Stiller v. Bohn Manufacturing Company
| Decision Date | 25 May 1900 |
| Docket Number | 12,155 - (237) [2] |
| Citation | 82 N.W. 981,80 Minn. 1 |
| Parties | PAUL STILLER v. BOHN MANUFACTURING COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Ramsey county to recover $10,000 damages for personal injuries to plaintiff's minor son. The case was tried before Bunn, J., and a jury, which rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $4,500. The court made an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but granting a new trial unless plaintiff consented to a reduction of the verdict to $3,500. Plaintiff having consented to the reduction, defendant appealed from the order. Affirmed on conditions.
Defective Machinery.
This is an action brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff's minor son by the negligence of the defendant in not furnishing reasonably safe machinery for his use as its servant. Held:
Negligence -- Assumption of Risk.
1. That the verdict herein to the effect that the defendant was negligent in the premises, that the plaintiff's son was not, and that he did not assume the risks incident to the use of the defective machinery, is sustained by the evidence.
Reasonably Safe Machinery Sufficient.
2. That an employer is not bound to furnish for his workmen the safest and best appliances and machinery in general use. It is sufficient if his own be reasonably safe.
Charge to Jury.
3. That the trial court did not err in charging the jury to the effect that the master was not bound to use the latest and best machinery, but if his own in fact was not reasonably safe, and there was safer machinery in general use, and he did not provide it, the jury would be justified in finding that he did not use ordinary care under the circumstances.
Verdict Excessive.
4. That the award of damages was excessive.
Morton Barrows and Davis, Kellogg & Severance, for appellant.
A master is bound to use reasonable care to provide his servant with reasonably safe tools, implements, and instrumentalities, and it is the concurrent duty of the employee to observe his surroundings, implements, and machinery and the incidental risks; and if, by reason of his inattention, he is injured, he cannot recover. Chicago v Kane, 50 Ill.App. 100; Scharenbroich v. St. Cloud F Co., 59 Minn. 116. Opportunity of knowledge is equivalent to actual knowledge. McDugan v. New York, 10 Misc. (N.Y.) 336. It is sufficient if the tools, materials, and facilities are reasonably suitable for the prosecution of the work, and could be used with reasonable safety if the workman exercised ordinary care. Williams v. St. Louis, 119 Mo. 316; Bajus v. Syracuse, 103 N.Y. 312; Fosburg v. Phillips, 93 Iowa 54; Chicago v. Garner, 78 Ill.App. 281; Jones v. Granite, 126 Mass. 84. It is not necessary to adopt newer or safer improvements if those already in use can, in the exercise of ordinary care, be used with reasonable safety. Sweeney v. Berlin, 101 N.Y. 520; Wabash v. Webb, 146 Ind. 303; Rooney v. Sewall, 161 Mass. 153.
The servant is held to assume the ordinary risks incident to his employment, in so far as they may fairly be presumed to be within his knowledge, in the exercise of ordinary care. Doyle v. St. Paul M. & M. Ry. Co., 42 Minn. 79; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Everett, 152 U.S. 107; Reiter v. Winona & St. P.R. Co., 72 Minn. 225; Swanson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 68 Minn. 184; Soutar v. Minneapolis I.E. Co., 68 Minn. 18. The danger, if any, was as obvious to plaintiff as to defendant, and in such case the master is not liable. Smith v. Tromanhauser, 63 Minn. 98; Anderson v. C.N. Nelson L. Co., 67 Minn. 79; 1 Shearman & R. Neg. (4th Ed.) 375; Chicago v. Clark, 11 Ill.App. 104; Truntle v. North Star W.M. Co., 57 Minn. 52; Scharenbroich v. St. Cloud F. Co., supra; Lawson v. Truesdale, 60 Minn. 410. It is sufficient if the tools, machinery, and facilities are reasonably suitable and could be used with reasonable safety if the workman used ordinary care. Jones v. Granite, supra; Payne v. Reese, 100 Pa. St. 301; Cagney v. Hannibal, 69 Mo. 416; Illinois v. Jones, 11 Ill.App. 324; Fosburg v. Phillips, supra; Gormully v. Olsen, 72 Ill.App. 32; Disano v. New England, 20 R.I. 452. It follows that newer inventions and more improved safeguards need not be adopted. Sweeney v. Berlin, supra; Wabash v. Webb, supra; Shadford v. Ann Arbor, 111 Mich. 390; Rooney v. Sewall, supra; Salters v. President, 3 Hun, 338; McGinnis v. Canada, 49 Mich. 466.
