Stiles v. State

• Decision Date: 17 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 10-94-073-CR,10-94-073-CR
• Citation: 927 S.W.2d 723
• Parties: Michael Thomas STILES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 723

927 S.W.2d 723

Michael Thomas STILES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 10-94-073-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas Waco.

July 17, 1996.

Kathi A. Drew, Dallas, for appellant.

John C. Vance, Criminal District Attorney, Anne B. Wetherholt, Asst. District Attorney, Dallas, Robert Huttash, State's Attorney, Austin, for appellee.

Before CUMMINGS and VANCE, JJ.

OPINION

CUMMINGS, Justice.

Appellant Michael Thomas Stiles was convicted by a jury on one count of first degree injury to a child and was sentenced by the same jury to fifty years of confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04 (Vernon 1994). Stiles raises fifteen points on appeal. In point one he contends the State violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), by striking three members of the venire panel solely because of their race. In points two through five he argues the trial court erred in allowing his confession into evidence because it was obtained without Stiles having been read the statutory Miranda warnings. See TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 2 (Vernon 1979); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In points six through eleven Stiles contends the same confession was inadmissible because law enforcement officials, before taking the confession, refused to honor his request for the assistance of counsel during the interrogation. In point twelve Stiles maintains that the trial court erred in failing to file findings of fact and conclusions of law on the voluntariness of his confession. In points thirteen and fourteen Stiles argues the trial court erred in allowing evidence of extraneous offenses before the jury. And in his final point Stiles complains about improper jury argument. We affirm.

On November 29, 1993, the date of the offense, Stiles was living in a mobile home in Irving with his girlfriend, Paula Darlene Genzel, their two children, Michael Antoni Thomas Stiles (referred to by his parents as Antoni) and Andromeda Marie Stiles (nicknamed Andy), and Genzel's third child, Destiny Lynn Jackson, who was fathered by another man. Andy was three months old, Antoni was two years old, and Destiny was seven.

On the morning of November 29, Andy awoke around 7:30. Sometime between 8:00 and 8:30, Genzel, who had been feeling ill, asked Stiles if he would feed Andy, and he agreed. Stiles went into the kitchen to warm her bottle and asked Genzel to retrieve a clean diaper so that he could change her. Stiles then took Andy into the master bedroom and closed the door.

According to Stiles, he changed her diaper and then, after sitting down on the waterbed, he sat her in his lap and fed her baby formula from the bottle. After Andy drank a few ounces of formula, Stiles took the bottle away from her because he was afraid she would drink too much. Andy then began to fuss. Stiles then played with Andy for awhile until Antoni came into the bedroom. Stiles quickly ordered him to leave the bedroom. After Antoni left, Stiles fed Andy the rest of the bottle. Stiles then burped Andy, and she vomited on his shirt. Stiles became angry and threw her onto the waterbed. Andy's head struck a rail that ran alongside the bed. Andy screamed and began to choke. Stiles called for Genzel. Aside from the brief moment when Antoni ran into the bedroom, Stiles was alone in the bedroom with Andy with the door closed during the time of the events immediately preceding her injury. Stiles's confession constituted the only direct evidence of what occurred between him and Andy while in the bedroom.

When Genzel arrived in the room, Andy was blue. Genzel felt for a pulse and breathed into Andy's mouth. Andy vomited into Genzel's mouth. Genzel then tried breathing into Andy's nose. Genzel was unable to locate a pulse, but Andy occasionally convulsed and vomited during these convulsions.

At this time, Genzel asked Stiles to call for an ambulance. At first he refused, and Genzel tried to walk past him to leave the bedroom. Stiles, however, blocked her way, and Genzel fell. Stiles then changed his mind and telephoned for emergency assistance. Emergency-assistance personnel then gave instructions over the telephone on how to care for Andy, and Stiles relayed the instructions to Genzel, who followed them. Paramedics from the Irving Fire Department arrived soon thereafter and, upon examining Andy, were able to locate a pulse. Andy was first transported to Irving Hospital and then to Children's Hospital in Dallas. Andy was placed on life support at Children's Hospital and was ultimately declared dead on November 30, 1993, when her life support apparatus was removed. Dr. Jeffery Barnard, Chief Medical Examiner for Dallas County, determined that the cause of Andy's death was blunt force trauma to her head.

