Stiehl v. State
Decision Date | 13 June 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 57825,No. 3,57825,3 |
Citation | 585 S.W.2d 716 |
Parties | Henry Stephen STIEHL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
John T. Montford, Lubbock, for appellant.
Alton R. Griffin, Dist. Atty. and John C. Kilpatrick, Asst. Dist. Atty., Lubbock, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before ODOM, PHILLIPS and W. C. DAVIS, JJ.
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated robbery wherein punishment was assessed at 40 years. In various grounds of error appellant complains of the trial court's refusal to dismiss the indictment because he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment by his pretrial confinement conditions; the exclusion of evidence of those conditions at the punishment phase in mitigation of punishment; denial of his motion for change of venue; refusal to appoint a psychiatrist to examine appellant; and denial of a limiting charge on extraneous offenses.
On January 26, 1976, two masked, rifle-bearing gunmen, one of whom was later identified as appellant, entered a United Super Market in Lubbock. They robbed the checkers and store manager of some $8500 in cash and then were interrupted by police responding to a silent alarm as they started to leave. In the ensuing confusion they dropped the money but managed to escape temporarily by taking two hostages.
After a brief automobile chase, however, they were captured when a police car rammed their car.
Appellant asserts that the indictment should have been dismissed because the conditions of his pretrial confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his constitutional rights. Appellant was a named plaintiff, along with other inmates in the Lubbock County Jail, in a federal suit against the Lubbock County Commissioners, the County Sheriff, and the Texas Commission on Jail Standards, alleging violations of their rights because of these conditions. They were successful in this action and a Memorandum Opinion was issued ordering various actions to correct deficiencies in living conditions and security in the jail.
Appellant's complaint is that the trial judge refused to give him relief in the present case for his confinement conditions. He asserts that dismissal of the indictment is the only appropriate remedy that would give effect to the constitutional rights involved and while such a remedy is extreme, it is not unusual. He likens his case to Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 93 S.Ct. 2260, 37 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973), wherein the United States Supreme Court emphasized that dismissal of the indictment is the only remedy for failure to grant a speedy trial. That opinion merely reinforces Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), which first established this remedy for violations of the speedy trial right. Appellant's attempt to link his claims of constitutional violations with the Strunk/Barker remedy of dismissal is not well taken. The Barker court stated:
"The right to a speedy trial is generically different from any of the other rights enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of the accused." 407 U.S. at 519, 92 S.Ct. at 2186.
The Court then enumerated some of the reasons why this was so and arrived at the conclusion that:
407 U.S. at 522, 92 S.Ct. at 2188.
Thus, the Supreme Court adopted this "unsatisfactorily severe" remedy because it was the only one possible. There are, however, other remedies available in instances where an individual has been subjected to cruel and unusual jail conditions prior to trial, as amply illustrated by the present case. Appellant participated in a federal suit against those in charge of the jail for the purpose of obtaining injunctive relief to correct jail conditions and monetary damages. The monetary claim was denied but injunctive relief was granted and the defendants were ordered to immediately begin correcting the deficiencies. Any constitutional rights violated by the conditions of appellant's pretrial confinement were vindicated by the suit in which he participated and it is not necessary to resort to the extreme remedy of dismissing the indictment.
Next, appellant contends that he should have been allowed to introduce at the punishment phase evidence of the conditions in the Lubbock County Jail for the purpose of mitigation of punishment. Article 37.07, V.A.C.C.P. This contention is without merit. This Court stated in Allaben v. State, 418 S.W.2d 517, 519, "Evidence legally admissible to mitigate punishment or evidence that is relevant to the application for probation, if any, is also admissible." The factors that can be introduced in mitigation are either statutory, such as temporary insanity caused by intoxication, V.T.C.A., Penal Code Sec. 8.04(b), and all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding a murder or voluntary manslaughter, V.T.C.A., Penal Code Sec. 19.06, Brazile v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 497 S.W.2d 302, or are judicially created and related closely to the statutory factors, such as testimony about church membership as relating to character in an application for probation case, Miller v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 442 S.W.2d 340. All these factors have in common a relationship to the circumstances of the offense itself or to the defendant himself before or at the time of the offense. Factors which arise after the offense and independently of the defendant should not be allowed into evidence in mitigation of punishment. In the instant case, the circumstances of appellant's pretrial confinement had nothing to do with the offense for which he was prosecuted nor with any of the statutory mitigating factors. They were properly the subject of an entirely separate action.
Appellant asserts that the refusal to grant a change of venue was error because the publicity was such that it was impossible for him to receive a fair trial in Lubbock County. The applicant for a change of venue bears a heavy burden of proving the existence of such prejudice in the community that the likelihood of obtaining a fair and impartial jury is doubtful. James v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 546 S.W.2d 306.
The publicity appellant complains of concerned to a small degree the crime itself but to a much greater extent it dealt with the federal lawsuit over the jail conditions. As evidence appellant presented approximately 68...
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