Stickle v. Cnty. of Jefferson
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 21CA0439 |
| Decision Date | 21 July 2022 |
| Citation | 519 P.3d 751,2022 COA 79 |
| Parties | Beverly STICKLE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. COUNTY OF JEFFERSON, Colorado, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Silvern & Bulger, P.C., Thomas A. Bulger, Lakewood, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Kimberly S. Sorrells, County Attorney, Eric Butler, Assistant County Attorney, Rebecca Klymkowsky, Assistant County Attorney, Golden, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
Opinion by JUDGE NAVARRO
¶ 1 Beverly Stickle was injured in the Jefferson County Courts and Administration Building's north parking structure (the parking structure) after she lost her balance and fell on a step down from a walkway. As a result, she brought this premises liability claim against Jefferson County (the County). The County moved to dismiss, asserting immunity from Stickle's claim under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). Among other things, the County argued that the CGIA's waiver of immunity for a dangerous condition of a public building does not apply here. See § 24-10-106(1)(c), C.R.S. 2021. The trial court disagreed and denied the motion to dismiss.
¶ 2 Answering a novel question in Colorado, we hold that a public parking structure can be a public building under the CGIA and that the parking structure here qualifies as such. We also reject the County's contention that the defect alleged here was not a dangerous condition because it was solely attributable to the design of the parking structure. Therefore, we conclude that the County waived its immunity, affirm the court's order, and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 3 The parking structure has two levels and is detached from the Courts and Administration Building. A photograph of the parking structure is reproduced below:1
¶ 4 On February 6, 2018, Stickle parked her car on the second level of the parking structure and walked to the Courts and Administration Building. Later in the day, she returned to her car to retrieve some paperwork.
¶ 5 To return to the second level of the parking structure, Stickle walked up the stairs nearest to the Courts and Administration Building, heading east. The top of the stairs is level with a walkway that runs along the western edge of the parking structure, as shown in the photograph reproduced below:
Separating the walkway from the parking surface, however, is a raised curb requiring a step down. On the day of the incident, the walkway and the parking surface were the same shade of charcoal gray, except for the edge of the curb, which was painted yellow. Photographs of the walkway and parking surface as they appeared in February 2018 are reproduced below:
As the trial court aptly put it, while it is obvious coming from the parking surface that there is a curb, "it is not obvious coming the other way from the stairs and walkway that there is a step down, even though the yellow line is bright and looked recently painted (in the photographs)."
¶ 6 After Stickle climbed the stairs and began walking to her car, she did not see the step down from the walkway to the parking surface. She fell and suffered a compound fracture of her arm.
¶ 7 Based on this incident, Stickle sued the County under the Colorado Premises Liability Act. See § 13-21-115, C.R.S. 2021. The County moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). The County argued, among other things, that Stickle could not show that it had waived its immunity under the CGIA's waiver provision for a dangerous condition of a public building because (1) the parking structure is not a public building and (2) the step down from the walkway was not a "dangerous condition" under the CGIA because the matching color of the walkway and the parking surface was a design choice for which immunity is not waived. See § 24-10-103(1.3), C.R.S. 2021.
¶ 8 After conducting an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Trinity Broadcasting of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster , 848 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1993), the trial court issued a written order rejecting the County's arguments, concluding that the County had waived immunity under the CGIA's public building provision, and thus denying the motion to dismiss.2
¶ 9 The County first contends that the trial court erred by concluding that the parking structure is a "public building" under the CGIA. We disagree.
¶ 10 On the question of whether the parking structure is a public building, the parties presented evidence of the following.
¶ 11 The parking structure was constructed between 1990 and 1991 and opened to the public in 1992. It is made of concrete and intended to be permanent. The first level is completely covered, has a fully enclosed utility room, has concrete or masonry pillars that support the second level, and is surrounded by a "knee wall." Thus, although the first level is covered, it is not "completely closed in." The second level and the stairs leading to the second level are uncovered.
¶ 12 The parking structure is equipped with electricity for lighting and vehicle charging, and it has a sprinkler system. It does not have heating, air conditioning, or other temperature control systems. Finally, the parking structure — including the step where Stickle fell — had to comply with a "building code."
¶ 13 Based on this evidence, and considering the analogous case of Pierce v. City of Lansing , 265 Mich.App. 174, 694 N.W.2d 65 (2005), the trial court ruled as follows:
¶ 14 Whether the CGIA protects a government from suit is a question of subject matter jurisdiction. Maphis v. City of Boulder , 2022 CO 10, ¶ 13, 504 P.3d 287. The plaintiff bears the burden to prove that the government has waived its immunity, "but this burden is relatively lenient, as the plaintiff is afforded the reasonable inferences from her undisputed evidence." City & Cnty. of Denver v. Dennis , 2018 CO 37, ¶ 11, 418 P.3d 489.
¶ 15 The application of sovereign immunity presents a mixed question of law and fact. Maphis , ¶ 14. The trial court makes "factual findings about its ability to hear the case," Dennis , ¶ 9, and resolves "[a]ny factual dispute upon which the existence of jurisdiction may turn." Swieckowski v. City of Fort Collins , 934 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Colo. 1997). On review, we will defer to the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Ackerman v. City & Cnty. of Denver , 2015 COA 96M, ¶ 12, 373 P.3d 665. Once any questions of fact are resolved, we review de novo the question of governmental immunity, as the only remaining matter is one of statutory interpretation. Maphis , ¶ 15.
¶ 16 Our task in construing a statute is to give effect to the General Assembly's intent. In re Estate of Colby , 2021 COA 31, ¶ 13, 486 P.3d 466. To do so, we begin with the statute's plain language, reading the words and phrases in context and construing them according to their common usages. Id. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it as written without resorting to other means of discerning legislative intent. Id. ; Coyle v. State , 2021 COA 54, ¶ 10, 492 P.3d 366. Further, "[b]ecause the CGIA derogates the common law, we construe its immunity provisions strictly but waiver provisions broadly." Maphis , ¶ 17.
¶ 17 The CGIA provides that "[a] public entity shall be immune from liability in all claims for injury which lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by the claimant." § 24-10-106(1) ; see also Hernandez v. City & Cnty. of Denver , 2018 COA 151, ¶ 5, 439 P.3d 57. "Sovereign immunity is waived," however, in an action for injuries resulting from "[a] dangerous condition of any public building." § 24-10-106(1)(c). The waiver of immunity in section 24-10-106(1)(c) relates to a physical condition of the building, not to uses of the building or activities conducted therein. See Jenks v. Sullivan , 826 P.2d 825, 827 (Colo. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Bertrand v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs , 872 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1994).
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