In his first point of error Stiles contends the trial court erred in overruling his motion to strike the jury panel after the State had improperly used three peremptory challenges allegedly in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 86, 106 S.Ct. at 1717. Stiles, who is white, complains that the State impermissibly struck three black veniremen, numbers 18, 23, and 25, solely because of their race. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409-10, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 1370, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (the holding in Batson is applicable to a white defendant who strikes black veniremen on the basis of their race).

When a Batson complaint is made to the trial court, the defendant has the initial burden of making a prima facie case of racial discrimination, thereby raising a presumption of a Batson violation. Harris v. State, 827 S.W.2d 949, 955 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 942, 113 S.Ct. 381, 121 L.Ed.2d 292 (1992). If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of discrimination, a "Batson hearing" is then held and the burden shifts to the State to present a race-neutral reason or reasons for striking the venireman. Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 688 n. 15 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 926, 113 S.Ct. 3046, 125 L.Ed.2d 731 (1993). Upon such presentation, the burden shifts back to the defendant to rebut the State's race-neutral reasons by refuting or impeaching the race-neutral reasons or showing that they are merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. It is at this third stage that the court determines whether the venireman, or veniremen, at issue was actually struck for a race-neutral reason. Purkett v. Elem, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1770, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995); Joseph v. State, 916 S.W.2d 657, 659-60 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no pet.).

During voir dire, Stiles made a prima facie showing that the State struck veniremen 18, 23, and 25 because they were black. A Batson hearing followed, and the State responded that it did not strike these veniremen because of their race. It asserted the fact that it had allowed three other black veniremen to sit on the jury demonstrated the State's lack of bias against black veniremen. The State also asserted that it struck veniremen 18, 23, and 25 because they all had relatives who had been in trouble with the law. The State asserted that: venireman 18's sister and brother-in-law had been tried for sexual abuse and found not guilty; that venireman 23 had a brother-in-law currently serving a sentence in the penitentiary for murder; ¹ and venireman 25's uncle was currently serving a jail sentence for check fraud. The State then further defended its strikes of veniremen 18, 23, and 25 by noting that it struck a white juror, venireman 3, whose son had been in trouble with the law on three occasions and was incarcerated at least twice, once for robbery and once for drug possession. ²

Stiles responded by noting that the State did not strike venireman 33, a white woman, whose nephew had been convicted of breaking and entering a habitation in San Antonio. Stiles also commented that since it was venireman 23's brother-in-law, not brother, who had been convicted of murder the connection between the two was not strong and would not have much effect on the venireman's objectivity. Stiles argued further that it is inconsistent for the State to allow venireman 33, a white woman, whose son had been convicted of burglary of a habitation, ³ to sit on the jury while the State struck venireman 25 whose uncle had been convicted of the less serious offense of check fraud. With regard to venireman 18, Stiles argued that she had stated she could be a fair and impartial juror; therefore, he contended that there was no reason to strike her.

The State responded that, concerning venireman 23, there is no meaningful difference between one's concern for his brother and one's concern for his brother-in-law. The State also noted that it was venireman 33's nephew, not son, who had been convicted of burglary in San Antonio. Moreover, the nephew was not serving any time in the penitentiary, but had been given a probated sentence. In addition, the State defended its failure to strike venireman 33 on the ground that her husband is the Fire Marshall in the City of Lancaster, which indicated to the State that she would be a strong State-oriented juror, especially due to the fact that the State intended to call medical personnel from the Irving Fire Department to testify.

We review the evidence adduced at Batson hearings in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Kemp v. State, 846 S.W.2d 289, 304 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 918, 113 S.Ct. 2361, 124 L.Ed.2d 268 (1993). A trial judge's finding that the State exercised its strikes in a race-neutral manner will not be overturned unless such ruling is clearly erroneous. Id. The trial court's ruling will be found to be clearly erroneous only if no plausible basis exists to support it. See Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707, 721-22 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (on rehearing) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, ...