Stiles v. Beed

• Decision Date: 11 March 1911
• Citation: 151 Iowa 86,130 N.W. 376
• Parties: STILES v. BEED ET AL. (EAMES ET AL., INTERVENERS).
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

151 Iowa 86

130 N.W. 376

STILES

v.BEED ET AL. (EAMES ET AL., INTERVENERS).

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 11, 1911.

Appeal from District Court, Franklin County; Charles E. Albrook, Judge.

Action to establish right to property resulted in decree as prayed. The defendants and interveners appeal. Affirmed.John M. Hemingway, for appellants.

E. P. Andrews, David Evans, and B. H. Mallory, for interveners.

Lundy & Wood and Clock & Clock, for appellee.

LADD, J.

E. S. Stiles died intestate and without issue November 22, 1908. He left lots in Hampton and certain personal property derived from the sale of land. These lots and land were acquired by conveyance from his wife, Harriet, October 18, 1897. The defendants are the heirs of decedent and claim all the property by inheritance. The interveners are the heirs of Mrs. Stiles, and contend (1) that the deeds purporting to convey to decedent the lots and land were never delivered, and (2) that, if delivered, they were procured by undue influence exerted upon her by the grantee therein, and prayed that, as her heirs, they be awarded the property left by decedent. The plaintiff is the son of one Jones, and claims the property under a contract alleged to have been entered into by decedent in February or March, 1867, by the terms of which he was to live with decedent until attaining his majority, and upon decedent's death was to take all his property as though his own son. In disposing of the case the appeal of interveners may be considered first, and then that of defendants.

1. At the time Mrs. Stiles signed and acknowledged the deeds conveying the lots and land to her husband, October 18, 1897, she was 79 years of age, and her husband about 10 years younger. She had been bedfast for some time, and so continued until her death in 1901. The evidence is conclusive that she was a well-educated woman and above the average in intelligence. One witness testified that her mind was impaired and her conversation incoherent, but this was successfully controverted by the overwhelming weight of evidence. Nor are we inclined to accept the conclusion of another witness that she was in fear of her husband. Though he was often what the witnesses denominate “grouchy,” the record bears convincing proof of his kindness, patience, and devotion to his wife throughout the period of her affliction. The situation then was this: The wife, though in full possession of her mental faculties and 79 years of age, was bedfast and cared for exclusively by the husband. Should it be inferred therefrom that in executing the deeds to him without consideration, other than that of affection, she was unduly influenced by him? Section 3157 of the Code enacts that: “A conveyance, transfer, or lien executed by either husband or wife to or in favor of the other shall be valid to the same extent as between other persons.” The mere relationship, then, is not enough to raise the presumption of undue influence. There must be something in addition thereto, as that one or the other is weakminded, as in Paulus v. Reed, 121 Iowa, 224, 96 N. W. 757, or, owing to the physical condition or surroundings, the one is rendered peculiarly susceptible to the control of the other. Notwithstanding the emancipation of the wife in her property rights, her situation and the nature of the relation exposes her to the machinations of a designing husband. When the relation is normal, she is affectionately anxious to please him. “When he commands, she obeys; when he persuades, she yields; when he gently hints a wish, she grants. When treated almost as a servant, when governed and corrected as a child, as did our sturdy ancestors, or when confided in as a companion and equal, her will is subdued to her lord. * * * Modern legislation has materially changed the common law respecting the rights and disabilities incident to the marriage relation. But the unity of person remains, resting on a foundation older than the common law, and the husband's influence over his wife, so strongly expressed by the common-law writers, will end only with the marriage relation itself.” Darlington's Appeal, 86 Pa. 512, 27 Am. Rep. 726.Said Gibson, C. J., in Weeks v. Haas, 48 Ark. 409, 3 S. W. 520: “Her dependence on him is more entire than the dependence incident to any other of the domestic relations; and the law relaxes its grasp on no means within its power to prevent him from misusing it.” In Boyd v. De La Montagnie, 73 N. Y. 498, 29 Am. Rep. 197, in discussing the proposition, Church, C. J., declared that: “A court of equity will interpose its jurisdiction to set aside instruments between persons occupying relations in which one party may naturally exercise an influence over the conduct of another. A husband occupies such a relation to the wife, and the equitable principles referred to would apply to them in respect to gratuitous transfers by the wife to the husband, however it might be in ordinary business transactions, which the wife may legally engage in. When this relation exists, the person obtaining the benefit must show, by the clearest evidence, that the gift was freely and deliberately made. The burden is upon the person taking the gift to show that the transaction was fair and proper.” 21 Cyc. 1293.

