment does not become final until those events have occurred. See Diversified Fin. Sys. , 63 S.W.3d at 795 ; McRoberts v. Ryals , 863 S.W.2d 450, 453 n.3 (Tex. 1993) ; Wise , 2016 WL 3398447, at *4 ; see also Bank of Am., N.A. v. Lilly , No. 07-11-00154-CV, 2011 WL 2226492, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 26, 2011, no pet.) (order of abatement) (per curiam); In re S.A.A. , No. 2-08-080-CV, 2008 WL 2002744 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 8, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam) ; Aleman v. Marsh USA, Inc. , No. 13-04-084-CV, 2006 WL 181376, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan. 26, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam).

Because this Court had questions relating to its jurisdiction, we ordered the parties to submit additional briefing relating to the finality of the trial court's severance order and to address how that order impacted this Court's jurisdiction over the appeal. In response, the parties filed a joint motion to abate the appeal, requesting that the appeal be temporarily abated to allow the trial court to sign a final judgment and assign a new cause number as contemplated in the trial court's severance order. This Court granted the joint motion and abated the appeal. On December 13, 2019, the trial court signed an amended final judgment, which was contained in a supplemental clerk's record filed with this Court. Then, the parties filed an amended notice of appeal referencing the new cause number,¹ after which this appeal was reinstated. Accordingly, we conclude this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal.

III. TRADITIONAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In issue one, Stevenson argues the trial court erred when it granted Ford's traditional motion for summary judgment and dismissed her wrongful-death and survival claims against Ford. Stevenson makes two alternative points: (1) the trial court did not conduct the proper choice-of-law analysis and incorrectly applied the Texas products-liability statute of repose; and (2) even if the trial court correctly concluded Texas substantive law applies, the statute of repose was tolled for the survival claims of the minor decedent.

A. Standard of Review

An appellate court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo. See Lujan v. Navistar, Inc. , 555 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2018). Also, a choice-of-law analysis is a question of law to be reviewed de novo, unless the contacts raise disputed issues of fact. Sonat Expl. Co. v. Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. , 271 S.W.3d 228, 231 (Tex. 2008). Determining which state's substantive law governs a particular issue is ultimately a question of law for the court to decide. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach , 217 S.W.3d 430, 440 (Tex. 2007) ; Torrington Co. v. Stutzman , 46 S.W.3d 829, 848 (Tex. 2000). Determining the particular state's contacts to be considered in making this legal determination involves a factual inquiry. Hughes Wood Prods., Inc. v. Wagner , 18 S.W.3d 202, 204 (Tex. 2000).

B. Choice of Law

In the first part of issue one, Stevenson argues the trial court did not conduct the proper choice-of-law analysis and incorrectly applied the Texas products-liability statute of repose. Stevenson contends that under the "most significant relationship" test, Michigan or Virginia law applies to her lawsuit, and neither of those states has an applicable statute of repose.² Ford responds that the trial court conducted the proper choice-of-law analysis and correctly concluded that Texas law applied, requiring the dismissal of Stevenson's wrongful-death and survival claims against it.

1. Applicable Law

a. Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws

Texas courts use the analysis described in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws to resolve choice-of-law issues and select the particular substantive law that governs a case. See, e.g., Hughes Wood Prods. , 18 S.W.3d at 205 ; Gutierrez v. Collins , 583 S.W.2d 312, 318–19 (Tex. 1979). Section 6 of the Restatement identifies a framework that many courts follow when deciding which jurisdiction's law applies....