Coyle v. State
| Decision Date | 22 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 19CA1465 |
| Citation | 2021 COA 54,492 P.3d 366 |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
| Parties | William Andrew COYLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Colorado, Defendant-Appellee. |
Levin Jacobson Japha, P.C., Daniel J. Levin, Don D. Jacobson, David C. Japha, Evan J. House, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Stephanie Lindquist Scoville, First Assistant Attorney General, Melissa D. Allen, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
Opinion by JUDGE NAVARRO
¶ 1 Colorado's Exoneration Act, §§ 13-65-101 to - 103, C.R.S. 2020, permits some wrongly convicted people to seek compensation from the State. But the Act does not permit a person to file a petition for compensation if the person's conviction was reversed based on a legal error unrelated to actual innocence. As a matter of first impression in Colorado, we conclude that an error involving the failure to ensure juror unanimity is a legal error unrelated to the person's actual innocence. Because appellant William Andrew Coyle's conviction was reversed on only that ground, he is ineligible to file a petition for compensation under the Act.1
¶ 2 Because we also reject Coyle's contention that the Act precludes a motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), we affirm the district court's judgment granting the State's partial motion to dismiss his petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
¶ 3 Coyle was charged with sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust and attempted sexual assault on a child. The alleged victim testified that Coyle touched her inappropriately on two occasions. At trial, the jury instructions did not specify which act applied to which charge, and the prosecutor did not explain to the jury which incident constituted the alleged completed assault and which incident constituted the alleged attempted assault. The jury acquitted Coyle of the completed sexual assault charge but convicted him of the attempted sexual assault charge.
¶ 4 Coyle appealed his conviction on the ground that the trial court plainly erred by not requiring the prosecution to elect which act it relied on to support the attempted sexual assault charge or, alternatively, by not instructing the jurors that they must unanimously agree that Coyle committed a specific act or that he committed all the alleged acts (i.e., a modified unanimity instruction). A division of this court agreed, discerning "a reasonable likelihood that the jurors disagreed upon which act Coyle committed to support the attempted sexual assault on a child conviction." People v. Coyle , slip op. at 7-8, 2015 WL 3407619 (Colo. App. No. 12CA2600, May 28, 2015) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f) ) ( Coyle I ). The division reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial on the attempt charge — subject to the trial court's consideration of whether a new trial would violate Coyle's double jeopardy rights because it was unclear which incident was the subject of his acquittal.
¶ 5 On remand, the parties agreed that another trial would violate Coyle's double jeopardy rights. The trial court thus granted Coyle's motion to dismiss the attempt charge.
¶ 6 Following dismissal of the criminal case, Coyle filed a petition for compensation under the Act. As pertinent here, he sought compensation for the time he spent in prison, the time he spent on the sex offender registry, child support payments that became due while he was incarcerated, interest on child support arrearages that accrued during his incarceration, and reasonable attorney fees.
¶ 7 The State moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that Coyle's conviction was reversed for legal error unrelated to actual innocence. He countered that the Coyle I division had reversed his conviction based on his actual innocence. The district court agreed with the State and granted the motion to dismiss.
¶ 8 Coyle moved for reconsideration on the basis that the court should have denied the motion to dismiss on procedural grounds. He argued the Act provides that, if the State objects to the relief sought in a petition, the State must file a response as prescribed by the Act and the court must hold a trial. The district court again disagreed. The court concluded that C.R.C.P. 12, which permits motions to dismiss, governs this action.
¶ 9 Coyle first contends that, by granting the State's motion to dismiss, the district court departed from the procedure the Act requires. According to Coyle, section 13-65-102(5)(d)(II), C.R.S. 2020, creates a unique process that limits the bases for challenging a petition either to the facts supporting actual innocence or to the petitioner's eligibility for compensation. He reasons that, because both grounds trigger the right to a trial, the Act necessarily requires a trial on all contested petitions and forbids granting a motion to dismiss. See § 13-65-102(6)(b).2 Coyle is mistaken.
