Stockbridge v. Mixer
| Decision Date | 18 June 1913 |
| Citation | 102 N.E. 646,215 Mass. 415 |
| Parties | STOCKBRIDGE v. MIXER et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Withdrawn from Files and Returned September 11, 1913.
Wm M. Stockbridge, of Boston, pro se.
G. W Anderson, of Boston, for plaintiff.
Gleason & Higgins, of Boston, for defendants.
This is a suit in equity under R. L. c. 159, § 3, cl. 7. The plaintiff alleges a debt due to him from two of the three defendants for services rendered, which has not been reduced to a judgment. He seeks to reach and apply in payment of this debt an interest owing to the principal defendants from the third defendant, which cannot be attached or seized in an action at law.
The first question is whether the defendant debtors are entitled as matter of right to a trial by jury. The nature and history of the relief afforded by clause 7 is set out at length in Pettibone v. Toledo, Cincinnati & St. Louis R. R Co., 148 Mass. 411, 19 N.E. 337, 1 L. R. A. 787. It there was held that the purpose of the statute was not to create a jurisdiction over 'a creditor's bill, in the sense in which those words are used in the practice of courts of chancery.' Speaking generally, such a bill(except where the estate of a deceased person was involved) could be brought only by a creditor who had secured a judgment at law and who was unable to obtain satisfaction of it, and must be instituted not only for himself but for all other creditors who might come in and be parties to the suit. Jurisdiction to entertain a bill, like that provided by clause 7, does not fall under any general head of equity jurisprudence. Hence it was not affected by the later statute conferring full equity jurisdiction. Barry v. Abbot, 100 Mass. 396; Tucker v. McDonald, 105 Mass. 423. The proceeding has been said to be 'in the nature of an equitable trustee process, as distinguished from a creditor's bill.' Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 127 Mass. 558. The distinction between the special relief afforded by this clause of the statute and that arising under general equity jurisprudence has been referred to many times. Carver v. Peck, 131 Mass. 291; Maguire v. Spaulding, 194 Mass. 601, 604, 80 N.E. 587; Chapman v. Banker & Tradesman Publishing Co., 128 Mass. 478; Geer v. Horton, 159 Mass. 259, 34 N.E. 269; Wilson v. Martin-Wilson Automatic Fire Alarm Co., 151 Mass. 515, 517, 24 N.E. 784, 8 L. R. A. 309; Weil v. Raymond, 142 Mass. 206, 213, 7 N.E. 860. In other cases the remedy established by this statute has been said to be 'not in itself a subject of equitable jurisdiction' ( Hoshor-Platt Co. v. Miller, 190 Mass. 285, 286, 76 N.E. 650), nor like 'a creditor's bill under general equity practice' (Snyder v. Smith, 185 Mass. 58, 62, 69 N.E. 1089).
This clause of the statute combines in a single proceeding two different matters or steps in procedure, one at law and the other in equity. The first is the establishment of an indebtedness on the part of the principal defendant to the plaintiff. The second is the process for collecting the debt when established, out of property rights which cannot be reached on an execution. In essence the first is an action at common law and the second a well recognized head of relief in chancery. Under the circumstances disclosed in the case at bar the plaintiff's initial claim for services rendered by him to two of the defendants presents purely an action at common law. If the plaintiff fails in this respect his bill must be dismissed. If, however, he establishes the indebtedness, then he will be in position to take advantage of the second part of the statute, which relates solely to relief and which is equitable in its nature. The case falls midway between a creditor's bill as known in chancery and the relief afforded by R. L. c. 159, § 3, cl. 8, which as pointed out in Powers v. Raymond, 137 Mass. 483, combines in one suit in equity two essentially legal proceedings. As was demonstrated by the illuminating judgment in Parker v. Simpson, 180 Mass. 334, 62 N.E. 401, the Constitution preserves the right of trial by jury as it was understood and practiced at common law and therefore there is no constitutional right to such trial respecting matters cognizable under the general principles of chancery. Nordoes it exist as to rights gratuitously created by the legislature. Sawyer v. Commonwealth, 182 Mass. 245, 65 N.E. 52, 59 L. R. A. 726. Where the right to trial by jury has the protection of the Constitution because connected with an action at common law, a party cannot be deprived of...
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