But for other evidence we should be inclined to regard the situation such as to justify the inference of undue influence. The wife was wholly dependent upon the husband for physical care and comfort, and, as said, the deeds were likely a gift to him. But such an inference is fairly overcome by the evidence adduced. It clearly shows that the purpose of so conveying the property had long been cherished by the wife. She had so stated to a neighbor repeatedly, and even the witness who thought her in fear of her husband testified that she had confided this much to her. She told of making the conveyances after this was done without apparent regret, and the lawyer who took the acknowledgmentsnoticed nothing of hesitancy in her manner, though he remarked on the comely appearance of her hair. Moreover, she had joined the husband in the agreement hereinafter discussed, and these transfers did not divert the property from going to plaintiff as both had designed. The conveyances were voluntary.

2. Nor is there any ground for the interveners' contention that the deeds were never delivered. These were signed and acknowledged and appear to have been recorded March 6, 1901, shortly after the grantor's death. Probably they were handed to the recorder by the grantee, as assumed by interveners, but of this there was no evidence. The suggestion that they were found by him among the grantor's effects after death, as in Reichart v. Wilhelm, 83 Iowa, 510, 50 N. W. 19, is gratuitous. Were Stiles in possession of the deeds, this was prima facie evidence of delivery. Parlin, O. & M. Co. v. Daniel, 111 Iowa, 640, 82 N. W. 1015;Courtney v. Courtney, 129 N. W. 52. So, too, delivery by the grantor is presumed from the recording of the deeds. Robinson v. Gould, 26 Iowa, 89;Craven v. Winter, 38 Iowa, 471;Foley v. Howard, 8 Iowa, 56;Hutton v. Smith, 88 Iowa, 238, 55 N. W. 326;McCrum v. McCrum, 127 Iowa, 540, 103 N. W. 771;Webb v. Webb, 130 Iowa, 457, 104 N. W. 438;Davis v. Hall, 128 Iowa, 647, 105 N. W. 122. Interveners argue that the reason for the presumption of delivery of a deed duly signed and acknowledged from possession or recording arises from the fact that one having paid a valuable consideration is presumed to have received the thing he bought at the time he parted therefrom. But the presumption arises without evidence of whether consideration has been paid. Of course, the presumption is rebuttable, and may be overcome by any satisfactory evidence. It is evidently based on the notion that, as only instruments duly delivered are recordable, such delivery should be inferred, rather than the surreptitious act of handing a deed never delivered to the recorder. Here the husband had sold the land and been in possession of the lots over seven years, and in the absence of any other evidence, save that of a neighbor saying the grantor told her she had transferred the land to her husband, we are of opinion there was sufficient proof of delivery. There was no error in dismissing interveners' petition.

3. That a contract as is alleged may be enforced was decided in Chehak v. Battles, 133 Iowa, 117, 110 N. W. 330, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1130. There the contract was in writing, while in this case oral evidence is relied on. The only difference is in the manner of proof. Such an agreement, if resting in parol, must be fully established by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. Wales v. Holden, 209 Mo. 552, 108 S. W. 89;In re Baner's Estate, 76 Neb. 652, 107 N. W. 993;Smith v. Lull (Mich.) 115 N. W. 1002. As remarked in Dicken v. McKinley, 163 Ill. 318, 45 N. E. 134, 54 Am. St. Rep. 471: “Such a contract, however, is looked upon with suspicion, and is only sustained when established by the clearest and strongest evidence.” And in Kinney v. Murray, 170 Mo. 700, 71 S. W. 199: “The proof of such a contract must be so cogent, clear, and forcible as to leave no reasonable doubt in the minds of the chancellor as to its terms and character.”

Samuel Jones, a shoemaker came to Hampton in 1866. In the fall of that year his wife died leaving two children, son and daughter. The record does not disclose what became of the latter, but the son is the plaintiff in this case, and now superintendent of the animals in Goldmar Bros. Show. He was born February 17, 1864, and lived with E. S. Stiles and wife at the Phœnix Hotel in Hampton, from March, 1867, until he was 21 years of age. It seems that in February or March, 1867, a party was about to start for Montana to prospect for gold, and Samuel Jones accompanied it. At that time North, one time county judge, N. B. Chapman, an attorney, and James Thompson, who had been county treasurer, resided at Hampton. North and Chapman are dead, but...