¶ 10 Coyle's argument raises questions of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. McCoy v. People , 2019 CO 44, ¶ 37, 442 P.3d 379. In construing any statute, we seek to ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly's intent. Martin v. People , 27 P.3d 846, 851 (Colo. 2001). To do so, we begin with the plain language of the statute, reading the words and phrases in context and construing them according to their common usage. McCulley v. People , 2020 CO 40, ¶ 10, 463 P.3d 254. We also consider the statutory scheme "as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts." McCoy , ¶ 38. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it as written without resorting to other means of discerning legislative intent. People v. Huckabay , 2020 CO 42, ¶ 13, 463 P.3d 283.
¶ 11 Because Coyle's argument concerns the proper procedure under the Act, we provide an overview of the Act.
¶ 12 The Act is found in Article 65 of Title 13; this article is titled "Compensation for Certain Exonerated Persons." The General Assembly itself authored this title. See Ch. 409, sec. 2, §§ 13-65-101 to -103, 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws 2412-23; see also In re Title, Ballot Title, & Submission Clause for 2009-2010, No. 24 , 218 P.3d 350, 353-54 (Colo. 2009) (). Consistent with this title, the Act creates a civil claim for relief aimed at compensating certain people wrongfully convicted of and incarcerated for felonies, but it erects procedural and substantive barriers to limit those who are entitled to relief. See § 13-65-102(1) ; Abu-Nantambu-El v. State , 2018 COA 30, ¶ 12, 433 P.3d 101.
¶ 13 First, the Act sets forth threshold eligibility requirements for filing a petition. Abu-Nantambu-El , ¶¶ 13-14. "A petition may be filed ... only" in the following circumstances: (1) "[w]hen no further criminal prosecution of the petitioner for the crimes charged, or for crimes arising from the same criminal episode in the case that is the subject of the petition, has been initiated"; (2) after a court vacates or reverses "all convictions in the case based on reasons other than legal insufficiency of evidence or legal error unrelated to the petitioner's actual innocence"; (3) after "an order of dismissal of all charges" or "an acquittal of all charges after retrial"; and (4) no more than two years have passed since the first three conditions have been met. § 13-65-102(2).3
¶ 14 Second, after satisfying these requirements for filing a petition, the petitioner must then demonstrate eligibility for compensation. Abu-Nantambu-El , ¶ 14. The petitioner must prove that the petitioner (1) meets the Act's definition of "actual innocence," § 13-65-102(4)(a)(I), see § 13-65-101(1)(a), C.R.S. 2020;4 and (2) is not ineligible for compensation for various enumerated reasons — for instance, because the petitioner committed perjury or pleaded guilty in the case at issue to avoid prosecution in another case, § 13-65-102(4)(a)(II) -(III).
¶ 15 If the State elects to admit the petition's allegations, the Act permits the State to file a "response" to that effect. § 13-65-102(5)(d)(I). In such a case, the district court must enter a final order finding the petitioner to be actually innocent. § 13-65-102(5)(d)(I) & (6)(a).
¶ 16 If, however, the State elects to contest "the nature, significance, or effect of the evidence of actual innocence, the facts related to the petitioner's alleged wrongful conviction, or whether the petitioner is eligible to seek compensation," the State must file a "response" to that effect and recite facts necessary to understand why the petition is being contested. § 13-65-102(5)(d)(II). Where the State contests "the petitioner's declaration of actual innocence or his or her eligibility for compensation ... or both, the district court shall set the matter for a trial." § 13-65-102(6)(b). Either party may elect to try the matter to a jury of six; otherwise, the district court hears the petition. Id.
¶ 17 The petitioner bears the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence "that he or she is actually innocent of all crimes that are the subject of the petition, and that he or she is eligible to receive compensation." Id. If the petitioner satisfies this burden as to both elements, the district court must award the petitioner compensation pursuant to section 13-65-103, C.R.S. 2020. § 13-65-102(6)(b).
¶ 18 Finally, Colorado's rules of civil procedure apply to a petition except as otherwise provided in the Act. § 13-65-102(5)(g).
¶ 19 The State moved to dismiss on the ground that Coyle did not satisfy the threshold requirements for filing a petition because his conviction was...
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