Stith v. State, A91A1375
Decision Date | 02 October 1991 |
Docket Number | No. A91A1375,A91A1375 |
Citation | 201 Ga.App. 621,411 S.E.2d 532 |
Parties | STITH v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
John H. Tarpley, Decatur, for appellant.
Paul N. Stith, pro se.
Robert E. Wilson, Dist. Atty., Barbara B. Conroy, J. Michael McDaniel, Nelly F. Withers, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee.
Following denial of his motion for new trial, Stith appeals his convictions for kidnapping, OCGA § 16-5-40(a), armed robbery, OCGA § 16-8-41(a), aggravated assault, OCGA § 16-5-21(a), hindering the apprehension of a criminal, OCGA § 16-10-50, and possession of firearm during commission of a crime, OCGA § 16-11-106.
and allowing the State to reopen its case so the victim could make an in-court identification based on the sound of appellant's voice as listened to by the victim while appellant was testifying. The complaint is that the procedure violated the rule of sequestration, was an improper re-opening of the case rather than rebuttal, and was unduly suggestive.
First, Chastain v. State, 255 Ga. 723, 724(2), 342 S.E.2d 678 (1986).
Discretion was not abused because the purpose of the rule was not compromised. Almond v. State, 173 Ga.App. 423, 424(1), 326 S.E.2d 798 (1985). Here, the victim was not recalled following appellant's testimony in order to further or alter the substance of his own recounting of the incident in light of the substance of appellant's testimony. He was recalled merely to testify about the similarity of the sound of the witness' voice to the sound of the gunman's voice during commission of the crimes. Identification was the issue, not the content of appellant's overheard testimony.
Second, assuming the additional testimony by the victim was a re-opening of the State's case rather than a rebuttal, Aikens v. State, 194 Ga.App. 195, 196(2), 390 S.E.2d 102 (1990).
Lastly, the contention that the voice identification was unduly suggestive under a Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972) analysis is unavailing. There has been no showing of a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. See Martin v. State, 193 Ga.App. 581, 582(1), 388 S.E.2d 420 (1989). Moreover, such an in-court voice identification in and of itself is no more or less suggestive than the common visual identification of a criminal defendant by a victim as the defendant sits at the defense table.
There was no error in allowing the victim to hear the appellant's testimony, in permitting the State to recall the victim, and in admitting the victim's identification of the appellant by his voice.
Appellant raises the objected-to in-court voice identification, which has been ruled on in Division 1. Even were such voice identification excluded, there was other evidence linking appellant to the crimes.
Appellant's co-defendant, who had already pled guilty to...
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Jefferson v. State
...was admissible under the test of Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). See Stith v. State, 201 Ga.App. 621, 622, 411 S.E.2d 532 (1991). The voice identification procedure employed by the police was the equivalent of using a one-person show-up for an eyewitness ......
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...visual identification of a criminal defendant by a victim as the defendant sits at the defense table." Stith v. State, 201 Ga. App. 621, 622; 411 S.E. 2d 532, 533 (Ga. App. 1991). Moreover, there is no entitlement to an in-court line-up or other method of lessening the suggestiveness of an ......
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Hornsby v. State
...on the sound of defendant's voice. The victim's in-court voice identification of defendant in rebuttal was admissible. Stith v. State, 201 Ga.App. 621(1), 411 S.E.2d 532. That the victim was unable to identify defendant previously was a matter which went to the weight, not the admissibility......