Webb v. Webb
| Decision Date | 12 July 1905 |
| Citation | 104 N.W. 438,130 Iowa 457 |
| Parties | MILES WEBB, ET AL., Appellants, v. JOSEPHINE WEBB, ET AL., Appellees |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Rehearing denied Friday, April 27, 1906.
Appeal from Linn District Court.-- HON. WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, Judge.
THIS is a controversy among the children and heirs at law of John W and Elizabeth Webb, deceased, over property which it is claimed at one time belonged to the parents, and which, it is said, was not equitably disposed of. The property now involved consists of a house and lot in the town of Marion and one hundred and fifteen acres of land in Linn county. The record title to the lot is in defendants Florence E. and Anabel Webb; to thirty-five acres of the land, in Florence E.; and to eighty acres, in Josephine, Anabel, and Florence. Plaintiffs contend that the deeds in which the mother was grantor were never delivered to the grantees therein named that the mother was of unsound mind when they were executed, and that they were obtained through undue influence. They also allege that the mother held title to the house and town lot in trust for all the heirs, and that the conveyance to Florence and Anabel did not discharge this trust, but that they held title in trust for all the children. This claim is based upon the assumption that the lot was purchased and the house built out of personal property received from her husband, which she held in trust for the children. Various allegations of fraud and conspiracy are charged, which need not be noticed at this time. The defendants denied practically all of the allegations of the petition. The trial court denied the relief asked by the plaintiffs, and they appeal.-- Affirmed.
Affirmed.
Jamison & Smyth, for appellants.
J. C. Davis and Smith & Smith, for appellees.
John W. Webb died in the year 1891. Before his death he made various provisions for his children, who are the parties to this litigation, giving certain ones personal property, and others real estate, and making a will whereby he devised to his wife, Elizabeth, who survived him, "all my personal property of every kind and description, to have to hold by her during her life; and at her death the same or whatever remains to be divided between my children equally between them." There is no controversy over the disposition made by John Webb of any of his property, save the personal estate bequeathed by the will. It is said that the widow invested it, or the proceeds thereof, in the house and lot in Marion, and that it stands as so much personalty to be distributed among the heirs equally, although the house and lot were deeded by the mother, before her death, to one of the defendants. Defendants contend that the will gave the mother the personal property absolutely, and that in any event no part of this property went into the Marion house and lot. It is further contended that the deed to this property was never delivered to the grantee named therein. The claims of undue influence and of unsoundness of mind are practically abandoned, but it is stoutly insisted that none of the deeds to the defendants were ever delivered. This, in short, is the case as presented to us; and it involves, as will be observed, mixed questions of law and fact.
We shall first take up the claim to the house and lot in Marion. The claims to this are two: First, it is insisted that it was purchased from proceeds of the personal estate left by John Webb, and should for the purposes of this case be treated as personalty; for the wife, Elizabeth, held the same in trust under the will for the benefit of all the children; second, it is contended that the deed from Mrs. Webb therefor was never delivered.
The first of these propositions depends primarily on the nature of the bequest made by John W. Webb in his will. If he bequeathed the personal property absolutely to his wife, then, of course, the investment of the proceeds thereof in the Marion property would not of itself avail plaintiffs, unless they show that Elizabeth died seised of the property. The will gave the property to the wife, Elizabeth, during her life, and provided that whatever remained at her death should go to his (testator's) children. This, of course, gave the widow implied power of disposition during her life, but it also limited her estate therein to one for life. The presumption is that the testator intended to pass his entire interest in the property to the legatee named. But he had the right to give but a life estate therein, with remainder over, if he saw fit, and also to confer upon the wife power of absolute disposition. The rule in this respect is the same, whether the property be real or personal. Godshalk v. Akey, 109 Mich. 350 (67 N.W. 336); Wooster v. Cooper, 53 N.J.Eq. 682 (33 A. 1050). Under our holdings the widow took but a life estate, with unlimited power of disposition added, as a separate gift; and, if she failed to exercise this power, the remainder upon her death passed to the children. In re Proctor's Estate, 95 Iowa 172, 63 N.W. 670. There is some confusion in our holdings on this subject, but the later cases announce the rule above stated. Law v. Douglass, 107 Iowa 606, 78 N.W. 212; In re Stumpenhousen's Estate, 108 Iowa 555, 79 N.W. 376; Spaan v. Anderson, 115 Iowa 121, 88 N.W. 200. So that the will gave the widow but a life estate, with power of disposition added, and all property left undisposed of at the time of her death passed to the remaindermen.
Appellees seem to concede that if part of this personalty, or the proceeds thereof, was invested in the house and lot in Marion, it is impressed with a trust for the benefit of all of the children, to the amount of such investments; but they deny that any of the property or money was so invested. This is purely a fact question, with the burden upon appellants of showing that there was an investment of the...
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