Stiltjes v. Ridco Exterminating Co., Inc.

Decision Date15 November 1990
Docket NumberNo. A90A1425,A90A1425
Citation399 S.E.2d 708,197 Ga.App. 852
PartiesSTILTJES v. RIDCO EXTERMINATING COMPANY, INC.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, John R. Grimes, Atlanta, for appellant.

Gorby, Reeves, Moraitakis & Whiteman, Michael J. Gorby, Stephanie L. Scheier, Atlanta, for appellee.

McMURRAY, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiff Stiltjes, acting in her capacity as the administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, filed this action against defendant Ridco Exterminating Company, Inc. ("Ridco") and another corporation. The complaint seeks damages for the pain and suffering of plaintiff's decedent due to the alleged negligence of defendants.

In a previous action, plaintiff, in her individual capacity, sought damages from defendant Ridco (and additional defendants who were eliminated from the action before trial), for the wrongful death of her husband. A jury trial resulted in a verdict for defendant Ridco. In Stiltjes v. Ridco Exterminating Co., 192 Ga.App. 778, 386 S.E.2d 696 (1989), we affirmed the judgment in favor of defendant Ridco in the wrongful death action.

In the case sub judice, defendant Ridco moved for summary judgment, relying upon res judicata and collateral estoppel. Plaintiff appeals from the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Ridco. Held:

"OCGA § 9-12-40 provides that 'A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered until the judgment is reversed or set aside.' OCGA § 9-12-42 provides that 'For a former judgment to be a bar to subsequent action, the merits of the case must have been adjudicated.' These code sections together set out the basic principles of res judicata in Georgia. For res judicata to act as a bar of a subsequent action, the original and subsequent action must bear certain identical characteristics. The two actions must be between identical parties or their privies, and the cause of action in each suit must be identical. Collateral estoppel, like res judicata, requires identity of parties or privity. However, unlike res judicata, collateral estoppel does not require identity of the claim but only precludes readjudication of an issue already adjudicated between the parties or their privies in a prior action. Sumner v. Sumner, 186 Ga. 390 (197 SE 833) (1938)." Norris v. Atlanta & West Point R. Co., 254 Ga. 684, 333 S.E.2d 835 (1985).

The cause of action by the wife for the wrongful death of her husband is a separate and distinct cause of action from that of the deceased's estate for pain and suffering. Complete Auto Transit v. Floyd, 214 Ga. 232, 235(2), 104 S.E.2d 208 (1958). Thus, the claim asserted in the case sub judice is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Directing our attention to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, we note that, as with res judicata, identity of parties or their privies is required in order to act as a bar to a second lawsuit. Mills v. Roberts, 172 Ga.App. 77, 78, 322 S.E.2d 93 (1984). This brings us to the question of whether plaintiff, acting in her fiduciary capacity in the case sub judice, is the same party as plaintiff acting in her individual capacity in the wrongful death action. We find that plaintiff Stiltjes in her individual capacity and in her capacity as administratrix are legally different persons. Stanley v. Dominy, 196 Ga. 192(1), 26 S.E.2d 355 (1943); Anderson Oil Co. v. Benton Oil Co., 246 Ga. 304, 306, fn. 6, 271 S.E.2d 207 (1980). Since the individual plaintiff in the former action did not represent the administratrix, nor did the administratrix claim any right under the individual, the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
16 cases
  • Rollins v. LOR, Inc., A18A0638
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • May 21, 2018
    ...in the earlier suit, it was as representatives of their adopted son rather than as individuals); Stiltjes v. Ridco Exterminating Co. , 197 Ga. App. 852, 853, 399 S.E.2d 708 (1990) (holding that collateral estoppel did not bar the litigation of an issue because the plaintiff, currently actin......
  • Allen v. Morrow (In re Morrow)
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. Eleventh Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • February 24, 2014
    ...Ga. 774, 777, 545 S.E.2d 898, 900 (2001); Stott v. Mody, 257 Ga.App. 738, 572 S.E.2d 83, 85 (2002); Stiltjes v. Ridco Exterminating Co., Inc., 197 Ga.App. 852, 399 S.E.2d 708 (Ga.App.1990). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the necessary elements of collateral estoppel have bee......
  • Gish v. Thomas
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • March 17, 2010
    ...capacities are not substantially identical. Sheldon, 184 Ga. at 440-441(1), (3), 191 S.E. 497; Stiltjes v. Ridco Exterminating Co., 197 Ga.App. 852, 853, 399 S.E.2d 708 (1990) (finding that plaintiff in her individual capacity and in her capacity as administratrix are legally different pers......
  • Stogniew v. McQueen
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • May 4, 1995
    ...for both offensive and defensive collateral estoppel. Jones v. Blanton, 644 So.2d 882 (Ala.1994); Stiltjes v. Ridco Exterminating Co., 197 Ga.App. 852, 399 S.E.2d 708 (1990), aff'd, 261 Ga. 697, 409 S.E.2d 847 (1991); Molokai Homesteaders Co-op Ass'n v. Cobb, 63 Haw. 453, 629 P.2d 1134 (198......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT