Stewardson v. Cass Cnty.
| Docket Number | 3:18-CV-958 DRL-MGG |
| Decision Date | 14 October 2021 |
| Parties | BLAKE STEWARDSON, Plaintiff, v. CASS COUNTY et al., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Earlier this year, the court granted and denied in part the defense's partial summary judgment motion leaving these claims for trial: excessive force against Deputy Christopher Titus, failure to intervene against Deputy Cameron Biggs, and state law assault and battery claims against Sheriff Randy Pryor in his official capacity. Deputy Biggs asks the court to reconsider. He says he lacked adequate notice of the failure to intervene claim and argues anew for qualified immunity.
The court has inherent power to revisit an interlocutory order. See Galvan v. Norberg, 678 F.3d 581, 587 (7th Cir. 2012); Peterson v. Lindner, 765 F.2d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (interlocutory orders “may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities”); White v. Gerardot, 509 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2007) (denial of summary judgment is interlocutory). Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function: without new evidence, to correct manifest errors of law or fact. Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251 (7th Cir. 1987).
A manifest error means a “wholesale disregard misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent.” Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 253 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Oto v. Metro. Life Ins Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000)). A motion for reconsideration may address circumstances when the court misunderstands a party, decides issues outside those presented by the parties, or makes an error of apprehension (not of reasoning). Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185 1191 (7th Cir. 1990). A reconsideration motion is not a vehicle to rehash soundly rejected arguments. See, e.g. Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2014).
Deputy Biggs merely rehashes an issue the court has soundly decided-that the first amended complaint articulated facts giving rise to a failure to intervene theory, one that remains reasonably for the jury to decide. See Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Currie v. Chhabra, 728 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 2013) (). Deputy Biggs argues that each claim based on a “separate transaction or occurrence” must be stated in a separate count, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b); but, to the extent this language makes sense here, the claims (excessive force and failure to intervene) are based on the same occurrence and operative facts.
Deputy Biggs argues too that the excessive force claim and failure to intervene claim are “legally distinct.” But that alone doesn't translate into a straightjacket of separately labeled counts. “A complaint need not identify legal theories, and specifying an incorrect theory is not a fatal error.” Rabe v. United Air Lines, Inc., 636 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2011); accord Ryan v. Ill. Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 185 F.3d 751, 764 (7th Cir. 1999). “Though legally distinct, the fate of [a] failure to intervene claim is closely linked to that of [an] excessive force claim since, by definition, if there was no excessive force then there can be no failure to intervene.” Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 767 (7th Cir. 2005). Closely linked as theories, they may be closely linked in the factual allegations of a pleading.
Deputy Biggs cites Guth v. Texas Co., 155 F.2d 563, 565-66 (7th Cir. 1946), which said that separate theories for negligence and account should've been stated in separate counts; but nonetheless the court of appeals-though agreeing with the district court that the negligence claim could not be maintained-specifically held that the district court erred by not considering the account theory that the pleading's facts supported and that the plaintiff pivoted to argue: “[I]ndeed we must, under the extremely liberal rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure take any possible view of the facts which would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” Id. at 566. Far from helpful to Deputy Biggs, the case supports this court's prior ruling.
The focus today remains on the facts, not labels. See Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2011); Lucien v. Preiner, 967 F.2d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 1986). N.A.A.C.P. v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 292 (7th Cir. 1992). This remains true even in the wake of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662. See Whitaker v. Milwaukee Cnty., 772 F.3d 802, 808-09 (7th Cir. 2014). “[T]here must be sufficient facts pleaded to allow the court and the defendants to understand the gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint.” Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318, 326 (7th Cir. 1996).
Mr. Stewardson's failure to intervene theory wasn't an amendment, much less an improper amendment at summary judgment. Even when a plaintiff raises a so-called new claim at summary judgment, the court must first consider “whether [the new claim] changes the complaint's factual theory, or just the legal theories plaintiff has pursued so far.” Chessie Logistics Co. v. Krinos Holdings, Inc., 867 F.3d 852, 860 (7th Cir. 2017). If the new claim changes the complaint's factual theories, the court may construe it as an impermissible attempt to alter the complaint. See Id. at 859; Whitaker, 772 F.3d at 808. On the other hand, if the new claim adds another legal theory based on facts already alleged in the complaint, the court should allow it to proceed “unless the changes unfairly harm the defendant or the case's development-for example, by making it more costly or difficult to defend the case, or by causing unreasonable delay.” Chessie Logistics, 867 F.3d at 859 (quoting Vidimos, Inc. v. Laser Lab Ltd., 99 F.3d 217, 222 (7th Cir. 1996)). Deputy Biggs offers no such reasons even if the court were to credit his view that this claim wasn't obvious. The court denies the motion to reconsider in this respect.
Deputy Biggs next says qualified immunity serves as a defense to the failure to intervene claim. He argued this defense vis-à-vis the excessive force claim at summary judgment, not the failure to intervene claim. Though often arguments not made are waived, qualified immunity proves a unique defense that is suitable to address today. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, (1985); see also Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 786-87 (7th Cir. 2020); Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 836 (7th Cir. 2008); Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335, 1338 (7th Cir. 1989); Alvarado v. Picur, 859 F.2d 448, 451 n.3 (7th Cir. 1988).
Qualified immunity shields officials from liability unless a claimant proves two elements: first, that the official violated a constitutional right; and second, that right was clearly established at the time of the conduct. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 735. The court may address either element first, id., though this circuit has endorsed analyzing the second element initially to prevent unnecessary litigation, Kemp v. Liebel, 877 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir. 2017).
Officials are shielded from civil liability “‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, (1982)). A right is clearly established if it is sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that his or her actions violate that right, meaning that existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308 (2015). Qualified immunity “gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions” and “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 743 (internal quotations omitted). The law cautions against defining clearly established rights at a high level of generality. Mullenix, 136 S.Ct. at 308.
Mr. Stewardson alleges two instances when Deputy Biggs should've intervened to prevent Deputy Titus' excessive force-the first being when Deputy Titus tripped and slammed a handcuffed Mr. Stewardson to the floor and the second when Deputy Titus “hip-tossed” Mr. Stewardson approximately thirty-one minutes later. Of course, the court construes the facts in Mr. Stewardson's favor because this argument harkens back to the summary judgment motion. “[A]n officer who is present and fails to intervene to prevent other law enforcement officers from infringing the constitutional rights of citizens is liable under § 1983 if that officer had reason to know that excessive force was being used or that any constitutional violation has been committed by a law enforcement official; and the officer had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring.” Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994). Triable issues remain for the jury as to Deputy Titus' use of force-and tied to it Deputy Biggs' failure to intervene. See Abdullahi, 423 F.3d at 774. On this record, Deputy Biggs is entitled to qualified immunity only in part.
As to the Deputy Titus' second instance of excessive force (i.e., tripping Mr. Stewardson to the ground) and Deputy...
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