Stinson v. Allstate Ins. Co.

• Citation: 441 S.E.2d 453,212 Ga.App. 179
• Decision Date: 11 February 1994
• Docket Number: No. A93A1966,A93A1966
• Parties: STINSON et al. v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)

Page 453

441 S.E.2d 453

212 Ga.App. 179

STINSON et al. v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

No. A93A1966.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Feb. 11, 1994.

Reconsideration Denied Feb. 25, 1994.

Certiorari Denied April 7, 1994.

Sell & Melton, Russell M. Boston, Macon, for appellants.

Thompson & Smith, Larry I. Smith, Augusta, for appellees.

JOHNSON, Judge.

While under the influence of drugs and alcohol, Richard Patrick Kaminski fired a high-powered hunting rifle seven times through the front door of the house in which his sister and former wife lived. One of the bullets hit and instantly killed Timothy Stinson, a cousin of his former wife. Kaminski pled guilty to one count of involuntary manslaughter and two counts of aggravated assault. Subsequently, John and Winifred Stinson, the parents of the deceased, brought a wrongful death action against Kaminski indirectly seeking recovery under a homeowner's insurance policy issued by Allstate to Kaminski's parents, with whom Kaminski allegedly lived at the time of the shooting. Allstate filed this declaratory judgment action, asserting that there is no coverage under the policy for the criminal acts committed by Kaminski while he was a resident of his parents' household. Following a jury trial, the court entered judgment on the jury's verdict, which found that Allstate has no duty to defend or indemnify its insured, Richard Patrick Kaminski, in any suit or for any damages arising from an incident in which Timothy Stinson sustained fatal injuries. The Stinsons appeal.

1. In their first enumeration of error, the Stinsons assert that the trial court erred "in failing to construe the exclusionary clause against the insurer by instructing the jury that coverage is excluded only if the insured (Kaminski) should have known that injury would have likely resulted from acts which were intentional or criminal on his part."

The exclusion in the policy is stated as follows: "We do not cover any bodily injury or property damage which may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts of an insured person or which are in fact intended by an insured person." The Stinsons and their co-defendants argued to the trial court that the language of the exclusion means that the bodily injury or property damage had to be reasonably expected by the actor who committed the intentional or criminal act. Stated differently, "[w]ould Kaminski have reasonably expected bodily injury or property damage to result from his intentional or criminal acts?" Allstate argues that the exclusion does not ask whether the insured reasonably expected the injury or property damage, but rather whether an objective factfinder would have reasonably expected the injury or damage to occur as a result of the insured's acts. Stated differently, "Would an objective person reasonably expect injury or damage to result from the intentional or criminal acts of the actor?"

The trial court found that particular language of the exclusion to be ambiguous and submitted the issue to the jury. This particular part of the exclusion has not been analyzed in detail by this court as far as our research reveals. However, in construing the same exclusion, Judge Beasley noted in her special concurrence in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jarvis, 195 Ga.App. 335, 393 S.E.2d 489 (1990) that "[t]he policy additionally provides that even where the insured did not have, in fact (that is to say, no actual ), intent to injure, acts are excluded from coverage if they may 'reasonably be expected to result....' The more universal objective test rather than the subjective intent of the insured pertains to this branch of the exclusion." Id. at 338, 393 S.E.2d 489. The majority's discussion in Jarvis, however, focuses upon the second phrase of the exclusion and the question of whether, under the facts of that case, the act itself was intentional or criminal. It allows a jury to consider an expert witness' testimony regarding the state of mind of the insured.

We do not agree with the trial court in its finding that the phrase at issue in this case is ambiguous. The common understanding of the words "which may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts of an insured person" clearly creates a universal objective standard, as Judge Beasley noted in Jarvis. Therefore, this phrase being unambiguous, and its plain meaning being that urged here by Allstate, the refusal of ...