The verdict should have been set aside on the ground of excessive damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion and prejudice. Gahagan v. Aermotor Co., 67 Minn. 252; Kennedy v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 59 Minn. 45; Slette v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 53 Minn. 341.
S. A. Anderson, for respondent.
This action was brought by the father, on behalf of his infant son (hereinafter designated as the plaintiff), to recover damages for personal injuries which the latter sustained by the alleged negligence of the defendant. There was a verdict for the plaintiff for $4,500, and the defendant made a motion for judgment not with-standing the verdict, or, in case that was denied, for a new trial. The trial court made its order denying the motion for judgment, but granting the motion for a new trial unless the plaintiff consented to a reduction of the verdict to $3,500. He so consented, and the defendant appealed from the order.
The plaintiff is a young man, -- twenty years old. He commenced working for the defendant on September 27, 1899. From this date to October 15, 1899, he operated a rip saw; occasionally running the planing and jointing machines. On the day last named he was sent to another part or floor of the defendant's manufactory, and set to work, under another foreman, upon a crosscut-saw machine, sawing blocks of wood, and was injured some three days thereafter by his hand coming in contact with the saw. The defendant urges on this appeal four general grounds or reasons why the order should be reversed. They are that there was no sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant to sustain the verdict; that it conclusively appears that the plaintiff assumed the risks of using the machine, and was guilty of contributory negligence; that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury; and, lastly, that the damages, as reduced, are still excessive.
1. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the finding of the jury that the defendant was guilty of negligence in furnishing the plaintiff an unsafe machine with which to work? We answer the question in the affirmative.
The machine in question consisted of a stationary circular saw, set in a table, which, when in use, revolved towards the operator at the rate of some three thousand times a minute. There was a slide, some five feet long and two and one-half feet wide, made of 2 by 4 pieces of pine, which moved back and forth on beveled rails or runners. One of these rails was placed at the further end of the slide from the saw, and the other eighteen inches from the saw. Between the underside of the slide next to the saw and the top of the table there was a space of about one-half of an inch, leaving eighteen inches in length of the slide next to the saw unsupported. The method of operating the machine is this: When the board or timber to be cut is placed in position on the slide, the operator standing to the right of the saw holds the board in place with his hands, and pushes the slide forward with his hip or side, bringing the board against the saw.
The evidence on the part of the plaintiff tends to show that on the third day after he had commenced to work on this machine he was sawing, in the usual manner, blocks three and one-half inches long from short pieces about five inches in length, when the slide suddenly jumped from its bearings on the rails and knocked his left hand into the saw, whereby his index finger was cut off, and his thumb and second finger injured; and, further, that when any material downward pressure was applied to the left or unsupported end of the slide the right or further end would be lifted from its rail so that the slide would swing around when the saw struck the board held by the operator, exposing him to the danger of his hand being caught in the saw, and that this was the way the plaintiff was injured.
If this machine was defective and unsafe because the end of the slide next to the saw was left unsupported, the evidence is sufficient to justify the jury in finding that the defendant did not use ordinary care in furnishing the plaintiff with a reasonably safe machine with which to work. The defect, if any, was patent, for the slide was simply a light, open frame. No claim is or can be made that there was any practical necessity for leaving the end of the slide next to the saw unsupported. The rail upon which it moved could have been placed at the end of the slide, instead of eighteen inches therefrom, thereby leaving a lever of that length with which to lift the other end of the slide from its bearings in case the operator inadvertently or otherwise pressed upon the lever while holding the board in place. The machine itself was received in evidence on the trial, and was exhibited on the argument of the case in this court. Counsel insist, with a degree of earnestness and positiveness calculated to beget confidence, and with undoubted candor, that the evidence fails to show that this machine was not a reasonably safe one. It must be conceded that the great preponderance of the expert evidence supports this claim. But the machine was in evidence. It was not a complicated one, and expert evidence was not necessary to enable the jury to determine whether the slide was a reasonably safe one upon which to hold with the hand...
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